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iv Abstract
Abstract
The growing complexity of the global mobility is a key challenge for the understanding of the
worldwide spread of emergent infectious diseases and the design of effective containment
strategies. Despite global connectivity, containment policies are often based on national,
regional and ’egocentric’ assessments of outbreak situations that are no longer effective or
meaningful, as recently demonstrated by 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, where months
passed before a concerted, international effort followed. Despite the importance of the matter,
optimal strategies in highly connected non-local settings are poorly understood.
In the work at hand we propose a set of methods for more informed decision making
during and prior to a pandemic. We introduce a method to calculate the risk of disease im-
portation in a specific location, propose metrics which characterise the role of a node during
a distinct outbreak and investigate the allocation of resources as a game theoretic dilemma.
All of the studied systems are represented by networks of connected nodes to account for
the dominant role played by the traffic networks during the global spreading of the disease.
While multiple publications embraced a minimalistic approach by concentrating on network
features and disregarding the specifics of the outbreak, others employed elaborate simula-
tions which are highly reliant on a plethora of disease specific parameters. To foster the
benefits of both approaches, the work at hand will follow the intermediate path by concen-
trating on the network topology with regard to the origin of the outbreak. Presented work
relies on the concept of effective distance introduced by Brockmann and Helbing in [17].
First, we devise two metrics which characterise the role played by a node during a pan-
demic scenario. Using the effective distance trees we define the scope of a node, which shows
the fraction of the network population that benefits from the countermeasures deployed at
the respective node. Since a travelling infected has to traverse a node in question to reach
the downstream population, the exit screening at the node in question will have a protec-
tive effect for the downstream population. The second metric, confluence, characterises the
branching of the effective distance tree after the node in question. This metric highlights the
nodes which are located at the end of a bottleneck on the effective distance tree. They are a
good fit for countermeasure deployment as a high amount of paths are blocked by success-
ful screening and containment at such a node. In combination, both metrics can be used to
narrow down the set of candidate nodes for countermeasure deployment and be used for
final decision making on par with other determining factors. We demonstrate the usage of
the metrics on real-world and hypothetical scenarios.
Before approaching the resource allocation problem, we device a method to estimate the
import risk of disease into a node, as it is necessary to judge the threat posed by a specific
outbreak. To account for the specific behaviour of agents on transportation networks, we
define the probability that an agent will exit the traffic network at a specific node when
starting at a defined location. The exit probability is not uniform across nodes as the traffic
connections between two remote locations often involve the transit via multiple additional
hubs. While this information can be extracted from data when available, we show how this
probability can be derived from the structure of the effective distance tree. Using the exit
probability and the information about the origin of the outbreak, we calculate the probability
of case importation into a node and hence the threat posed by an outbreak. Using real-world
and hypothetical outbreak scenarios as examples we demonstrate how the import risk can
be averaged over a broad region to reflect the spread of the pandemic.
Finally, we investigate the resource allocation during a pandemic scenario from selfish
and pro-social perspective. The question is approached using the cost function optimisation
with the function varying depending on the mode of optimisation. The problem resembles
the public good dilemma well known in the game theory but with an important difference:
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While the basic form of the cost function is equal for every node, the import risk varies due
to different positions on the network. We show that in case of an outbreak concentrated in a
single location the selfish and pro-social outcomes do not differ substantially. The allocation
of resources to the source of the outbreak is the optimal strategy in both cases. When the
pandemic is seeded at two remote locations, self-investment emerges as an optimal strategy
for a subset of nodes in the selfish scenario. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the risk of
case importation and the ratio of import risks from multiple locations are the determining
factors when it comes to the resource allocation decisions. Multiple additional insights can
be gained from the simplified model we are presenting, e.g. that self-investment is never pro-
socially optimal, and a strategy resembling the ring vaccination emerges when investment
into the infected is not possible.
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Zusammenfassung
Das Verständnis der komplexen Interaktionen innerhalb des weltweiten Transportnetzes ist
ein essentieller Schritt auf dem Weg zur Vorhersage der Krankheitsausbreitung und Ent-
wicklung von effektiven Gegenmaßnahmen. Ungeachtet der weltweiten Vernetzung werden
die politischen Entscheidungen oft von nationaler, regionaler und egozentrischen Denkweise
geleitet. Die Ebola-Epidemie in 2014 demonstrierte deutlich, dass solche Herangehensweise
modernen Epidemien nicht gerecht werden kann. Trotz des Potentials viele Menschenleben
zu retten, ist die optimale Strategie im Falle eines Ausbruchs in einer vernetzten, komplexen
Umgebung nicht ausreichend verstanden.
In dieser Dissertation werden mehrere Methoden entwickelt, welche es ermöglichen wäh-
rend einer Epidemie die globalen Teilnehmer entsprechend ihrer Rolle einzustufen und das
Risiko des Krankheitsexports zu berechnen. Darüber hinaus wird mit Hilfe eines verein-
fachten spieltheoretischen Modells der Prozess der Ressourcenverteilung zur Epidemieein-
dämmung untersucht. In allen Aspekten der Arbeit wird netzwerkbasierte Repräsentation
des Systems verwendet, so dass die Orte durch knoten innerhalb eines Transportnetzwer-
kes abgebildet werden. Viele Publikationen, die die Eindämmungsstrategien im Kontext von
Epidemien untersucht haben, konzentrierten sich auf der Netzwerktopologie und ließen die
krankheitsspezifischen Parameter außer Acht. Wiederum andere nutzten aufwändige Simu-
lationen, welche entscheidend von der Wahl der epidemiologischen Parameter abhängen.
Um die Vorteile beider Herangehensweisen auszunutzen wird in dieser Arbeit der Mittelweg
eingeschlagen: während der Schwerpunkt auf der Topologie des Netzwerkes liegt, berück-
sichtigt die vorgestellte Methodik den Ursprungsort der Epidemie. Die vorgestellte Arbeit
nutzt das Konzept der effektiven Distanzen die darauf basierenden kürzesten Pfade und
Bäume, vorgestellt in [17].
Um die Rolle eines Knoten im Kontext eines bestimmten Ausbruchs zu charakterisieren
definieren wir zwei Zentralitätsmaße: scope und confluence. Scope zeigt an welcher Anteil der
Netzwerkpopulation von Eindämmungsmaßnahmen im entsprechenden Knoten profitieren
wird. Die zweite Metrik, confluence, spiegelt die Verzweigung des Baums der kürzesten Pfa-
de nach dem entsprechenden Knoten wieder. Folglich identifiziert diese Metrik jene Knoten,
die für viele wahrscheinlichsten Pfade zwischen dem Ausbruchsort und dem Rest des Netz-
werks wichtig sind. Dementsprechend sind Knoten mit hoher confluence bevorzugte Ziele für
Gegenma{\ss}nahmen. In Kombination können beide Metriken verwendet werden um die
besten Kandidaten für den Einsatz der Gegenmaßnahmen auszuwählen. Anhand von realen
und hypothetischen Ausbruchsszenarien wird die beschriebene Anwendung demonstriert.
Bevor eine Untersuchung der Ressourcenverteilung gemacht werden kann ist es notwen-
dig eine Methode zu finden die Gefahr abzuschätzen, die von einer Epidemie ausgeht. Diese
sind definiert als die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Infizierte, die auf der Transportnetzwerk be-
wegen, die Krankheit in den Knoten eintragen. Um die Spezifik der Transportnetzwerke zu
berücksichtigen muss die Wahrscheinlichkeit bestimmt werden, dass ein Individuum, wel-
ches sich auf dem Netzwerk bewegt, dieses an einem spezifischen Knoten verlässt. Diese
Wahrscheinlichkeit, exit probability, kann zwischen den Knoten stark variieren, da Reisever-
bindungen zwischen zwei Orten häufig über mehrere Transitknoten erfolgen. Während die
exit probability aus den Daten entnommen werden kann, sind Informationen darüber nicht
immer vorhanden. Daher wird aufgezeigt wie die exit probability aus der Struktur des Bau-
mes der kürzesten Pfade geschätzt werden kann. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit des Imports einer
Krankheit wird unter Verwendung der exit probability und der Information über der Ursprung
der Ausbruchs berechnet. Das wird anhand von mehreren realen und hypothetischen Epide-
miebeispielen illustriert.
Abschliessend wird ein Modell entwickelt um die Frage der optimalen Ressourcenver-
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teilung im Falle einer Pandemie zu studieren. Die Optimalität wird durch die Minimierung
einer Kostenfunktion durch einzelne Knoten erreicht. Die Optimierung erfolgt unter einem
egoistischen oder pro-sozialem Blickwinkel. Diese Problemstellung ähnelt dem public good
dilemma aus der Spieltheorie,doch unterscheidet sich in einem entscheidenden Aspekt: die
allgemeine Form der Kostenfunktion einzelner Knoten ist gleich, doch der numerische Wert
unterscheidet sich dadurch, dass das Risiko des Krankheitsimport in einzelne Knoten stark
verschieden sein kann. Das Modell zeigt auf, dass das globale Resultat der Optimierung
durch egoistische und pro-soziale Agenten nah bei einander liegt, wenn der Ausbruch in
einer einzelnen Quelle beginnt. In beiden Fällen ist es die optimale Lösung die Ressour-
cen zur Pandemiebekämpfung dem Ausbruchsursprung zu Verfügung zu stellen. Wenn die
Epidemie zwei getrennte Quellen aufweist, bildet sich eine neue Strategie heraus, die für
egoistische Knoten optimal sein kann. Bei dieser Strategie werden die Ressourcen von dem
Knoten selbst für Pandemieprävention utilisiert. Darüber hinaus zeigt das Modell, dass der
für die Strategie entscheidende Faktor die Wahrscheinlichkeit des Krankheitsimportes und
im Falle von mehreren Ausbruchsquellen der Quotient aus den Wahrscheinlichkeiten ist.
Anhand des Modells können weitere Erkenntnisse generiert werden, wie zum Beispiel die
Tatsache, dass aus der pro-sozialen Perspektive die Investitionen in Prävention innerhalb von
nicht betroffenen Knoten nie optimal sein kann oder dass die Ringimpfung sich als domi-
nante Strategie herauskristallisiert wenn die Investition von Ressourcen innerhalb von dem
Ausbruchsort nicht möglich ist.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the beginning of the twenty first century multiple large scale outbreaks have demon-
strated that in the modern world epidemics can travel at an unprecedented speed and cross
large distances. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was “the first severe infectious
disease to emerge in the twenty-first century” according to the World Health Organisation
(WHO) [8]. After surfacing in 2002 it claimed 774 lives and sickened 8096 people over a
course of 8 months. Within weeks SARS was present in 26 countries and across 5 conti-
nents. Only two years after the SARS pandemic the International Health Regulations (IHR)
were signed by all member states of the WHO, underlining that SARS emergence and rapid
spread was a wake-up call for the international community [109]. By establishing the IHR,
the WHO gained legal grounds to establish binding rules for surveillance and investments
in the health infrastructure of countries. Among other tools there exists the declaration of
the public emergency of international concern (PHEIC) which enables WHO to call interna-
tional attention to pandemic events and humanitarian crises posing a threat for the global
community. Five years after the SARS epidemic the first PHEIC was declared by the WHO in
connection with the H1N1 flu pandemic, an emergent influenza strain of the same subgroup
as the Spanish flu [75]. Until today PHEIC was declared four times, with most recent call
connected to the increase of microcephaly cases associated with Zika infections. Consider-
ing that the IHR entered into force in 2007, it emphasises that global pandemics are a major
problem of the twenty-first century, occurring on a regular basis.
Middle east respiratory syndrome (MERS-CoV) was first confirmed as a new zoonotic
strain of a corona virus in 2012. Since then 2122 laboratory cases and 740 related deaths
were confirmed as of January the 2nd, 2018. While not declared a PHEIC, the disease has
raised strong concern and media attention due to its initial similarity to SARS. The MERS-
CoV transmission is still ongoing with many transmission events between dromedary camels
and humans. Sustained human-to-human transmission was not observed until now. In 2014
Ebola has reachedWest Africa, resulting in the most severe Ebola outbreak ever recorded and
claiming more lives than all outbreaks of this disease since its emergence in 1976 combined
[114]. During the time between the onset of the epidemic in January 2014 and the lifting
of the PHEIC status in March 2016 Ebola infected 28616 people, killing 11310 of them with
mortality rates ranging from 25% to 90% [111, 113]. In the aftermath of the Ebola outbreak,
the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel heavily criticised the international response and the
delayed reaction of the WHO [77]. Among other points made by the panel was a delayed
declaration of the PHEIC, the slow reaction and the lack of financial commitment of the
WHO member states or non-adherence to the recommendations of the PHEIC committee.
As demonstrated by multiple epidemics, like those caused by influenza and SARS, the
spread of human diseases is tightly coupled to human mobility. Several disease importations
of the past centuries occurred in ports by means of the sea travel, dominant long distance
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traffic of past ages. Prominent examples are plague, cholera and HIV [101]. The influence of
human traffic on the spread of modern epidemics has been observed by multiple studies and
is well documented for some pandemics [61, 17, 41]. Considering the increasing availability
and speed of long distance traffic, disease in the modern world has the means to spread over
huge geographic distances in timespans of hours and days. This has been demonstrated by
the SARS epidemic and several influenza outbreaks. Ebola, while not sparking an epidemic
beyond the borders of West Africa, has demonstrated how pandemics can unfold when reach-
ing major cities. Upon reaching the capital the case numbers of the epidemic skyrocketed
and the containment efforts were heavily complicated. Paired with the growing urbanisa-
tion in developing countries causing densities of up to 20000 citizens per kilometre, diseases
which were unable to spread in dispersed populations will pose an ever increasing problem
in the future. In such conditions contact tracing is hardly feasible and isolation of all possible
contacts is impractical. As big cities are also transportation hubs, the importation is likely to
occur in one of these, resulting in optimal conditions for a hard to contain epidemic. These
challenges were demonstrated in the course of the yellow fever outbreak in 2015 to 2016,
where a sustained transmission chain was established in the capital city of Angola, Luanda
[112].
Combating a potentially global outbreak is a multilevel process involving a variety of
actors. The interruption of local transmission is an indispensable part of the containment
effort and it requires high commitment and a considerable amount of resources. Apart from
treating infected individuals, medical workers on site have to establish the potential source
of infection, the transmission chain and further epidemic parameters. The methodology to
solve these questions includes laboratory diagnostics, surveys and questionnaires. Using
mathematical modelling projections about the course of the epidemics can be made, but
only after disease parameters are known. Two essential disease parameters are the time
an infected takes to recover and the number of secondary cases produced by an infected.
Establishing the latter can be challenging in the face of an unfolding epidemic. The number
of secondary infections is prone to fluctuations, can be varying across different regions and
change with time and the underlying social structure. Based on the estimated parameters the
final size of the epidemic can be evaluated. Furthermore, the risk of a global pandemic can
be judged using these estimates. The mathematical models used for this purpose can range
from simple systems of differential equations to sophisticated models including the structure
of traffic and behavioural changes in response to the disease. Based on the predictions of
models the countermeasures can be devised and implemented by the NGOs and the global
community. As has been demonstrated during the Ebola epidemic, a scientific community
can contribute a lot to the containment efforts: through theoretical models or by pushing
forward the development of a vaccine, better treatment and diagnostic.
The work at hand is attributed to the field of mathematical modelling of pandemic spread
and countermeasure deployment. The aim of the broad field is to devise and evaluate com-
putationally the possible intervention strategies to interrupt the local transmission chain or to
prevent the outbreak from reaching global dimensions. With computing capacity becoming
more accessible, the field of mathematical modelling in the context of epidemic spreading
has gained popularity. The use of mathematical models in connection with disease spread-
ing and prevention has a long history. One of the first documented occurrences dates back
to 1760, when Daniel Bernoulli used a simple model to show that the risky procedure of
inoculation with smallpox was beneficial on population level. Until now, smallpox remains
the only disease ever eradicated. Throughout the centuries, mathematic models have been
refined and expanded, benefiting from the computational revolution. It has established itself
as a field of its own, uniting a wide range of methodologies and approaches from a range of
disciplines [94]. Mathematical modelling was applied to a variety of diseases including the
3bubonic plague [45], measles [38, 46] and a subset of vector borne diseases [6, 107, 60]. More
recent epidemics were investigated in real time and in retrospective by the epidemic models
[91, 34, 22]. Classical epidemiological models subdivide a population into compartments ac-
cording to their infection status, risk or age class. One of the most common epidemiological
models are the SIS and SIR models, where each letter indicates a population compartment
according to the infection status. In the SIS model a susceptible (S) individual can be infected
(I) and returns to the susceptible compartment after recovery. In the SIR model the disease
provides immunity, hence after infection an individual is assigned to the removed / recov-
ered (R) compartment. Depending on the disease in question the model can be expanded to
account for more compartments, e.g. exposed asymptomatic cases (SEIR) or partial immu-
nity. Compartmental models can be implemented as systems of differential equations or as
stochastic agent based models.
When speaking about the global spread of disease the above models have a drawback.
They are designed to model the disease spread in a single population with a central assump-
tion being the homogeneity of the population. Worldwide population is composed of several
semi-isolated communities connected by air, sea and land traffic fluxes. Thus, the global
population has a complex structure which needs to be accounted for if the model is to make
reliable predictions. It was in fact demonstrated that models incorporating the structure of
traffic connections were able to reliably reconstruct past outbreaks [25, 41]. The network the-
ory presents a natural way to account for the structure inside and between the populations.
When modelling a single structured population the individuals can be represented by the
nodes and the contacts between them are captured by the links. On a global scale the nodes
represent meta-populations connected by the links derived from traffic flows. The latter ap-
proach has been widely used to study past and make real time predictions about ongoing
outbreaks [95, 91, 50, 34, 84, 67, 66]. Furthermore, a sophisticated modelling tool was build
based upon traffic data incorporated in a global meta-population network model [18].
Nevertheless, all the methods described above rely on disease specific parameters, like
the recovery time or the number of secondary cases produced by an infected. The estimates
of these parameters are especially unreliable at the beginning of the epidemic due to the
fluctuations and the lack of data. At the same time, deployment of counter measures at an
early stage has the prospect to stop the epidemic at a low number of cases.
An additional challenge is introduced by the change in the spreading patterns of the
global epidemics. Historical epidemics were spreading in wave-like patterns, starting at the
outbreak origin and propagating outwards on the map. Such course was observed in past
bubonic plague outbreaks, but is not observed nowadays. Many modern epidemics have
demonstrated long distance jumps across big geographic distances, thus deviating from pre-
viously known behaviour. Past epidemics were well explained by diffusion models as the
spreading was dominated by close distance commuting. An infected individual was likely
to die or recover before covering a long distance and carrying the disease to a remote desti-
nation. In 1869, for example, a journey from London, England, to Melbourne, Australia, in
59 days was considered an extraordinary achievement [1]. Today a non-stop flight can cover
the distance in 17 hours. This drastic reduction in travelling times makes it possible for an
infected individual to travel to a different continent before he recovers or shows symptoms of
the disease. On par with accelerating the disease spread, the fast and accessible long distance
travel also removes natural boundaries, like oceans, which prior separated populations and
prevented certain diseases from reaching other continents. At the same time geographically
close locations with poorly developed infrastructure can require a longer travelling time than
remote destinations accessible by plane.
Due to globalisation the geographical distance becomes decoupled from the travelling
time, thus changing the transmission dynamic. This has important implications for the pre-
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diction of epidemic spreading, the estimation of risks and the design of countermeasures.
An infection can escape a geographically remote origin via air traffic. Consequently, reliance
on geographical notion of distance can contribute to a perception of false security and lack
of action in situations which pose a considerable risk. Modern epidemics do not exhibit
wave-like patterns on a geographical scale, thus it is not the driving force behind global
spreading. Recently it has been shown that wave-like spreading patterns can be retrieved
when locations are remapped according to their network properties as opposed to geograph-
ical coordinates [17]. Brockmann et al. propose the concept of effective distance, which is a
modified variant of a shortest path connecting two nodes. According to the effective distance
the separation between two locations a and b is proportional to the probability that an indi-
vidual departing from the location a will proceed to location b. This probability, in turn, is
defined by the proportion of flux going through the respective link or set of links if nodes
a and b are not directly connected. When nodes are remapped according to their effective
distance from the origin, the epidemic front and the wave-like pattern is restored. This was
verified through multiple real-world epidemics with effective distances constructed based on
air traffic between airports. The study has demonstrated consistent results emphasising that
long distance traffic has a similar predictive power as geographic distance had centuries ago.
Brockmann et al. also demonstrate that the effective distance to the correct origin only results
in the wave-like pattern, thus the methodology can be used to retrospectively reconstruct the
outbreak origin.
Even before networks were considered in epidemic context, dynamic processes were stud-
ied on them. Analysis of random walks is one of the topics which provided multiple concepts
now widely used in network based epidemiology [63]. An important property defined in this
context is the centrality of a node. It can be defined in a variety of ways and thus emphasise
different aspects of node’s localisation. Centrality ranges from simple definitions like the
degree centrality, which indicates the number of direct neighbours, to complicated and com-
putationally heavy metrics. An often utilised centrality measure is the betweenness centrality,
which indicates what fraction of shortest paths crosses the node in question. Consequently
it indicates how many shortest paths are disrupted when the node is removed from the net-
work. Several papers have applied these centralities in context of epidemic spreading and
countermeasure design. In the former case, the spreading potential of a node was studied
in connections with its centrality characteristics [51, 28], in the latter case centrality mea-
sures were used to identify targets best suited for the application of countermeasures, e.g.
vaccination [39, 99].
The disadvantage of these centrality measures is their independence of context. Between-
ness centrality, for example, is calculated from paths between all possible pairs of nodes,
while for a specific outbreak shortest paths from the outbreak source play a more important
role. Hence, conventional centrality measures assign the same importance to a node regard-
less of the scenario at hand. Nonetheless, we can easily imagine a scenario in which a hub is
central to a specific region, but plays little role in case of an outbreak outside of this region.
By considering a non-context sensitive metric the importance of a node can be overstated
in some cases and underestimated in others, leading to the deployment of intervention at
wrong locations and a wrong time. As will be demonstrated in this work and has been
in part shown in [17] the role of a node varies greatly in different outbreak scenarios. Out-
break sources which are geographically close can lead to very distinct spreading pattern with
transmission over different routes. A metric which disregards the outbreak origin is unable
to capture the differences. To overcome this limitation a context sensitive metric is needed.
In this thesis, we propose two centrality measures which account for the context of the out-
break and assign a node the importance characteristic for a specific outbreak. The metrics are
based on effective distance trees introduced in [17], thus they rely on the information about
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When the source of the outbreak is known and important nodes are identified, deploying
informed interventions is still a challenge. When it comes to the design of counter mea-
sures the decisions are often based on ’common knowledge’, political ties and relations, or
on the results of elaborate simulations. The latter are only possible several months into the
epidemic, after sufficient number of cases have been accumulated and reliable estimates for
disease parameters are available. Consequently, informed countermeasure deployment is
only possible at an advanced state of the epidemic and thus many opportunities to control
the epidemic growth are missed. At times when elaborate models are unavailable decisions
are often guided by geographical distances. It has been outlined above how this can lead
to false conclusions and inappropriate responses. Especially troubling are the outbreaks in
geographically remote locations, e. g. multiple African countries. These often have poor
economies, a fragile infrastructure and an unstable political situation. As has been demon-
strated by the Ebola epidemic in 2014 underdeveloped health system, bad sanitation, insuffi-
cient surveillance and lack of education can lead to epidemics spiralling out of control very
fast. In such cases an early intervention is essential to prevent the spread of the disease and
save many lives, but it is often missed or considered on a much later time point due to the
underestimation of the threat an outbreak poses globally.
Even when international awareness of a specific pandemic is present, the decision about
the right resource allocation is not trivial. The possibilities range from allocating supplies and
personnel, to the affected region to ramping up preparedness inside of yet unaffected coun-
tries. The former is usually perceived to be an altruistic, pro-social act, while latter is seen
as selfish. Consequently depending on the entity owing the resources different strategies are
employed: the WHO and multiple NGOs employ the ’pro-social’ strategy, offering help to the
affected regions. The international community is rather reluctant, providing support to the
outbreak source mainly in cases of humanitarian crises like the Ebola pandemic. Nonethe-
less, this classification of strategies is based on common knowledge rather than research.
There is a body of work on the resource allocation topic, both as a post deployment review
or as purely theoretical work. The review of the effectiveness of the intervention in retro-
spective is difficult to interpret as no controlled conditions can be guaranteed to make the
evaluation reliable. As for theoretical work, different modelling and analytical approaches
were employed to study this topic. All but one study on global resource allocation aimed
to minimise the global cost, thus assuming that the global good is the state desired by the
allocating entity. While a variety of the studies have been done in human epidemiology
[87, 86, 85], studies from the field of computer networks can also be conclusive for pandemic
research [37, 117]. Resource allocation on a more local scale is well represented by human
vaccination behaviour, where a vaccine is the resource distributed among individuals to pre-
vent the spreading of the disease in the population. One of the important questions asked
is how a certain population can be protected by a minimal amount of vaccines. This was
extensively investigated with and without the application of game theory with regarded for
the decisions of selfish individuals [32, 33, 12, 26, 83, 97]. Motivated by the global spreading
the question of resource allocation between a pair of coupled meta-populations was studied
in multiple papers [64, 93, 103].
While the countermeasure deployment is not a public good game in its original form,
the two processes share multiple features. All nodes in the network benefit from imple-
mented containment efforts while only the donor of the resources bears the cost. Thus, there
is incentive to free ride. This has been demonstrated in context of vaccination behaviour,
where according to theoretical results in a system of selfish agents herd immunity can never
be reached under voluntary vaccination conditions [12]. From the public perspective herd
immunity is the desired state, hence a discrepancy between the desired global and selfish
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optima arise. This has been described as a general feature of public good games [73].
In most of the papers studying resource allocation in context of global epidemics the fi-
nal resource distribution is imposed on the nodes by some external entity which distributes
either limited resources or tries to achieve a given goal with minimal possible resources. In
the real world most of the resources are owned by countries and hence no external strategy
can be imposed on the usage of these resources. While after implementation of the IHR
the WHO gained some directive authority, there is no legal instrument to punish the states
deviating from the proposed line of actions. As has been demonstrated by game theoretical
studies, cooperation in public good games is difficult to maintain in the absence of punish-
ment [30]. Therefore, the resource allocation decisions in the real-world are best described
by a system of agents who individually make allocation decisions and not a global entity
imposing the distribution rules in a top-down manner. When investment decisions are left to
individual agents different behaviours can be expected: pro-social, which aims for the good
of all, selfish, which regards only the own cost, and a variety of intermediate predisposi-
tions. Another lesson learned from the field of game theory is that in public good games
the globally optimal solution differs strongly from the optimal outcome for selfish individu-
als. Thus, there is reason to assume that the same holds for the investment behaviour in the
case of a pandemic. Wang et al. has investigated the resource distribution in two connected
meta-populations from a selfish and global perspective [103]. It was demonstrated that there
is in fact a deviation between the global optimum and the solutions optimal to either of the
infected. Consequently, in other investigated systems we expect a different equilibrium to
arise when the resource allocation is optimised by individual selfish agents.
During a pandemic the decision making is heavily influenced by the perceived risk posed
by the outbreak. The risk of case importation is central to the estimation of the overall threat
of the current situation. It can be evaluated by elaborate epidemic models, but as outlined
above precise predictions are only available after an extensive time period. We argue in favour
of a more readily available method for risk estimation that enables to evaluate the threat at
an earlier stage. Import risk, the driving force behind the resource allocation decisions, is
highly dependent on the network topology, thus we expect the latter to have an impact
on the resource allocation as well. It is important to investigate whether certain topologies
can facilitate globally optimal decisions even when the optimisation is performed by selfish
agents. When risk assessments are made with geographical distance in mind some locations
are less likely to receive help due to their perceived remoteness. We will demonstrate that
the same nodes can be well connected if the distance is calculated according to the network
topology. At the same time other nodes can be at topological disadvantage, leaving them
at lower probability to receive investment. Previous theoretical studies have investigated
systems subject to a single threat or disease. In recent years concurrent crises were observed
multiple times, hence decisions on countermeasure deployment and resource allocation are
made while the international community is facing multiple potentially global issues. For that
reason it is necessary to understand how the the number of outbreak sources influences the
decision making and the final distribution of resources.
In this thesis we approach the topic from a network based perspective and define the
necessary methods before concentrating on the resource allocation problem. We use the
effective distance trees previously defined by Brockmann and Helbing in [17] and introduce
a new centrality measure based on these. These metrics describe the role of a node in case of a
specific outbreak showing which nodes are most likely used by infected individuals as transit
location and are hence best suited for countermeasures like passenger screening. They allow
to judge what fraction of the global population benefits from protective measures deployed
at the node in question and how a change in the location at which the countermeasures are
deployed changes the protective effect. Further we derive a method to evaluate the risk of
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how this metric can be used if the information about the origin is missing or is imprecise.
Using this risk estimation we device a model to study resource allocation on a network of
countries and report its generic features like the emergence of self-investment or resource
allocation to the source of the outbreak even in case of selfish optimisation.
As has been previously outlined the world aviation network (WAN) plays a central role
in the spread of diseases on the global scale. We have used it to capture the interactions
between different locations, i.e airports and countries, during pandemic situations. In all
the work described on subsequent pages, WAN and transportation networks as a general
class play a central role. On the WAN nodes represent the airports which are connected by
air traffic and are measured in means of passengers on commercial flights. These are the
carriers of the disease in case of a pandemic and long distance flights enable them to travel to
remote locations during their infectious period. It has been demonstrated that the reliability
of global models increases when the air traffic network is accounted for and therefore we
believe that it has to be at the core of a metric aimed at the prediction of global pandemic
spread.
As the first step, we define two centrality measures: scope and confluence. Both metrics
are calculated based on the effective distance tree derived from the original network. Hence,
both metrics evaluate the role of the nodes based on their presence in the most probable paths
from the outbreak origin to remaining nodes of the network. Scope of a node n represents the
fraction of the network downstream of n on the effective distance tree, thus the population
which can be reached through a shortest path traversing the node in question. The initial
cases imported into the country downstream from the node n are likely to be brought in by
traversing node n and hence the downstream nodes benefit from the countermeasures imple-
mented at n, such as passenger screening. We call a node starring a high scope value a gate.
The second metric proposed in this work, confluence, indicates the branching of the tree after
the node in question. Consequently, a node with high confluence represents a bottleneck on
the effective distance tree which is a part of a high fraction of shortest paths and the latter are
diverging after passing this node. Such bottlenecks are valuable targets for countermeasure
deployment as they present a good (and last) opportunity to efficiently protect a high fraction
of population. Any shift of containment measures to a further downstream node will lead
to a reduced protective effect. In cases when the outbreak origin is uncertain or is stretched
over a great geographic distance each metric can be averaged to account for the situation
at hand. We will explain the procedure and outline the benefits and downsides of it. Both
metrics were motivated by the application in a pandemic scenario, hence we demonstrate the
distribution of these metrics across the WAN. Using scope and confluence we characterise
the nodes of the WAN in terms of their role in a variety of outbreak scenarios. We establish
that a role that one node can take on varies strongly depending on the outbreak situation:
a node can change from being a major gate in one scenario to be a leaf node in another
case. Taking a global average of the metric conceals this highly variable role, thus leading to
similarly wrong conclusions as established centrality metrics. To demonstrate how deliberate
averaging can be used to aid decision making, we apply scope and confluence on a selection
of real-world and hypothetical outbreak scenarios spanning extended geographic regions.
We identify important global and regional gates in each case. Using scope averaged over 22
distinct geographic regions we define a profile of an airport and show that it bears important
information about a particular hub. The profiles highlight functional differences between the
airports in terms of their region of influence and describe how often a node acts as a gate.
Relying on the effective distance trees we devise a method to estimate the probability of
case importation to a specific node during an ongoing epidemic. It regards an important
feature of the WAN, i. e. the existence of the hubs used for transit flights and the smaller
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airports which only serve as terminal targets. The feature leads to a profound difference in
probability that an agent will exit the transportation network at a specific node. As the risk
of case importation is highly dependent on the exit probability and the information about it
is rarely available we establish a method to infer the exit probability from the topology of
the effective distance trees. Just as in the case of scope and confluence, import risk is not
dependent on specific disease parameters. The only information required is the origin of the
outbreak or the currently affected region, thus making import risk a measure available on
early stages of the outbreak. To demonstrate the application of import risk we use it in a set
of real-world and hypothetical scenarios. Similar to the metrics described in the paragraph
above, import risk can be averaged over a broad geographical region to account for the spread
or other factors of the disease. The weighting during the averaging procedure can reflect the
specifics of the location or the severity of the outbreak in the target location. All in all we
show how import risk can be used to evaluate the threat of an outbreak and predict locations
which are likely to experience early imported cases.
Using the import risk we develop a simple model to study the resource allocation prob-
lem. Considering the benefits of a network based approach the defined model incorporates
the actors as nodes of a network. The actors represent countries connected by traffic. We
develop the model with a network analogous to WAN, we do not limit the exact kind of
traffic. To reduce the complexity and enable the understanding of basic laws this model is
based on an artificial, synthetic network. As the network is the core part of the model and
plays an important role for the distribution of import risk across the nodes we investigate
how changing topology affects the decision making by the acting agents. The model intro-
duced on the subsequent pages aims to understand the resource distribution optimal from
the global perspective and the perspective of individual selfish agents. The proposed model
incorporates that the resources are held by the individual countries. Hence, each node is an
entity owning resources and making decisions about how to best distribute those in the face
of a current pandemic. We call the final distribution of resources of a single node its strategy.
In the thesis at hand we study two different scenarios: a fully pro-social network, which is
equivalent to optimisation by a global benevolent entity, and a network of selfish players,
who minimise solely their own cost. In both cases the optimisation is an iterative process
consisting of multiple rounds of decision making and revision. As expected from previous
knowledge there is a discrepancy between the outcome of both optimisation modes. We
demonstrate that the results in fact deviate, but only to a small extent for many cases. In
outbreaks originating from a single location or a set of adjacent locations the globally and
selfishly optimal solutions differ only in the amount of donated resources, but not in their
distribution. This situation resembles the conflict demonstrated by Bauch et al. in case of
voluntary vaccination [12]. Our model demonstrates that resource allocation to the source of
the infection is the optimal solution in both cases. We present analytical evidence pointing in
the same direction. To investigate how the decision making is changed by increasing number
of outbreak sources we implement the multi-source outbreak scenario. Here the discrep-
ancy between the optimisation modes increases, giving rise to a strategy of self-investment
in the selfish scenario. Nodes in close proximity of the source of the outbreak profit most
from investment in the source even in selfish optimisation scenario. The nodes threatened
by multiple sources to the same extent adopt self-investment as the dominant strategy. Our
model demonstrates that the driving force behind the investment strategy is the probability
of case importation from the infection sources present in the network. In case of multiple
outbreak sources the ratio between these probabilities becomes of a particular interest for
selfish agents.
All outlined results are stable across the tested network topologies implying that they
are generic to the problem at hand. The results are also stable with respect to multiple
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chapter. While the distribution of the resources across the network does not play a role for
the final resource distribution, the overall amount of resources is of high importance. Our
model suggests that a selfish system with low resources is more prone to self-investment.
Consequently, it might drive the system into a vicious cycle, where affected countries are
left unaided during the epidemics, their economies are damaged, thus resulting in an eco-
nomically weaker system. Our research also highlights how benevolent organisations can
influence the final resource distribution of the system by making informed investment into
the affected states.
This thesis is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 gives an outline of approaches available in the field of the epidemic mod-
elling, highlighting the methods borrowed from the network science and game theory;
it gives a broad overview about the current theoretical methodology for risk estimation
and the most recent research about countermeasure deployment and disease contain-
ment.
• Chapter 3 summarises the research which serves as a basis for the work presented in
subsequent chapters; in gives a detailed description of the world aviation network, its
features and further summarises the concept of the effective distance introduced by
Brockmann and Helbing in [17].
• Chapter 4 introduces the centrality measures of scope and confluence; derivation of the
metrics, their comparison with established metrics and application is presented in this
chapter.
• Chapter 5 defines the import risk and exit probability, presents a detailed mathemat-
ical definition and demonstrates the application of it in hypothetical and real-world
scenarios.
• Chapter 6 describes the model derived to study the resource allocation problem; here
we present the mathematical definition and thorough analysis of the model on differ-
ent topologies and in a subset of special cases; we further demonstrate computational
results on a variety of networks with different conditions and parameters.
• Chapter 7 summarises the results putting them in a bigger picture; we outline how our
results can be used during the epidemics to come and how our methodology can be
extended.
10 Introduction
Chapter 2
State of the Art
This chapter summarises scientific findings, which lay the foundation for the thesis. As
the work presented in subsequent chapters is from a multidisciplinary field, this chap-
ter present the state of the art of network science, epidemic modelling, optimisation and
game theory. Nonetheless, the emphasis lies on the application of the methods in context
of human disease spreading. First, the mathematical concept of a network is introduced,
followed by approaches to find shortest and most probable routes between the nodes of
the network. Epidemiological models are outlined in the next sub-chapter, emphasising the
differences between the findings based on classical and network based methods. Game the-
oretical approaches and their application to disease containment are explained thereafter.
Finally, existing attempts to answer the questions approached in the thesis are summarised.
Presented work is rooted in different areas of science and requires understanding of the
concepts from multiple fields. In this chapter we will explain the topics required to fully
understand the work presented in subsequent chapters. While it gives a brief overview, it
is not a full review of the topics. We refer an interested reader to consult the literature
referenced in the respective chapters. Finally, we will introduce multiple papers, which which
are concerned with a similar topic as explored in this thesis. The differences in methodology
applied and the questions posed will be discussed in detail.
There are two building blocks of the model. First is network theory. Chapters 4 - 6 require
basic knowledge of network theory, which will be presented in this chapter. We will explain
how graphs are constructed, which benefits arise from structuring the population of a model
as a network and what methodology exist to work with graphs. Apart from the concept
of a network as a structure to capture the relations, an important role is assigned to the
path finding algorithm. Finding path from node a to node b is a necessary requirement for
answering multiple questions. This is especially true for spreading phenomena, which use
the links as their spreading routes. As will be explained below, finding a path is a non trivial
and often computationally intensive problem. We will explain the most established method
to find shortest paths on weighted networks, the Dijkstra algorithm. Based on it, the Yen
algorithm enables the user to determine k shortest paths instead of only one. We will outline
modifications which make the latter possible. We will briefly explain how the Yen algorithm
can be modified to find all paths with length above a certain threshold. Finally, we will give
a brief overview of successful application of networks in the disease modelling and point out
the milestone findings.
Second building block are concepts borrowed from the game theory. The cost function
optimisation plays central role in game theoretical research, as it does in our model presented
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in chapter 6. Hence, we will illustrate the basic approach to function optimisation in general.
Further we will describe the evolutionary strategy method of optimisation, which is at heart
of the implementation of the model proposed in chapter 6. While we did not use the classical
version of the evolutionary strategy algorithm, understanding of this approach is required to
fully understand the modified version used in this thesis. In the last section we will review
research centred around the resource allocation topic. Multiple papers were published in
recent years with the aim of solving this important question. While concerned with similar
question as our research, the methodology and the basic assumptions differ. Most central
difference is the entity distributing the resources and the cost function being optimised. All
but one paper discussed in this chapter assume an overarching actor, who distributes the
resources across the network to achieve an outcome with the minimal cost for the entire
network. We will discuss the implications of these assumptions in more detail in the last
section of the chapter.
2.1 Basic network theory
Recently, graph and network theory experienced a rise in popularity and were incorporated
into studies across different fields. Among these are the social sciences and, more recently,
public health and epidemiology. Both fields benefit from the introduced methodology and
contribute to the development of graph theory itself. Hence, there is a mutual interest for
both research areas in a joined effort. The work at hand follows along this line, using network
theory to study a public health related question. Networks present a very convenient tool to
describe a structured population or a group of agents sharing distinct relations. They allow
individuals in a population to be distinct in some features, while sharing others.
A most simplistic network is composed of a set of nodes, with the number of nodes
usually denoted by N. These nodes are connected by links, where the number of links is
denoted by L. Both, the nodes and the links, can have properties assigned to them. A most
common property of a link is its weight, which represents the strength of a link. Usual
notation of a weighted link from node n to node k is wkn, where n is source and k is target.
There is no consensus on how a link weight is defined as the definition heavily depends on
the objective for which the network is constructed. Multiple kinds of link weights exist. On
the one hand, a weight of a link can represent the distance or the cost, e.g. the distance in
terms of kilometres in a road network or transport fees of a rail network. In such a system
two nodes are farther apart if they are connected by links of greater weights. Such definition
is appropriate if travelling times or resource spending are the matter of interest. Another way
to define a link is to associate its weight with a capacity or a flux possible via this connection,
e.g. in case of passenger numbers on a specific traffic route or capacity of connecting pipes.
When this definition is used, a location is closest when it is connected by a link with a
high weight. Regardless of the definition, the distances over multiple links are calculated by
adding the weights along a specific path. The sum of the link weights is the length of the
path. The shortest path according to the distance-based notation is the one resulting in the
smallest possible sum of links. Using the flux inspired definition, the path responsible for the
biggest flux between target and destination is the one resulting in the biggest sum along its
links. Note that the usage of the word length in the latter case is rather misleading. The exact
procedure of finding the shortest path is described in the subsequent chapter. Apart from
the weights, links can be assigned a direction, thus wnk 6= wkn. Directed links can arise on
road network when one way streets are present or in a biological regulatory network, when
one gene is inhibited by product of the other, but not vice versa. Some of the methodology
described in the subsequent sections can not be applied on weighted or directed networks.
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We will explicitly state the limitations of each method.
A property can be also assigned to nodes to characterise them in a greater detail. Prop-
erties can be descriptive, e.g. characterising the kind of a node or its affiliation to a certain
group. Other node properties can arise from its position on or features of the network. Most
basic property of a node n is its degree, kn. A degree describes the number of links attached
to a node. In case of an unweighted, undirected network, a degree also represents the num-
ber of neighbours of the node. In weighted networks a weighted degree can be defined,
kn = ∑j wjn. The latter accounts for the strength of the links, thus using more of the available
information. On directed networks, two different degrees can be defined: in-degree, which
accounts for the incoming links, and out-degree, which describes the outgoing links. Espe-
cially in social sciences degree is used as a centrality measure, it shows the influence of a
node when links represent social contacts or friendships.
There are three additional centrality metrics, which will be used in this thesis. First is
the closeness centrality, it describes the maximal distance of a node to any other node in
the network, Cc(n) = N/∑k dkn; 1 ≥ Cc ≥ 0 where dkn is the length of the shortest path
from n to k. Defined in this fashion, the closeness centrality approximately describes the
average path length from the node n to every node in the network. While in undirected
networks closeness centrality is equal regardless whether the paths to or from n are used.
In the directed networks, a node can have high closeness centrality for the incoming, but
low for the outgoing paths and vice versa. As per convention two nodes n and k which are
not connected by a path have dkn = dkn = ∞. Thus, for such nodes Cc(n) = 0. To prevent
this, the sum of the quotient is used instead of the quotient of sums, i.e. Cc(n) = ∑k 1/dkn.
The latter definition was proposed in multiple publications under the name of valued or
harmonic centrality [92, 29].
The second centrality measure is betweenness centrality, which reflects how often a node
is part of a shortest path. Betweenness centrality is defined as Cb(n) = ∑ts χ
i
ts where χ
i
ts = 1
if the shortest path from s to t traverses i and 0 otherwise. Hence, betweenness centrality
counts the number of the shortest paths traversing node n. A node with a high betweenness
centrality is crucial in connecting the nodes of the network. A disruption of this node, e.g. its
removal, will have a big impact on the traffic in the network. To make betweenness centrality
more comparable across networks of different sizes, it can be normalised by the number of
all possible paths
Cb(n) =
∑ts χ
n
ts
N(N− 1)
Latter definition is used in chapter 4. Betweenness centrality has been widely used to es-
timate the role of a node during pandemic spreading, it was suggested that nodes with
high betweenness centrality are valuable targets for vaccination [28]. Similar arguments were
made in connection with the degree of a node. Immunisation with regard to centrality met-
rics has shown better results than the pure random immunisation. Nonetheless, high amount
of nodes have to be immunised to achieve a transmission disruption. For more details about
the application of centrality measures for pandemic prevention and disruption we refer in-
terested reader to one of the following publications [28, 39, 42, 51, 62].
In recent years advances in technology enabled us to record a variety of the real world
networks: transportation, social contacts and regulatory networks. Multiple synthetic net-
work types were created to resemble their natural counterparts. There are some features,
which are often observed in nature and are generic for many real world networks. We will
outline the evolution of synthetic network types and explain how introduced features change
general properties of the network.
One of the basic types of a network is a chain. The chain is a collection of N nodes where
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each node with index n is connected to nodes with index n− 1 and n+ 1, if such a node exist.
Following from the topology, there is only one path from each node to any other if each node
is traversed only once. Deletion of any link will result in a disconnected network, with some
parts being inaccessible for the rest of the network. A chain can be modified to represent
a ring, when nodes with indices 1 and N are connected. A network with slightly more
complexity is a lattice or grid graph. Such graph forms a regular tiling when represented
in Euclidean space [108]. Additionally, a grid with looped boundaries can be defined, such
that the nodes at the edge of the lattice are connected to edge nodes at the opposite side.
Given that, all nodes on the lattice have exactly the same number of neighbours. In a lattice
each pair of nodes is connected by multiple paths, even if each node is traversed only once.
Consequently, this network is very robust against link deletion. Due to the regular structure
of this graph, multiple shortest paths between the nodes exist. On a chain, a ring and a lattice
the maximal shortest distance between two nodes, called the diameter of the network, tends
to grow linearly with the size of the network. In many real world networks diameter tends
to be small and increase slower with the growing network size.
An important feature of networks found in nature and technology is the small-world
property. In such networks, diameter tend to be short and increases logarithmically with the
growing network size [104]. The popular statement about “six degrees of separation”, refer-
ring to the number of acquaintances needed to connect every two person in the world, points
out the same phenomenon [70]. A network type which exhibits small-world properties is a
random graph, with most prominent example being Erdo˝s–Rényi model. For every pair of
nodes n and k a link is established with probability p. Average degree of an Erdo˝s–Rényi
network is 〈k〉 ≈ N ∗ p, the diameter of the network is considerably lower compared to lat-
tice with similar degree. Note that, in contrary to lattice, the degree of nodes in a random
graph follows a Poisson distribution. Furthermore, the final network can contain discon-
nected nodes. Multiple studies indicate that small-world networks are more stable against
perturbations [105, 4, 3, 53, 52].
Another aspect of many real world networks is the presence of high degree nodes, so
called hubs. These nodes accumulate many connections and emerge as the transit locations
when agents or information is travelling across the network. Prominent networks starring
high number of hubs are transportation networks (e.g world aviation network) and man-
made communication networks (e.g. internet network). In such networks the degree distri-
bution follows a power law with exponents 2 < ε < 3. The network category which fea-
tures the small-world property and a power law degree distribution are scale-free networks.
Barabási–Albert model is one of the best known and studied models to generate a scale-free
network [11]. In this model is initiated with multiple seed nodes, the subsequent nodes are
added one by one. With each node l links are added. These links lead from the node in ques-
tion to an already existing node. Probability to connect to a node is proportional to nodes
degree, thus nodes with high amount of links are more likely to gain additional connections.
In an Barabási–Albert network the minimal degree is l and the network is fully connected. It
can be shown analytically that the exponent of the degree distribution is ε = 3. Networks of
this type exhibit multiple interesting features, e.g. very high robustness against random node
removal [23, 19, 4]. As the probability of randomly removing a hub node is low, networks
integrity is conserved even at high attack rates. At the same time, the scale-free networks are
very susceptible to targeted attacks, which eliminate the hub nodes. Furthermore, diameter
of such networks increases at an even slower rate due to preferential attachment to the hub
nodes.
While there is a variety of more complex synthetic networks, the types listed above al-
ready exhibit many features observed in natural and technological networks. An important
example, world aviation network, exhibits both mentioned properties: the small-world be-
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haviour and the heavy tail degree distribution. Moreover, this network shows a community
structure, which is not part of any network types described above. World aviation network
is discussed in more detail in section 3.1
2.2 Path finding, Dijkstra and Yen algorithms
As has been mentioned in the previous section, the task of finding paths from a source node
to a target is not a trivial task. In general, amount of paths between two nodes is infinite,
if some nodes can be traversed multiple times. Nonetheless, a path with loops can never be
the shortest, hence such paths are of no concern to an algorithm searching for the shortest
possible connection. The most simple and common algorithm, which finds paths from a
source node to all possible targets in the network is the breadth-first search. It can only be
performed on an unweighted network as it minimises the number of traversed edges. When
the network is weighted, a path via many short links can be in fact shorter than a path via a
few long links. Note that we use the terms applicable to distance-based links for simplicity.
The breadth-first algorithm is unsuitable for the transportation networks, where link weights
are available.
The methodology, which can be applied to find shortest paths on weighted networks
is the Dijkstra algorithm. Similar to breadth-first algorithm, it finds paths from the source
node to all the nodes in the network. Note that no target node can be specified to the basic
algorithm, thus the fastest way to find a path from the source to the node of interest is to run
the Dijkstra algorithm until the target node is reached and thereafter terminate the algorithm.
This method is guaranteed to find the shortest possible path [70].
The algorithm is initiated with two arrays. The first array d holds the best current estimate
of the shortest distance to the source. Note that the distance estimate has to be the upper
bound for the possible shortest path length. Distance from source s to itself is set to ds = 0,
for all other nodes dk = ∞ is the most farthest possible distance. The second array indicates
whether the actual shortest distance was already found. At initiation all values in the second
array are set to 0 to represent that distances set at initiation now are uncertain. Further the
algorithm follows an iterative procedure:
1. Among the nodes, whose estimated distance is not certain, a node n with the smallest
estimated distance is chosen
2. Its distance is marked as certain
3. Distances to all neighbours of n are calculated by adding the weight of connecting link
to the distance of n; if the calculated distance is shorter than the current estimate for
the neighbour, the estimate is replaced by the new shortest distance
4. the procedure is repeated from step 1 until no nodes with an uncertain distance are left
If the calculation is performed on directed graphs only outgoing links are considered in this
calculation. Crucial step to this procedure is step two, where current estimate of the distance
is marked as certain. We can be sure that established distance dn at this point is the shortest
possible due to following consideration. As per definition there can be no negative weight
to a link. Hence in a path shorter than the current estimated distance to n, distance to all
intermediate nodes have to be shorter than dn. No unexplored nodes fulfilling this condition
remain since we have chosen n as the node with smallest uncertain distance. Neighbours
of all nodes, which distance has been marked as certain, has already been explored and
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compared to n’s shortest distance estimate. Thus n’s current shortest distance is in fact the
shortest possible distance and we can safely mark it as certain.
Particular problems require knowledge of a set of K shortest paths. An algorithm, called
the Yen’s algorithm, was designed to solve this problem on weighted and unweighted net-
works [115]. To initiate the Yen’s algorithm, the shortest path from the source node to the
target node has to be found. To do this any of the path finding algorithm described above
can be used. Assume we found the shortest path {1, ..., i, ...t} where 1 is the source node and
t is the target node. First path is stored as A1, where A is the list holding all acquired shortest
paths. If there are multiple shortest paths available, the choice of A1 is made randomly and
the remaining paths are assigned to the list B. List B holds all candidate paths. If at first step
only one shortest path is acquired, list B is created empty.
For any subsequent path a different procedure is followed. To find the next shortest path
k we assume that paths 1, .., k− 1 have been found.
1. To find next shortest path Ak following procedure is repeated for each node i ∈
{1, ..., t− 1} in the pathAk−1
(a) Assign a subpath of Ak−1 from node 1 to i to be the root path Rki
(b) For each path Aj, with j = 1, 2, ..., k− 1, check if the the subpath from 1 to i-th
node is equal to Rki ; if so, the link between the nodes i and i+ 1 of the respective
path is temporally removed
(c) Find the shortest path from node i to the target node t; this path is called the spur
path Ski
(d) Root and spur paths are joined to form path Ak, leading from source to the target
node; this path is added to list B
(e) All removed links are restored and the process is repeated for the next node i,
which is part of Ak−1
2. From set B choose the shortest path and add it to A as Ak; repeat from step 1 until all
K paths are found
Note that the list B already contains a set of shortest paths, hence as soon as B contains K or
more paths the algorithm is finished. We can fill the list A with shortest paths from B. As
proposed by [21], a path is a shortest possible path when it is composed of subpaths, which
are in themselves minimal. For detailed derivation and the proof see [21, 115].
All algorithms described previously are designed for the link weights, which are additive.
We can imagine a network where the link weights represent transition probabilities. Conse-
quently, when calculating a path length in this probabilistic notion, the link weights have to
be multiplied. Both of the presented algorithms can be applied in such a network after link
weights have been transformed to w∗kn = −log(wkn).
2.3 Epidemiology and disease spreading on networks
There is no consensus about what was the first epidemiological study ever performed. But
multiple landmark papers can be identified throughout history. The one which marks the
first use of mathematical modelling in the history of epidemics is a paper written by Daniel
Bernoulli in 1760 about the smallpox and inoculation [14]. Bernoulli was arguing in favour
of the inoculation technique against small pox using the mathematical reasoning and the
population data available at that time. While attempts to use population wide information
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were done prior to him, e.g. in the prominent cholera outbreak investigation by J. Snow in
1854 [100], Bernoulli’s article was one of the first applications of exact mathematics to the
matter.
In context of classical epidemiology, no population structure is modelled. A common
assumption is that the population is well mixed, thus each individual has the same proba-
bility of a contact to any of his peers. While not reflecting the details of reality, it is a valid
assumption when the data about the population structure is unavailable. Consequently, an
assumption about the homogeneity of individuals in the population is made. The only dis-
tinction is based on the infection related status. Accordingly, the population can be split into
subclasses of identical individuals. Given this approach, two parameters are needed to char-
acterise the disease: the infection rate β and the recovery rate γ. The latter is defined as the
inverse of infection period. The simplest model contains only two classes: susceptible and
infected, hence it is called the SI model. It can be described using only one parameter, β, as
in this model infected never recover. While this reflects the properties of some infections, it is
highly unrealistic for others. SIS and SIR models resolve this limitation by introducing a re-
covery process. After the recovery, the individuals either return in the susceptible group (SIS
model) or form the recovered / removed compartment (SIR model). Multiple more complex
models have been formalised, e.g. by introducing an exposed compartment, which accounts
for infected, but not yet symptomatic individuals. Furthermore, the population can be di-
vided into age groups to account for different disease dynamic among age groups. All of
these models can be implemented in terms of a system of ordinary differential equation or as
a stochastic system. For more details and the differences in the outcomes of these approaches
refer to [47].
Using this models fundamental insights into pandemic behaviours were gained. One of
the central parameters of theoretical and applied epidemiology, R0, is derived from the pa-
rameters described in the above paragraph. This value reflects the number of secondary cases
produced by a single infected in a fully susceptible population and thus can be established
approximately during an outbreak. One of the most fundamental laws, highlighted by the
epidemic modelling and reasoning alike, is the existence of an epidemic threshold at R0 = 1,
below which no disease spreading can be sustained. At this threshold an infected, on aver-
age, produces 1 secondary case. Thus, the disease can be remain persistent in the population
in a deterministic system. At lower reproduction rate the number of infected declines and
the disease goes extinct. Furthermore, the existence of herd immunity and the exact fraction
of vaccination fraction can be derived on the basis of epidemic models. A comprehensive
review of the matter is presented in [31].
Findings described above rely on the assumptions made. One of the heaviest assumptions
is the well-mixed population structure. With recent advancements in technology, many ways
of inferring the population structure have been created. It can be pooled from the online so-
cial networks, the mobile data and from portable sensors. The network science is a valuable
tool to incorporate this information into epidemic models. It has been shown that the popu-
lation structure can have a strong impact on the final size of the epidemic and the speed of
its progression. As demonstrated by [47], network topology can alter the final size of an SIR
epidemic. Erdo˝s–Rényi networks exhibit the highest peak incidence and it is also reached
fastest. The arising curve is comparable in its form to the classical well-mixed simulation.
Similar curves are derived from other networks, which exhibit distinct small-world properties
and small diameter. Other examples of such networks are geometric and scale-free networks.
Regular networks, like lattices, and certain implementations of small-world networks exhibit
a much slower epidemic progression and local wave-like pattern of the spreading. When
the regular lattice structure is loosened by random rewiring the spreading progresses faster.
This effect is due to the possibility to cross into an unaffected part of the network. The study
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of epidemic spreading on networks has challenged the existence of the epidemic threshold
described above. As has been demonstrated by [4], releasing the assumption of a homoge-
neous population alters the values of the epidemic threshold. Albert et. al. demonstrated
that in a theoretical scenario of an infinitely big scale-free network, an epidemic threshold is
non existent. Hence, if the underlying population structure permits it a disease with lower
R0 can spread.
To model the disease spreading on a more global level a combination of the network
and ODE based approach can be used. In this case the network represents a set of con-
nected meta-populations. Each meta-population is then modelled by a system of differential
equations, the links indicate a coupling between the populations. This model allows to ac-
count for known global structures, e.g. air traffic connection between the countries, and
include spreading of disease in a local population with an unknown contact pattern. Such
model was used in multiple publications, e.g. [25, 86]. One of the most sophisticated tools
to model worldwide disease spread, GLEaMviz, uses a combination of spatially separated
meta-populations coupled by traffic connections. It was applied in connection with multiple
outbreaks, most recently to forecast the spreading of Ebola during the 2014 outbreak [84, 34].
A different approach is taken by [17], where the network structure of air traffic is used to
predict the spread of the disease without regard to any disease specific parameters. It has
been shown that arrival times can be reliably predicted and outbreak origins estimated using
this methodology, called the effective distance. The effective distance is described in more
detail in chapter 3.
Alongside with the disease spreading on networks, the countermeasure deployment was
widely tested. In network science multiple metrics describing the role of a node are known.
Their usefulness in context of epidemic containment was investigated by several researchers.
The main insights are summarised by [79]. Many papers highlighted the usefulness of the
degree and betweenness centrality for the identification of influential spreaders [4, 79, 81]. It
has been shown that vaccination strategies based on knowledge of the properties of a node
are far more effective than random immunisation of individuals, requiring a lower fraction
of the population to be vaccinated for the disruption of disease spreading. Other publica-
tions emphasised that depending on the spreading process classical metrics, like degree or
betweenness centrality, are less suited to evaluate the role of the nodes [51, 28, 62]. Dur-
ing a pandemic the structure of the affected network is often unknown, as are degrees and
centralities of individuals composing a network. Thus, methods to infer these from the local
information were proposed and applied in context of the epidemic containment [24, 39]. Net-
work specific interventions, like link deletion, were tested in context of disease containment
[84].
In general, network science has proven to be a valuable tool to investigate a spreading pro-
cesses, led to new insights and approaches. In recent years many real world networks were
used to forecast the course of ongoing and emerging epidemics and to reconstruct past out-
breaks [34, 66, 91, 102]. It became a common practice to evaluate the threat of an outbreak by
extensive simulations, often involving transportation networks to infer the spreading routes.
An extensive computational tool, using transportation networks on multiple level and meta-
populations, was developed to enable interested parties to use computer simulations without
programming knowledge [18].
2.4 Game theory and disease containment
Game theory is a diverse scientific field, which was applied to many different questions
in economics and social sciences. It gave rise to the concept of homo economicus, now well
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known and widely accepted in finance. Game theory was later introduced into biology by
John Maynard Smith and eventually became one of valuable tools for theoretical study of
evolutionary biology. More recently game theoretical methods found their way into other
fields, e.g. psychology, computer science and public health.
At the basis of the game theory are players who compete in a game, trying to maximise
their payoff. A game is defined by a set of rules, which in turn defines the available actions
and the possible outcomes. The payoff of a strategy of a player depends on the action of
its peers. This is a unique feature of game theory, setting it apart from the field of classic
optimisation. Hence, actions of others have to be considered during the optimisation in
game theoretical context. The players are considered to be strictly selfish, minimising their
own costs. In evolutionary game theory this is easily explained by the selection pressure
applied on individuals and groups. Thus, a species that suffers lowest challenges will be
favoured by natural selection. In this context, even altruism can be explained in terms of
selfish or group-centric thinking. We refer interested reader to [72] for further details on the
game theory in evolutionary context.
There are multiple standard games, which have been investigated and solved analytically,
e.g. zero-sum games or the prisoners dilemma. These games can be rephrased to fit multiple
scenarios and used to investigate a big variety of questions. A game of particular interest
for public health and pandemic phenomena is the public goods game described as follow-
ing. At the beginning of the game all players have the possibility to contribute to a pool of
public goods. After that, donated amount is multiplied by a factor and split equally among
the players, regardless of their contribution [54]. In this context, free-riding emerges as a
dominant strategy: a player can generate payoff without inflicting any cost to himself. It has
been shown that no cooperation emerges in the classical public goods game if the players
are rational [5]. Nonetheless experimental results suggest a different behaviour when this
topic is investigated experimentally [54, 7]. Multiple mechanisms were proposed to explain
how cooperation can emerge and be sustained, e.g. through altruism, reciprocity or pun-
ishment [30, 48, 5, 57]. Some papers suggest that parallel public good games in structured
populations, e.g. networks, lead to higher cooperation than in a well-mixed group [96]. For
more information about game theoretical formalism on networks see [43]. Note that in this
classical definition all player have the same circumstances, thus same strategy results in the
same payoff for all players. The assumption that all players are equal, is not fulfilled in a
variety of situations, e.g. in the model proposed in chapter 6. However, a broad spectrum of
questions can be addressed by formulating those as classic public good games.
The vaccination behaviour, vaccine acceptance and levels, achieved by voluntary vaccina-
tion are highly relevant topics for public health and policy making. In recent years it was
widely explored using the game theory. The phenomenon of herd immunity can be well
framed in the public good terminology. For any disease eradication achieving herd immu-
nity is necessary, thus it is crucial to understand the mechanisms which promote vaccination.
The vaccination can bear cost for an individual in terms of time, money and adverse effects.
On the other hand it prevents cost inflicted by infection and disease. With an increasing
fraction of population being vaccinated, the incentive for an individual to vaccinate declines
as infection becomes less likely. Using game theoretical formalism, [12] showed that herd im-
munity can never be reached under voluntary vaccination policy with selfish, rational agents.
This also requires a player to have complete information and to explicitly evaluate the payoff
of a strategy. More realistic optimisation strategies with limited information and learning
behaviours were investigated, but led to globally suboptimal outcomes like temporal or spa-
cial flare-ups of disease [26, 65]. When, however, a network structure is introduced into the
game, a different outcome arises. As shown by [83], when disease is spreading over a con-
tact network and the vaccination behaviour is dependent on local information eradication of
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disease can be achieved even when the policy is voluntary.
As has been mentioned in the paragraph above, different algorithms of cost optimisation
can be used in context of game theory. In the subsequent section we will explain challenges
and basic methodology of cost function optimisation. Further we describe the basic algorithm
used in chapter 6 in detail.
2.5 Optimisation and evolutionary strategy
As explained in the previous section, the cost function optimisation is a central part of game
theory. In simple two player games solutions can be found by reasoning or by back of
the envelope calculations. With an increasing number of players and complex interaction
networks finding the final equilibrium is not simple. For more complex systems a complete,
analytical solution can often not be found. Thus, an iterative heuristic must be used to
acquire the final equilibrium of the system. A variety of algorithms can be used for this
purpose. Depending on the function, which is being optimised, multiple approaches exist.
A very popular method is gradient descent. In this method, the gradient of a function at
the current position is evaluated and this information is used for the most efficient descend.
While intuitive, this method is problematic when a function has multiple optima, is not
differentiable or must be optimised over a large number of parameters. Discrete parameter
values can be a further source of problems.
To solve problems of this kind, a family of algorithms inspired by the evolution arose.
Three distinct methods exist: evolutionary programming, genetic algorithms and evolu-
tionary strategies. All these algorithms incorporate two opposing forces, the diversification
through randomness and the pursuit of optimality through selection. In each case the optimi-
sation is an iterative process, where at every step a set of possible parameter configurations
of the function is created and subjected to selection. Each parameter configuration in the set
has a measure of quality, called fitness, upon which parameter configurations are selected.
The selection process is described in detail at the bottom of the paragraph. The set, which
remains after the selection process, is called a generation. From each generation new individ-
uals are created by a process which mimics the mating. During this process a new parameter
configuration is created as a copy or a permutation of multiple parameter configurations
from the previous generation. The template configurations are called parents and the cre-
ated ones are called offsprings. Additionally, the mutation of offsprings can be performed
to introduce a greater variety and explore the parameter space. After this step parameter
configurations with the highest fitness are selected to form a new generation and the rest
of the set is discarded. In this thesis we use evolutionary strategy for the cost optimisation.
We will explain this methodology in greater detail in subsequent paragraphs. We follow the
procedure described by [16].
Before describing the algorithm some basic concepts have to be introduced. In this al-
gorithm an individual is described by a parameter configuration for the optimised function
and the endogenous parameters of the individual. The latter affect the mutation rate of all
properties of the individual as the evolutionary strategy algorithm allows mutation of func-
tion and endogenous parameters. Assume, for example, the function we are minimising is
y = x21 + x
2
2. Then an individual is described by (1) an array of length two, x = (x1, x2), (2)
a vector of endogenous parameters s and (3) the fitness associated with the parameter con-
figuration, F(x). More generally, an individual ik is described by ik = (xk, sk, F(xk)) where xk
is a vector of length n containing all parameters of the optimised function. The evolutionary
strategy algorithm has application beyond simple numerical functions, for more detail we re-
fer to [16]. The fitness F(xk) is the measure of how close the value of the optimised function,
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parametrised by xk, comes to the desired outcome. Depending on the implementation,
the fitness can approach zero when reaching optimal configuration or it can be max-
imal at the desired best configuration. In previous example we can define the fitness as
F(x) = y(x), thus fitness will decrease as it approaches the optimal solution. In this section
we call parameter configuration closer to the optimum to be fitter, regardless of the underly-
ing implementation of the fitness function. The exogenous parameters, meaning unvarying
parameters of the algorithm are µ - size of the parent population, λ - size of the offspring
population and ρ - mixing number, determining how many parents an offspring has. The
general procedure of the algorithm is as follows
1. Initialise the system by creating the first generation
2. For each offspring kn; n ∈ {1, 2, ..., λ}
(a) Pick ρ individuals to be parents of kn
(b) Create the offspring by recombination of parents’ s and x
(c) Apply mutation on the offspring; note that mutation parameters s have to be
mutated first, followed by mutation of x
3. Select the fittest individuals to form the next generation
4. Repeat steps 2 to 4 until the final generation is established; this can be triggered either
when a specific number of generations is reached of if the composition of the population
is not changing over multiple generations
At initiation of the algorithm the first generation is created randomly. Depending on the
constraints and the system, the range of random number generator can be limited. The first
generation contains µ individuals, which will serve as parents. Note that the number of par-
ent individuals is not limited to two. In case of ρ = 1 no recombination is possible in the next
step, thus usual choice is ρ ≥ 2. Parents are chosen with uniform probability with no regard
to fitness, consequently selection is not applied at this stage. This is an important difference
between genetic algorithm and evolutionary strategy, where in the former selection is applied
during the mating process. In evolutionary strategy non-optimal parameter configurations
can still serve as templates to create offsprings. Thus space around suboptimal solution is
explored and diversity is not lost at early stages. After all ρ parents were selected, one off-
spring is produced as a recombinant of those. Two types of recombination can be applied to
generate an offspring. The intermediate recombination produces an offspring for which each
parameter is the average value of its parents. Thus for an offspring k and set of its parents
in; n ∈ {1, 2, ..., ρ}
km =
1
ρ
ρ
∑
n=1
(in)m
Discrete parameters need to be mapped back in discrete space, e.g. by probabilistic rounding.
When the dominant (or discrete) recombination is performed, the offspring is a permutation
of the parents features. Each parameter of the offspring k is a randomly chosen feature
of one of its parents, km ∼ U({(i1)m, (i2)m, ..., (iρ)m}). Same procedure is applied to the
endogenous parameters assigned to the individual. The offsprings are generated until their
number reaches λ. Note that an individual can be parent to many offsprings. There are
multiple theories about how the recombination promotes optimality as well as diversity in
this algorithm. For a detailed discussion of it see [15].
The most important tool to create variability in the population during the evolutionary
algorithm is the mutation step. Again, the mutation procedure is applied to the endogenous
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parameters and the parameters of the function under optimisation. Note however, that the
endogenous parameters have to be mutated first as they affect the subsequent mutation of the
function parameters. There are multiple requirements for the mutation process to make the
algorithm effective. First, to ensure an effective search and enable a global convergence each
point of fitness landscape and each parameter configuration must be reachable irrespective
of the initial conditions and in a finite number of steps. Second, the mutation process have
to be unbiased by fitness information. Selection and mutation serve antagonistic purposes,
the recombination is a part of the latter process. Thus, it should not use the same underlying
information as selection. Third, the entire evolutionary strategy system has to be defined in
a way that enables a smooth evolutionary random path across the landscape. Hence, it is
required that a small change in the parameter configuration of the function under optimi-
sation results in a small change in the fitness. This depends not solely on the optimised or
fitness function but on the parametrisation of the algorithm. Consequently, the optimised
function is not necessary required to be differentiable. For more detailed analysis of the last
requirement see [15, 98]. Nonetheless, the listed requirements can be violated without any
loss of effectivity when the optimised function requires to do so and the violations are chosen
carefully.
When a vector is mutated a randomly drawn offset is added to each entry of the parameter
vector, x′ = x+ z where x′ is the vector x after mutation. z is the mutation vector of length
n with each entry drawn from a normal distribution and multiplied by σk, the mutation
strength in a particular dimension. In mathematical terms, zk = σkZ; k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, Z ∼
N (0, 1) . Thus, the strength of the deviation through mutation in each parameter of the
optimised function can be varied. Note that the use varying mutation strength requires some
knowledge about the system under optimisation. Consequently, the easiest assumption is
σk = σ for all k. In this case all mutants are normally distributed around the original point
in parameter space in each dimension. While this procedure is suited for search in space of
real numbers similar considerations can be done for discrete and binary domains [15].
After all offsprings were generated and mutated, selection is applied. While the previous
steps increased the diversity of individuals in the population, selection is steering the system
towards optimality. Depending on the implementation of the algorithm the next generation
is composed exclusively from offsprings ((µ, λ) selection) or parents and offsprings ((µ +
λ) selection). In both cases the µ fittest individuals are selected from the population to
form the next generation of parents. In (µ, λ) selection scenario only the offsprings are
considered for selection, when (µ+ λ) selection is applied all individuals compete to enter
the next generation. Thus, in (µ+ λ) selection an individual can, in principle, survive over
the entire algorithm duration. The selected µ individuals form the next generation. After
new generation has been established the procedure to create the subsequent generation is
repeated: parent selection, recombination and mutation, followed by selection. This iterative
process is performed for intended number of generations. The last generation is a set of
solutions which are optimal or close to optimal.
For many problems, the methods like gradient descent or simulated annealing are not
feasible due to the complexity of the function, constraints, discrete and highly multidimen-
sional parameter space. In these cases the evolutionary computations are the only family of
methods to solve the task, combining the diversity of solutions achieved by random search
and the optimality introduced by selection rounds. Note that the presented algorithm con-
tains multiple parameters and methodic choices, which need to be made with regard to the
problem at hand. The choice of mutation parameter σ can influence the width of distribution
in the final generation. If σ is too large, the fitness of individuals in the final generation will
fluctuate in a broad region around the optimum. Further under certain assumptions it can be
shown that for real-valued search space the number of generations needed for the algorithm
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to approach optimal solution scales linearly with number of parameters of the optimised
function.
2.6 Existing approaches for resource allocation
The question of efficient resource allocation is of direct importance for public health. Major
outbreaks can be prevented and the outcomes improved when resources are directed to the
right locations efficiently and timely. This is a non trivial task as the spreading routes and
the contact networks can be unclear, the delays unforeseeable. But even with knowledge of
the underlying network and with negligible delays the task is rarely fully tractable, let alone
analytically solvable. A similar problem arises in a different area where viruses spread, but
not via human contacts. In computer networks the virus attacks or the cascading failure
of nodes can be studied with the same methods as a contagion phenomena on networks in
public health. Network structures in this field are usually known, top-down policies and
compliance can be enforced easier than in human interaction networks. Public health and
network security can benefit from sharing the insights, thus below we will discuss results
from both fields, outline the differences and the application of results from computer science
to public health.
All but one publication described in this section assume a top-down policy, which is en-
forced in a network by a certain overarching entity. This is a valid assumption, as there are
global organisations capable of coordinating the international containment efforts. As will
be outlined in chapter 6 there are multiple issues connected to such an arrangement. Fur-
ther, all research papers discussed below consider two or more coupled locations which are
affected or threatened by the disease. A simplest case to study is presented by two coupled
nodes, connected by a transmission link. This topology is highly simplified and artificial,
but analytically tractable. Thus it is often applied in combination with meta-population ap-
proach, meaning that the population inside the nodes is modelled by an ODE system. Most
papers use the number of individuals infected in the course of an outbreak as a measure of
the cost. The final outbreak size is acquired by explicitly solving the ODE equations or by an
approximation. [93] and [64] used the described procedure to study the allocation problem
with analytical tools. Epidemic models used are SIS and SIRS respectively. The later is also
investigated in its limit case where the immunity vanes instantly, making it equivalent to an
SIS model. In both publications all subpopulations are affected by the epidemic to different
extent and the task is to distribute the resources to minimise the final size of the epidemic.
While the ethics might suggest that the heavier affected region should be prioritised for
treatment, both publications suggest otherwise. In fact, they show that treating the heavier
affected region is the worst strategy among all considered alternatives. [93] concludes that
the most efficient strategy is to concentrate the containment efforts on the less affected region
and allocate no resources to the heavily affected region. While ethically questionable, this
strategy results in much lower global prevalence.
In the paper by [93] resources are allocated prior to the epidemic as a one time donation.
[64], on the other hand, proposes a model in which a certain constant amount of resources
is supplied per time step. Thus, a more complex strategy can be employed. The optimal
strategy presented in the paper requires to change the recipient of investment at a certain
time point. Most affected region receives investment at the early stage, from a certain time
point onwards the resources are committed lesser affected region. The timing of the switch
is highly dependent on the disease specific parameters, which makes this strategy difficult
to implement in a real world scenario. [116] has shown that it is possible to solve a more
complicated system of connected populations.
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When the problem is studied on a more local scale, the nodes are assumed to be individ-
uals, thus assigned a discrete state. This approach is also pursued when computer networks
are studied. This way the efficiency of a containment strategy can be evaluated with re-
spect to a specific population structure. Many papers have studied the targeted vaccination
without resource constraints as has been outlined in section 2.3. Several publications, pub-
lished in computational journals, propose solutions to this problem under constraints, e.g.
[87]. In this paper resources of two kinds are available: preventive, vaccine like resources
and corrective antidotes, which can be given to an affected node to free it from the disease.
The paper proposes an algorithm to solve the resource allocation problem using geometrical
programming. The final solution resulting from an extensive calculation, does not correlate
to any of the existing centrality metrics and results in a complicated pattern. Preciado et.
al. apply proposed algorithm to computer and transportation networks alike. [20] studies
the problem in a more analytical manner, correlating the final solution to existing metric.
His research indicates that the allocation strategy can be guided by degree of the nodes, but
decision whether high or low degree nodes are granted investment depends on the epidemic
regime of the system.
The resource allocation in context of multi-resistant bacteria spreading over a hospital net-
work was studied by [85]. In the proposed model allocating resources to a hospital decreased
the probability of disease transmission to the respective node, thus slowing the overall disease
progression. In this paper heuristic optimisation algorithms are proposed and implemented,
which are capable of calculating an effective resource distribution over the network. The pa-
per demonstrates that the algorithm can calculate resource distribution which is three to six
times more effective than the strategy currently employed by the hospitals. The algorithm
can be used outside of the public health domain as long as the spreading takes place on
a network with known topology and at the time of deployment infected nodes are known.
The latter must not be true in a realistic situation due to gaps in surveillance or diseases
where asymptomatic progression is possible. [118] proposes multiple algorithms to calculate
optimal resource allocation given unreliable and incomplete information.
The only paper to our knowledge, which studies a bottom-up, agent driven resource allo-
cation is [103]. The system under investigation consists of two connected meta-populations,
which own a specific amount of resources and can distribute available resources to remove
susceptible from the population, e.g. in analogy to vaccination. In this paper the nodes
are required to spend all available resources on disease prevention, but can choose how to
distribute those between the nodes. The distribution of resources is chosen to reduce the
final number of affected individuals among own meta-population. For each node there is an
incentive to donate a fraction of resources to the second subpopulation as it poses a threat
to the local population through the coupling term. Wang et al. prove that in this system a
Pareto optimal solution exist. They further study the outcome of a top-down, global optimi-
sation solution. In this case overall number of infected is being minimised. As expected from
similar problems studied in context of game theory, there is a mismatch between selfish op-
timal solution and the global optimisation. When optimised selfishly the infected neighbour
receives less investment than is considered optimal from the global perspective. Note that
this model is not a subtype of a public good game, but only resembles it in minor details.
2.7 Summary
As has been outlined above, the epidemiology is a rich field being explored by a variety of
methods. After the introduction of network approach into epidemiological field modelling
global spread became feasible and common in times of ongoing pandemics. Aside from
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forecasting the progression of a certain outbreak in real time, efforts have been made to
draw more general conclusions, which can be readily used without reliance on knowledge of
disease specifics. Latter approaches, on par with sophisticated modelling tools, can inform
decision makers about future development of an epidemic to enable a timely and adequate
reactions.
Further research has been made to understand what an adequate and feasible reaction
is. The game theory has been a tool of choice to study resource allocation as soon as con-
flicting interests arise. One of the current topics widely explored using this approach is the
vaccination and herd immunity. Multiple relevant insights were generated, among others the
impossibility of achieving herd immunity when all individuals act perfectly selfish and the
emergence of fluctuations in the vaccine uptake. The resource allocation on a global scale
with response to a pandemic was investigated for a set of simplified systems. The research
in this area was concentrated on a top-down enforced allocation of available goods among
all actors of a system. It has shown that optimal strategies can generate ethical conflicts,
i.e. when the optimal strategy prescribes to abandon heavily affected countries and aid the
regions with fewer cases. Furthermore some more complicated strategies were proposed,
but their reliance on exact parameter estimates makes them a risky choice in a real world
scenario, where disease parameters are difficult to estimate and are subject to seasonal and
regional fluctuations.
The work presented in this thesis is at the crossing of two approaches described above.
On the one hand it aims to develop a set of methods to evaluate the risk of disease importa-
tion and identify influential nodes. On the other hand it describes a solution to the resource
allocation problem on a global scale, but releasing the top-down assumption. Assuming self-
ish interests, a conflict among the players arises, making the game theoretic optimisation a
natural choice. To our knowledge there is only one publication studying resource allocation
by selfish agents. It demonstrates that optimal allocations are different among players, high-
lighting the conflict. Further, when optimisation minimising global cost is performed the
outcome differs from the selfish optimisation. As will be demonstrated in later chapters, this
result is consistent with our findings despite the different methodology.
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Chapter 3
Prerequisites
Research presented in this short chapter is necessary to understand the methods intro-
duced in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Unlike the broad overview given in chapter 2, following
pages give a detailed description of two Concepts. First we construct and characterise
the world aviation network, which serves as a basic structure for the metrics developed
throughout this thesis. Second, we describe the effective distance introduced by [17] and
used extensively in chapters 4 and 5. Forthermore,
In the work at hand we make use of the concept of effective distance introduced in paper
[17]. This concept was derived for transportation networks where the fluxes between the
nodes are known. Its use originally demonstrated on the world air transport network (WAN),
the same network we will use in this thesis. Multiple publications has highlighted WAN as
the basis for global pandemic spreading [25, 41, 67, 101]. It has been shown that predictive
power of pandemic models is increased when world air traffic is considered, as it is the
fastest way of long distance travel with million passengers per day [58]. Due to short travel
times an infected is unlikely to recover on a plane, thus carrying the disease to his traffic
destination. This makes air traffic an important transmission path. Very short travel times
are an important change compared to the traffic about hundred years ago, where journey
between continents took months to finish. Back then an infected was likely to die or recover
prior to his or her arrival. This is one of many reasons why modern pandemic spread with
a much greater speed than their historic counterparts. Traffic volume is another reason for
increased spreading speed. Effective distance and effective distance trees can be derived from
any kind of transportation or freight networks. In the original paper the methodology was
successfully applied on food supply network in Germany to track food bourn outbreaks.
In the following chapter we will explain effective distance and introduce the world air
transport network. First we will we describe the WAN in greater detail, data which served as
a basis and the construction of the network from traffic data. Further we analyse the distri-
bution of traffic across continents and regions, discuss how the amount of traffic in a region
relates to its population and the implications of this relationship. Second we demonstrate
how effective distance can be calculated on WAN, how it can be used to predict the course
or the source of a pandemic and to estimate arrival times of the disease.
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3.1 World air transport network
World air transport network (WAN) is derived from the data of scheduled flights as reported
by [58]. Data contains 3856 airports and 26691 flight connections. The network is constructed
using airports as nodes and flight connections as links. The weight of a link from node i to
node j, Fji, is defined as number of seats on scheduled flights from i to j during the year
20141. We further define relative flux of a node i, fi = ∑j Fij/∑k,m Fkm. Relative flux over a
node represents the fraction of worldwide traffic accumulated by node i. Note that Fij = Fji
as the network is symmetrical. Furthermore geographical coordinates, region and country
to which the airport belongs is provided by the dataset. Hence, we use this information
throughout the thesis.
The WAN is highly inhomogeneous network with multiple high degree hubs and a much
larger number of low degree nodes. It shows distinct small world properties. Median and
mean relative fluxes are f˜ = 1.6e− 5 and f¯ = 26e− 5. In this network the top 100 airports
account for more than a hsalf of the entire passenger flux. The diameter of the network is 16.
Although, when smallest airports accounting for 2% of the global flux and links connected
to those airports are removed, the diameter is reduced to 6. Reduced network contains
1787 airports, approximately a third of the nodes from full WAN. This underlines that high
fraction of nodes present in the WAN accounts for a little fraction of links, while the core of
the network is composed from a smaller number of well connected hubs.
The WAN gives insight about the distribution of the air traffic across the globe and can
give us a general understanding of the participation of different nations in the air transporta-
tion. While we generally expect the flux to be roughly proportional to the population inside
of the catchment area, statistics provided by the World Bank allow us to verify this assump-
tion at least on the level of countries, regions or continents [10]. The population percentages
represent the fraction between the population in the respective location divided by the total
worldwide population. Flux fractions are calculated analogously.
On continent-wide scale the proportionality between population and flux is weak. While
Asia is home to more than 60 % of the global population, it accounts for about 37% of the
air traffic. Similar situation arises in Africa: while it harbours approximately 15 % of the
global population, its share of the air traffic is 3.2 %. It also hosts 353 airport, which is
the second lowest number in the WAN. Oceania is the only continent accounting for less
airports than Africa, home to 337 airports. At the same time, Oceania’s population is only
3.5 % of the population on African continent. With exception of Africa, ranking of continents
according to population and to flux match. Hence we can conclude that while there is a
proportionality between population size and amount of flux, it is neither direct and nor linear.
When assuming equal proportionality across the globe, systematic under- or overestimation
can lead to false conclusions.
When populations and fluxes on regional level are considered, similar picture arises. Gen-
erally, higher flux in a region correlates with bigger population, nonetheless several regions
deviate from this rule. Regions with better developed infrastructure account for higher frac-
tion of flux, e.g North Africa is accounting for 36% of african traffic while it harbours 21 %
of its population. Middle Africa, on the other hand, accounts for only 6 % of African traffic
and 13.5 % of the population. In Asian region, Central and Southern Asia participate less
in the air transportation than expected from their population fractions. While Southern Asia
harbours 42 % of the Asian population, it accounts for only 10 % of the traffic. Western Asia,
1Raw link weight matrix Fraw represents cumulative number of seats in scheduled commercial flights between
target and destination over the year. To ensure that Fij = Fji at every link, the flux matrix F was defined as
F = Fraw × FTraw. Division by 2 was omitted as the absolute values of passenger flux are not important for the
methodology presented in the work at hand.
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Figure 3.1: (A) The structure of the WAN superimposed with a geographical map; points
show the location of the airports, lines show flight connections, colors represent the conti-
nent. The graph shows traffic connections with highest passenger numbers, presented links
account for 50% of the worldwide air traffic. (B) Relative flux distribution of the WAN. X-
axis shows the relative flux accumulated by a node, y-axis - the probability that a randomly
chosen node has relative flux higher than the x value. There is a number of hubs accounting
for more than one percent of the global traffic each. It also contains a high number of nodes
which contribute little to the worldwide traffic flow, mean and median weighted degree are
one order of magnitude apart. The WAN is a highly heterogeneous network showing small
world properties.
on contrary, is the smallest Asian region with 6 % of the population. Nevertheless, it facili-
tates 16 % of Asian traffic. On American continent, North America accounts for 73% of the
entire traffic, bearing only 36 % of the population. American continent as a whole hosts 1514
airports, which is the highest number of airports per continent. 990 of American airports
are situated in North America. Flux distribution across Europe is more even, with Eastern
Europe accounting for smaller and North Europe higher fraction of the air traffic, compared
to the expectation from the population of the region.
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The distribution of the hub airports across the world is uneven, with most hubs being
located inside the developed countries. 30 out of 100 biggest hubs are part of the North
American region, 20 are located in Eastern Asia and 13 in Western Europe. Central America
and South Africa are home to one of the top 100 hubs respectively. Other regions represented
by the top 100 hubs are multiple European regions, Australia, South America, Southern and
South-Eastern Asia.
The above observations emphasise that on par with the amount of population, develop-
mental level of the region impacts the flux inside this region. Regions harbouring the highly
developed, high income countries account for higher fractions of air traffic and host more
global hubs. As the hubs are used as the transit nodes, this will have implications in the
latter chapters. In general, it is likely that an agent starting at a random node will traverse
one of the hubs after only a few steps. This means that highly developed more probably host
transit nodes and lie at short effective distance to the rest of the network.
3.2 Effective distance
The main idea behind the effective distance is that the spreading on a network is dominated
by the most probable paths, leaving the rest of connections redundant. This is analogous
to the dominance of the smallest resistor in an electrical circuit, where many heterogeneous
resistors are connected in parallel. This allows us to simplify a complex network to a tree, if
we know the outbreak origin. This method was originally described in [17].
Consider a weighted network with N nodes and L links. A link from node i to node j has
a weight of wij. Some special attention has to be payed to the definition of a weight. One
possibility to define a link weight is to consider it to be the cost connected with traversing an
edge (analogous to resistance) or as distance along this edge (analogous to road distance). In
this case a higher link weight means longer distance between the nodes. Another approach is
to define a link weight as flux over an edge (analogous to the amount of passengers travelling
along a route), relating bigger link weight to shorter distance between the nodes. In the thesis
the latter definition is used, in case of WAN wji = f ji.
When a process is spreading over a network it can be carried by a random walker, in anal-
ogy to an infected individual travelling via air traffic. To predict the course of the spreading,
we need to know the route of the walker. At each node i the walker has a limited set of
links which he can take. To be precise, nodes which are not connected to i via a link can not
be reached by the walker in a single step. Hence, the probability that at the next step the
agent will move to one of i’s neighbours is ∑j∈N Pji = 1, where N is the set containing all
neighbours of i and Pij is the probability that a walker will travel from i to j. The definition
Pji = Fji/∑
k
Fki (3.1)
satisfies this condition. Note that even in case of Fij = Fji, Pij 6= Pji in most of the cases.
When speaking about distances, we expect them to be additive, hence we define the effective
length from i to its neighbour j as
dji = d0 − logPji
This way effective lengths along one path can be added and lower probability Pji results in a
bigger distance between i and j. In addition we can define a minimal distance between two
nodes, d0. If we wish to penalise the paths involving multiple transit nodes, we can assign
d0 > 0 . We can think of this penalty as a waiting time until the walker can move on to the
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next node. Throughout the course of the thesis we define d0 = 0. All presented results were
also tested using d0 = 1 without any qualitative and only minor quantitative changes.
To calculate the overall length of a path from n0 to a remote node nL in terms of effective
distance we need to sum the effective lengths of links between the nodes contributing to this
path. Using above definitions we can calculate the length of a path from n0 to a remote node
nL along a path ω = {n0..., nL}
λ =
L
∑
i=1
dnini−1
and define effective distance between the nodes as the shortest length of all possible paths
DnLn0 = min(λ)
Using the shortest paths based on effective distance we can construct the effective distance
tree rooted at node i. This tree shows all most probable spreading routes from i to the rest
of the network. Note that on the effective distance trees, just as on the shortest path trees,
issues arise when multiple shortest paths between a pair of nodes exist. This is not the case
in the WAN and is generally an exception in weighted, non highly symmetrical networks.
Modern epidemics result in wave-like patterns when the nodes are remapped according
to the effective distance to the origin of the outbreak. This highlights that the spreading in
the modern world is not dominated by the geographical distance, but rather by the possible
fastest routes of travel. For individual, international traffic the air transport is unprecedented
in its speed and volume of traffic. Hence, it is not surprising that it determines the inter-
national spread of diseases. Nonetheless, usefulness of the WAN can decline when short
distances are concerned. It is likely that commuter and short range travel is dominated by
car or train traffic. When investigating such scenario we advice to use a different network,
which accounts for most used means of travel in context of the problem.
An important application of the effective distance tree lies in the estimation of the arrival
time of the epidemic. The latter can be calculated without the knowledge of any disease
specific parameters, which makes this approach more robust against the uncertainties in the
estimation. The arrival time can be described as the quotient of effective distance from the
source over the spreading speed of the disease on the effective distance tree
Ta = Dji/υe f f (α, R0, γ, ε)
The spreading speed can be estimated as soon as the disease has been transferred to at least
one node different from source. Spreading speed depends on disease specific parameters,
but knowledge of these is not required. Knowing the effective distance from the source to
this node, Dki, and the time difference between the beginning of the outbreak and its arrival
at node k, ∆tki, we can estimate the spreading speed as
υe f f = Dki/∆tki
As has been demonstrated in the original paper, the effective distance can also be used to
estimate the outbreak origin, in case it is unknown. As highlighted by the formula, there is
a linear dependency between effective distance and the arrival time. Hence, by calculating
the correlation between these values most probable outbreak origin can be identified. For a
more detailed explanation and application examples refer to [17].
Throughout this thesis we will use the effective distance and the derived tree to define
further metrics which we apply to guide decision making during an unfolding pandemic.
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Chapter 4
Defining the scope: A context
specific approach to identifying key
airports during a pandemic
In this chapter we introduce two metrics: scope and confluence. Both metrics describe the
importance of a node during a pandemic and its role in dessiminating the disease. Defined
metrics rely on effective distance trees and therefore present a context sensitive characteri-
sation of nodes in a specific outbreak scenario. After showing the mathematic definition of
the metrics we superimpose them with established, non-context sensitive centrality mea-
sures. On the world air traffic network, scope and confluence result in a more diverse
and specific list of super-spreader nodes across multiple outbreak scenarios. Further, we
demonstrate how airport profiles can be defined in terms of scope and be utilized to group
the locations according to their region of influence and the characteristic role they take
on. We show that the airports can be separated in two groups: generalists and specialists.
Specialists play a major role during outbreaks in a specific region while having a minor
influence when the outbreak is initiated outside of this geographic region. Generalists, on
the other hand, are important disseminating points in many outbreak scenarios. Finally,
this chapter shows how the matrics can be applied to a selection of hypothetical and real
world outbreaks. Moreover, the metrics can be applied with the focus on a target location,
informing in what scenarios this location takes on an important role.
On early stages of epidemiological modelling, ODE systems have dominated the field.
At the heart of this approach is the assumption that all agents in the system are equal, sur-
rounded by the same environment and have the same probability of contact with every agent
in the system. This assumption has big implications for the outcome of the model and hence
introduces a bias. Recent research has shown that in real systems this assumption doesn’t
hold. A more realistic way of describing social systems was offered by network theory, where
individuals are approximated by nodes and relations between them are described in terms
of links. Incorporating this approach made it possible to account for differences in the num-
ber and strength of contacts, removing the uniformity assumption. This also changed the
way how countermeasure deployment was viewed. When all agents are considered to be
equal and live in the same environment, there is no difference in whom to target by the in-
terventions, e.g. vaccination or quarantine. On networks some nodes can be a better target
for interventions than other, e.g. because of a high number of links or their central posi-
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Figure 4.1: Examples of shortest path trees derived from air transportation network as ex-
plained in [17]. Outbreak origins are located in Freetown (left) and Conakry (right), the
length of the branches represents the effective distance from the origin. Nodes are coloured
according to the geographical region. While the trees look similar in their structure different
nodes take on important roles. London Heathrow (LHR) is an important gate in case of an
outbreak in Freetown, but it has only a minor role when the epidemic starts in Conakry. Paris
Charles de Gaule (CDG) displays the opposite behaviour. Dubai International (DXB) plays
a much bigger role if the outbreak is starting in Conakry compared to Freetown. Therefore
the knowledge of the origin and the structure of the shortest path tree is crucial for effective
countermeasure deployment.
tion between communities. There have been efforts to use conventional centrality measures
from graph theory to guide decisions about intervention efforts on networks [99, 51, 39, 28].
While there is a myriad of metrics, some of them have gained bigger popularity than others
[70]. The simplest centrality measure is degree centrality, which describes the number of
neighbours of a node. This metric indicates how many nodes are directly influenced by the
source or can be infected by it. Another metric, which was was demonstrated to be useful
in many respects, is betweenness centrality. This centrality measure accounts for the num-
ber of shortest paths crossing a node. This reflects how many long distance connections are
disrupted when a node is removed from the network. Other common metrics are closeness
centrality, which reflects the shortest path length from a node to all remaining nodes of the
network, and eigenvector centrality, which considers not only own degree, but also factors in
the degree of surrounding nodes. All centrality measures mentioned above were developed
outside of the epidemic context and are calculated for the network regardless of its state, not
including any information about the source of a spreading phenomenon. Thus they assign a
node the same importance in every pandemic scenario.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates that such thinking obscures the real picture of the highly variable
role of a node depending on the epidemic scenario. The graphs show effective distance trees,
as explained on page 30, rooted at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Conakry, Guinea. Both cities
were heavily affected by Ebola epidemic in 2014 and posed a potential threat of exporting
cases. Their locations are geographically close, lying only 217 km apart, but the route via
which the disease would most likely spread globally from either source is very different. The
graph demonstrates that Paris Charles de Gaule airport (CDG) is a major transit airport in
case of an outbreak in Conakry. This means that the probability of an infected who exits
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Conakry to pass through CDG, weather to exit there or to proceed travelling to another
destination, is very high. If the outbreak happens in Freetown, Charles de Gaule airport has
much less importance. The inverse is true for London-Heathrow (LHR) airport, which is a
major transit airport when the journey is started in Freetown, but is close to being a leaf in a
tree rooted at Conakry airport. This highlights the need of a context sensitive metric which
accounts for the origin of the outbreak.
Contrary to the above, different conventional metrics often favour the same hub nodes as
we demonstrate in figure 4.2. The figure shows the top 15 airports from the WAN according
to passenger flux, which is equivalent to weighted degree, betweenness and closeness cen-
trality. As demonstrated by the plot, betweenness and closeness centrality correlate heavily
with weighted degree. If each metric would provide an entirely distinct ranking, figure 4.2
would contain a set of 45 unique airports. Instead, only 27 distinct airports are present in
the figure. Furthermore, 24 airports are present in at least two centrality measure rankings,
4 are shared between all three. This highlights how much overlap is observed between these
metrics. Considering the computational power needed to calculate complex metrics like be-
tweenness and closeness centralities and the ranking overlap with flux or degree centrality,
the benefit from the calculation might be minor. None of these metrics is solving the prob-
lem of a varying node role depending on the origin of the spreading phenomenon. Hence
we need to develop a new, context sensitive metric which will account for the variability
observed in areal world scenario.
In this chapter we approach this issue by defining new centrality measures following
the methodology introduced in [17]. The outbreak origin enters the calculation, thus we
account for the specific context in which our metrics are to be applied. We use shortest path
trees based on effective distance to derive two node properties: scope and confluence. We see
the latter as a context specific number of children to which the disease can spread directly
through the node. Scope accounts for the fraction of the network which can be accessed
on the shortest path tree through the node. This also reflects the fraction of flights which
will use the node either for transit or as final destination. Hence by deploying interventions
at this node we can protect a given fraction of the population. We demonstrate how those
metrics relate to existing centrality measures, particularly degree and betweenness centrality,
and show that the later is a special case of scope. We outline how a set of trees can be
used to calculate average scope or confluence if a wide geographical region is affected by
the disease or the true outbreak origin is unknown. Averaging has some implications which
will be discussed in this chapter. We demonstrate that scope is more suited to identify
nodes of importance for a particular outbreak scenario than established metrics by being
context sensitive and giving a tractable value for the benefit connected to the deployment
of countermeasures in a particular node. We apply scope on different outbreak scenarios
and discuss which nodes act as transit locations and how influences of colonial history can
still be observed in the structure of world aviation network (WAN). One of the advantages
of scope is that it is possible to switch perspectives and concentrate on a target node rather
than the outbreak origin. We show how outbreak sources can be classified according to the
scope value they invoke for a specific node. This application is important for local authorities
who monitor and manage a certain airport. Thus they are in a position to prevent disease
spreading beyond the respective airport if the response is appropriate.
4.1 Definition of scope and confluence
As has been demonstrated by [17], spreading processes on networks are dominated by most
probable paths between nodes. Hence we expect that the import of disease to a new node
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Figure 4.2: Top 15 airports according to passenger flux f , betweenness centrality Cb and
closeness centrality Cc. Airports are labeled by respective IATA letter code. Bold labeled
airports are part of the top 15 according to all three centrality measures. Colour of the bars
indicates their geographic location. Established centrality measures favour similar nodes.
Out of 27 nodes defined by the top 15 among all centrality measures, 24 are shared in at least
two out of three metrics.
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Figure 4.3: Graphic explanation of scope and confluence. The shortest path tree is derived
from a random geometric graph, an example node n is shown in red. Confluence of node
n is the number of paths, which converge at the node. Nodes with high confluence present
good intervention targets as each node downstream from them will cover only a fraction of
paths joining at node n. The fraction of the network population on the branch downstream
from node n, itself included, is the scope of the node (blue and red). Nodes with high scope
act as transit bottleneck to a big portion of the network in case of an epidemic and represent
valuable targets for interventions like passenger screening.
will happen via such probable paths and less probable paths can be neglected. Note that in
some networks there can be multiple paths with the same probability. In this case neglecting
either can lead to biased results. However, only highly symmetrical graphs, like lattices,
are affected by this problem. The the WAN, which is highly heterogeneous, has a very
low chance of multiple equiprobable paths. Further in none of the presented cases did we
observe multiple paths with same or similar probabilities. Therefore we define new metrics,
scope and confluence, based on the effective distance tree instead of a full network. As a
consequence both metrics depend on the origin of the tree. Below we will demonstrate that
scope and confluence can vary greatly depending on the outbreak scenario. We will show
how those metrics can be averaged over multiple trees and how this changes the reliability.
Given a network and respective effective distance tree Ti with node i as its origin, we
define confluence of the node cn(Ti) as the number of its direct offsprings on the shortest
path tree. Confluence of a node is strictly kn − 1 or smaller, where kn is degree of node n.
Scope of a node sn is defined as the fraction of network population which can be reached
through node n on the shortest path three
sn(Ti) = ∑
k∈Θ
ηk; sn(Ti) ≤ 1
where ηk is the population fraction at node k and Θ = Θ(Ti) is a set of children, grandchil-
dren etc. of node n as well as n itself. Thus, the most probable path to each node in the set
Θ is traversing node n. Note that Θ is dependent on the effective distance tree and hence the
outbreak origin. For the tree origin i this set contains all nodes of the network, hence si = 1.
A note regarding the population size of a node is necessary. The most natural approach
to define the size of a population of the airport node in the WAN is by assigning it the
size of the population in its catchment area. This information is rarely available. Thus, one
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possible assumption is that the population size inside the catchment area is proportional to
the flux. This assumption is only true for the mobile population inside the area, meaning the
population fraction which has real access to the air traffic. Due to low income, availability
of faster transport or geographical boundaries some population fraction can be excluded
from the access to the airport. Assuming the aforementioned proportionality of flux and
population inside the catchment area, systematic errors can arise. For example we are given
two nodes, n and k, and fn = fk. By proportionality assumption we set ηn = ηk. If, due to
social disparities or any other reasons, a higher fraction of n’s population has access to the
air traffic than at node k even if the population at n is smaller it will generate the same flux
as the less mobile population at k. This way we underestimate the value gained by protecting
the population at node k.
Thus scope can systematically overestimate or underestimate the importance of some
nodes. For this reason we encourage the use of real population data if available. To demon-
strate the methodology we will estimate the size of the mobile population from available
fluxes. We thus assume that mobile population Nn at node n is proportional to the flux of the
same node Fn. Hence the same must be true for the relative values ηn ∼ fn. The most general
proportionality is ηn = α f εn + β, where α, β and ε are factors. For the sake of simplicity we
use direct linear proportionality ηn = fn for all nodes.
Our approach until now assumes that the true origin of the outbreak and the tree is
known, but there are multiple scenarios where this may not be the case. On the one hand,
we can think of a scenario where the outbreak occurs in multiple, possibly neighbouring
locations. This will generally happen when the outbreak is not contained fast enough and
spreads via the air transportation route as well as locally by means of other traffic. On the
other hand, true source of a disease may not be known at the beginning of a pandemic, e.g.
when cases are reported in multiple countries in fast succession. One of the most recent
examples is the N1H1 pandemic of 2009, where the origin remains unclear even multiple
years after the pandemic has passed. We can account for both situations by calculating
average scope over multiple trees. Thus if we have a set of possible outbreak locations
Υ = {i1..., iL}. We can average the scope such that
sn(Υ) = ∑
i∈Υ
αisn(Ti) (4.1)
where α is a weighing coefficient. One possible definition is αi = 1/|Υ| for all i, resulting
in an equally weighted average. Nonetheless, it is plausible to assume that an outbreak in a
bigger meta-population will pose a higher threat compared to a smaller one, as the disease
can infect higher absolute number of people. Thus we expect a big meta-population to
export higher absolute number of cases and want to reflect that dependency in the average.
Therefore in this thesis we define αi = ηi/∑k∈Υ ηk. The same procedure can be followed to
average confluence.
Both metrics can vary greatly for a node when the trees are rooted at different origins
as demonstrated in figure 4.1 for LHR and CDG. Therefore averaging must be applied with
reason. In some realistic scenarios it can be more informative to inspect scope resulting in
each scenario separately, instead of taking the average. For example when deploying pas-
senger screening it is important to know which outbreak location poses the highest threat
and concentrate the efforts on incoming flights from it. Nonetheless the averaging method
can be used if little information about the outbreak is available or if a bigger region is af-
fected. Furthermore scope and confluence averaged across all possible outbreak origins can
be compared to existing centrality measures.
Betweenness centrality Cb and scope sn are based on a similar reasoning: nodes, which
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Figure 4.4: Relationship between proposed and established centrality measures. Colour code
is according to the region of the airport. (A) Established centrality measures versus average
scope and confluence. The size of the nodes is scaled with passenger flux. Selected hub
airports are labeled with the IATA codes. All metrics show a similar trend, but none can
be used as a good predictor for the others. Beijing International Apt. has the highest scope
and confluence while its degree and betweenness centrality are considerably lower, possibly
understating its importance during epidemics. The reverse is the case with Seattle Apt. which
shows high betweenness centrality and very low confluence and scope. (B) Top 12 airports
according to average scope and confluence. Only 6 airports are shared between the bar charts
There is considerable overlap with the top 15 airports reported by other centrality measures
(Fig 4.2). All 4 airports shared by 3 conventional metrics also appear in scope ranking in the
top 12, further 6 airports are shared with at least two other centrality measures. Confluence
deviates more, sharing only 7 airports with two or more conventional metrics.
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constitute to multiple shortest paths are important. We can show that under special condi-
tions betweenness centrality is a special case of scope, provided path length is judged based
on effective distance in both cases. On a regular unweighted graph (i.e. Fij ∈ {1, 0} for all
i, j) with Υ = {0, 1, ...,N} scope and betweenness centrality have a linear relation of a form
Cb(n) = sn(Υ)/ f
∗ with f ∗ being the relative flux per node. For detailed derivation see Ap-
pendix 8.1. Note that betweenness centrality always considers paths from all origins, while
scope can be limited to one or few trees. This way scope can be used in a context sensitive
manner providing more specific information for the scenario at hand, while betweenness
centrality can only provide the global average.
Figure 4.4A compares average scope and confluence with unweighted degree and weighted
betweenness centrality. We have chosen degree as the second conventional centrality mea-
sure as its logic is most closely related to the concept of confluence. While all metrics
have a similar trend many nodes are assigned a different importance according to differ-
ent metrics. For example Beijing Intl. airport (PEK) is ranked as the top airport according
Figure 4.5: Relationship between average
scope and confluence. Nodes are scaled with
the passenger flux and colored according to
the geographical region. Both metrics show
a similar trend. There are several excep-
tions showing low confluence and high scope
(London Heathrow, New York J.F. Kennedy
and Los Angeles International) and vice versa
(Hartsfield–Jackson Atlanta, Istanbul Atatürk
and Chicago O’Hare).
to average scope and confluence while
its degree and betweenness centrality are
not the highest. A similar picture arises
for London-Heathrow airport (LHR), which
role is far less according to betweenness
centrality, while its scope ranking is sec-
ond highest. The most striking example is
Seatle-Tacoma airport (SEA), which shows
the second highest betweenness centrality,
but scores very low in terms of scope and
confluence. Figure 4.4 B shows the top 12
airports according to average scope and con-
fluence. There is still a considerable overlap
with conventional centrality measures, but
multiple new airports appear in the rank-
ing. PEK and LHR are not ranked as top
airports by any of the conventional metrics,
but are being close to the top according to
scope. Nonetheless high overlap between
average scope and other centrality measures
indicates that scope averaged over all pos-
sible locations suffers from the same draw-
back: much context specific information is
lost. Hence the advantage of scope and con-
fluence is negated by global average.
One important phenomenon is rarely ob-
serves when global average is considered.
In many outbreak scenarios there exist a
non-source node with very high scope, thus
playing crucial role for a specific outbreak
origin. In this thesis we call such node a
’gate’. Gates are airports which have to be
passed by traveling agents to reach a big
fraction of the network and are therefore
best targets for intervention deployment. A
gate can take on this role for multiple out-
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break scenarios and in fact most of the gates are hubs of considerable size. Exceptions arise
when the outbreak is initiated at an isolated airport, having access to the WAN via a single
connection to a bigger local airport. In this scenario the second airport becomes the major
gate for the outbreak without having high flux itself.
In comparison to scope, confluence shows a similar trend, but there are multiple excep-
tions starring high scope and low confluence ( e.g. London Heathrow, New York J.F. Kennedy
and Los Angeles International) and vice versa (Hartsfield–Jackson Atlanta, Istanbul Atatürk
and Chicago O’Hare; see figure 4.5). This is not surprising: on an effective distance tree a
node, which has low confluence and a child with high scope, can have similar scope as a
node with high confluence and hence high number of leaf node children. Nonetheless, it
gives an interesting insight into the structure of the WAN, where a small node can become
a gate by linking to a global hub. This case is rarely observed in the global average. An
interesting example is Domodedovo Intl. airport (DME), Moscow, which displays second
highest average confluence while having low average scope of approximately 1%. This air-
port is not base to any major airline but is a destination of several international and especially
European airlines. The discrepancy can be observed on a much weaker scale in degree and
betweenness as well. To our knowledge the difference can be explained by a high number of
low traffic connections. While DME has a lot of children they account for low flux, giving
it high confluence and low scope. Istanbul-Atatürk airport shows similar behaviour. Such
discrepancies between scope and confluence might hint to specific network properties and
are important for further investigation.
4.2 Application of the metrics on world aviation network
Scope of node n indicates the role of a node in a certain outbreak, its participation in the most
probable transmission routes and the population fraction which can be reached through it.
Higher scope means more infectious agents are likely to traverse the node, thus the node
takes on a role of a gate into specific region. For this reason, high scope nodes are natural tar-
gets for intervention deployment like passenger entry or exit screening. Several papers have
evaluated the effectiveness of exit screening with mixed results. While the potential of entry
and exit screening to delay disease spread has been acknowledged in multiple publications
[36, 27, 71, 13], current effectiveness of its implementations is controversial [89, 49, 59]. It has
been emphasised that screening procedures are able to delay, but not prevent the spreading.
It is most effective on early stages of the epidemic when numbers of infected are low [40].
Hence it is advisable to implement this countermeasures as early as possible in parallel with
local containment at the outbreak location. This aligns well with the benefits of scope, which
can be calculated very early knowing the origin only. Using WAN we investigate exemplary
hub nodes and outbreak scenarios to highlight the application of the devised metrics.
In absence of an epidemic we want to characterise the airports to get a general under-
standing for the role of a node. As outlined above fully averaged scope is of limited value,
but it is hardly possible to interpret the scope of a node for each outbreak location separately,
since there are nearly 4000 possible outbreak locations. Thus we define a regional profile of
an airport by averaging its scope across each of the 22 geographical regions. The regions are
in accordance with the information provided by [58]. These profiles can be used to roughly
judge the importance of an airport in case of regional outbreaks when no further information
is available. Figure 4.6 shows the profiles of the biggest airport on each continent (A) and
subsequent six biggest airports worldwide (B). Multiple depicted airports only play a role in
case of an outbreak inside their own region. In this case most of the traffic leaving the region
is directed through this node as it takes the role of a local hub. Many airports of this kind
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are observed in the network in general and in this figure in particular. The most prominent
example is Johannesburg O.R. Tambo (JNB). In case of JNB its importance in outbreak sce-
narios in the Southern African region is tremendous, with scope reaching about 71 % of the
network. Further examples are São Paulo-Guarulhos and Sydney Kingsford Smith, the latter
being important for two neighbouring regions. The scope of airports New York J.F.Kennedy
(JFK) and Tokyo Narita (NRT) is dominated by only one region, but different than their own:
Caribbean region in case of JFK and Micronesia in case of NRT. Both are small regions which
use the respective airport as main transit hub. We can classify airports of this type as spe-
cialists, regardless if they are important for their own or other single or few regions. On the
other hand there are generalist airports, which play an important role for many regions while
never being the dominant transit airport for the whole network. Those airports shouldn’t be
neglected in any outbreak and can be safely considered important if no information what-
soever is available about the outbreak. Examples of such airports are London-Heathrow
(LHR) and Dubai International (DXB). Scope of both airports varies across broader regions,
e.g. low scope in case of outbreaks on American continent or higher scope in case of an
outbreak in African and multiple Asian regions. Multiple airports lie in between both types:
they behave as a gate for multiple regions, nevertheless the scope for remaining regions is
non negligible. Examples of this mixed type are Beijing Capital (PEK) and Los Angeles Intl.
(LAX) airports. PEK shows strong association with its own region being a central hub for
China, but also uniformly increased scope for all other regions except Oceania and South- /
South-East Asia. The latter combination is not surprising as airports from South-Eastern Asia
often act as transit hubs for traffic from Oceania and vice versa. LAX has no single dominant
region and multiple locations with scope close to zero. At the same time LAX gains high
scope from many locations, mainly in Oceania and America. While clear distinction between
those types is only possible in extreme cases, the information provided by the profile gives
valuable insight into the role of an airport.
We already mentioned the most obvious types of profiles an airport can exhibit. To
explore it further we clustered 100 airports with the highest total passenger flux according to
their scope profile. The airports were clustered hierarchically based on mean correlation. Two
approaches were employed. The result of the first is shown in 4.7 B and is based on profiles as
demonstrated in figure 4.6, where the scope values are associated with geographical regions.
To produce the clustering shown in 4.7 A the scope profile of each airport n war reordered so
that sn(i) < sn(i+ 1) where i is the index of the scope value. The airports were then clustered
according to these modified profiles.
While the first approach associated airports by their region of influence, the later is an
indication of the specialisation level discussed above. With the latter clustering approach
airports are partitioned in two classes, reflecting the extremes mentioned above: generalists
and specialists. Generalists are predominant among the 100 biggest airports, accounting for
about two thirds of the airports. In a sense this is a disadvantage for airport administration,
as generalists need further investigation at every outbreak. Nonetheless it is interesting that
the airports are divided into two distinct clusters despite of the boundaries being smooth.
When airports are clustered using full profile information the resulting clusters can be
easily tied to regions for which they have the highest importance. To assign a region to the
cluster, scope profiles of all airports contributing to the cluster were investigated and the
regions were ranked according to scope they grant to the airport. If a region was present
in the top 4 of all but one or all airports of the cluster, the cluster was tied to this region.
An exception to this rule is the mixed African cluster (purple): here the top 6 regions were
considered, otherwise a classification was not possible. Detailed lists of region association can
be found in Appendix 8.2. In several clusters the region of influence and geographical regions
of airports overlap, e.g North-American cluster and Central Asian cluster. Here multiple
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Figure 4.6: Scope profiles of big airports with respect to 22 regions of the air transportation
network. The bars represent average scope of the airport with regard to different outbreak
regions.(A) Biggest airports from each of the six continents. Some airports (i.e. Johannesburg
O.R. Tambo and Sao Paolo Guarulhos) act as gates in case of an outbreak in the region they
belong to, but play minor role when outbreaks happens in other regions. Other airports
like Beijing Capital and London Heathrow play an important role for multiple regions. (B)
Examples of hub airports displaying different profiles. Los Angeles International plays an
important role for outbreaks in all 4 regions of oceania. Frankfurt International is a big hub
in terms of passenger flux, but it has a relatively low profile for all regions and is not a gate
for any of the regions.
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Figure 4.7: Hierarchical clustering of the top 100 airports according to their regional pro-
files. Final clusters were established using ’fclust’ algorithm from scipy.cluster package. All
branches inside one cluster share the same colour. Branch length shows the distance between
the adjacent groups. (A) Clustering of the airports considering full profile information. Node
labels are IATA letter codes of the airports and coloured according to the geographical region
of the airport. Clusters are coloured according to the regions for which the most airports in-
side the cluster act as gates (see main text for more information). Note that the geographical
location of the airport is not a determining factor for the assignment to a particular cluster.
Best example is the African cluster (purple), which contains airports located in several geo-
graphic regions. Paris Charles de Gaule is inside this cluster and as we showed in previous
figures is an important gate in case of an outbreak in Africa. London Heathrow, also shown
to be an important gate from Africa, is assigned to a more specific South-African cluster (vi-
olet). (B) For this, clustering the regional information of the profiles were stripped and the
scope values sorted. Airports were clustered according to the shape of the resulting profile.
All nodes are partitioned into two clusters: generalists (dark grey) and gate (light grey). The
gates play very important role for small number of regions. Examples of gate airports are
Johannesburg O.R.Tambo, Sao Paolo Guarulhos and New York J.F.Kennedy. Generalist air-
ports play a role in case of an outbreak in multiple regions but are never an exclusive gate
into a region. Examples of generalist airports are London Heathrow, Paris Charles de Gaule,
Beijing Capital and Dubai International.
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smaller airports from the respective regions can be observed. Other clusters have influence
in a broader region around their geographical location, e.g. the multi-regional Asian cluster
starring airports from western Asia exclusively. In his case all airports combined in this
cluster are big hubs and base airports of one or multiple airlines (with the exception of
Sabiha Gökçen Intl. Airport, SAW). Many flight connections between Western and Asian
regions are routed through airports in this cluster.
The most interesting clusters contain airports from a variety of geographical regions,
which share the same region of influence. For example the multi regional African cluster
with airports from Europe, USA and Asia. Some historical ties can be seen in this cluster:
two French airports are present in it, accounting for the long history of French colonisation.
Brussels presence in this cluster is also linked to the colonial ties it shares with Congo and
Ruanda-Urundi. Other airports may or may not be attributed to history. Without a doubt all
airports in this cluster accumulate a high fraction of traffic to and from Africa. This cluster
highlights an important feature of infectious disease spreading. Outbreaks in certain geo-
graphic regions create very complex spreading patterns involving gates from distinct regions
and continents. Such outbreaks inevitably require an international coordinated response to
prevent a global outbreak.
Another example is the cluster associated with Oceania, in which two American and one
Canadian airports are present. Two of these airports are located on the West Coast and are
hubs used for transit flights from Australia and Oceania to multiple American and European
destinations. The Oceania cluster also highlights strong association between Oceania and
South-East Asia, represented by Changi Airport in Singapore. Another clusters highlighting
historical relations are South-African cluster, which includes London-Heathrow, and Central
Asia cluster, where the importance of Domodedovo airport, Moscow, may be attributed to
the legacy of Soviet Union.
Scope was designed to be context sensitive and applied to different outbreak scenarios
where detailed or limited information is available. Figure 4.8 A demonstrates this on real
world outbreaks while figure 4.8 B outlines some hypothetical outbreak scenarios. The figure
shows worldwide, top European and US American airports according to scope. We chose
a subset of outbreak settings spanning different continents and sizes. In the worldwide
ranking diverse airports are represented. In regional ranking, on the other hand, multiple
airports occur in every scenario. For case import into European region those are Paris Charles
de Gaule (CDG), London-Heathrow (LHR) and Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS). In every case
either of the first two is being the top airport inside of the European region. The role of
LHR and CDG is especially striking in case of the Ebola outbreak, where 50% of the network
will most probably be reached through either of those airports. In this scenario the scope
of LHR or CDG lies almost one order of magnitude above the scope of the airport ranking
third (sLGW = 0.03). Again we can observe how historical ties influenced the structure of
the world air traffic. We can conclude that these three airports, LHR, GDG and AMS, are
European top targets for countermeasure deployment if little information is available on
the outbreak. They appear among the worldwide top 10 and are predominant gates in the
European region. All of these airports are generalists with high capacity, thus their presence
it the worldwide ranking of many scenario is not surprising.
A similar situation arises in the US ranking where New York J. F. Kennedy (JFK), Los An-
geles Intl. (LAX) and Atlanta Heartsfield-Jackson (ATL) are present in every scenario with
JFK ranking highest in many settings. JFK is present in the worldwide top 10 and is the
biggest gate in case of a hypothetical outbreak in the Caribbean region. Similar to the situ-
ation with European gate airports, JFK, LAX and ATL can be valid targets for interventions
when little information is available. Further, it is noteworthy that in two scenarios where
either a European or American airport is taking on the role of the global gate the respective
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Figure 4.8: Application of scope on exemplary outbreak scenarios. Bars show the top airports
with respect to scope in case of a real outbreak (A) and an outbreak in a geographic region
(B). The top row shows top ten airports on the global scale, middle row - top 7 airports inside
Europe, bottom row - top 7 airports inside the US. The outbreak region is shown on the map
(red color). Bars are coloured according to the geographical location of the airport on the
x-axis, labels are IATA letter codes of the airports. Different outbreak regions lead to distinct
scope distributions with different airports being the main gate for the outbreak. At the same
time the figure highlights that inside of a region there are important hubs which act as gates
in a variety of scenarios, e.g. Paris Charles de Gaule and London Heathrow in Europe. In
case of Ebola their role is especially prominent while there are no obvious gates among US
airports. Reverse is true for an outbreak in the Caribbean region. Using proposed metrics
countermeasures like passenger screening can be deployed in the gate airports, which lie on
the most probable route from the outbreak location into entire regions.
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other region exhibits rather low scope overall.
Worldwide ranking is showing a diverse picture for every scenario. Airports from mul-
tiple geographical regions, which are often different from the outbreak region, are starring
in the ranking. Those airports act as gates into their own and other regions, distributing
the disease worldwide. In case of ZIKA outbreak, the top gate is located inside the affected
region, while the second largest gate is in the unaffected part of the USA. Multiple European
airports are also represented in the worldwide top 10. In case of the MERS outbreak the top
5 gates lie inside the region affected by the disease. Those airports facilitate a big amount of
traffic and act as worldwide traffic hubs. Hence it is not surprising that they take on the role
of gates in this scenario. The dominant gate in this case is Dubai Intl. giving access to 49%
of the networks population. This airport also enters the picture in context of Yellow Fever
endemic region, side by side with multiple African airports. In the hypothetical scenario of
an outbreak in Eastern Asia, PEK is the dominant gate, followed by multiple airports from
the same region. While PEK accounts for only 20% of the scope, there is still a 10% gap in
scope between it and the second ranking airport. In this scenario LAX and CDG are also
present among the worldwide top 5.
Figure 4.8 demonstrates that there are some recurring patterns in the outbreaks and re-
spective rankings. Some hubs always rank high when compared to other regional airports,
often being distinct dominant gates. On the other hand when viewed globally, a dominant
gate is difficult to predict using geographical information only. It often lies inside the affected
region, but it is not guaranteed to, as can be seen in case of an outbreak in the Caribbean.
Until now we have concentrated on outbreak scenarios and characterised the role of nodes
in context of the outbreak. Using scope it is possible to switch perspectives and focus on a
node as a target rather than on a single outbreak origin. This is an important point when
advising administration of an airport on matters of pandemic response with no regard to a
specific pandemic. The aim of this application of scope is to raise awareness about locations
relevant for the respective airport to facilitate a faster response in case of an outbreak. Again,
different scales of averaging can be used for this approach. Often an outbreak is not limited
to a narrow area and reporting is handled country-wise, hence it makes sense to evaluate
threat at the countrywide scale. As can be observed in figure 4.9, all illustrated airports
predominantly take on a role of major gates during outbreaks in the catchment area of small
airports. Often those small airports do not share the same geographical region with the gate
airport. An interesting example is Beijing Capital airport (PEK). The airport granting PEK
the highest scope lies inside North Korea, highlighting the ties between these countries. This
is also the only airport in this ranking which shares the region with PEK, while the rest
belongs to Eastern Europe. Though this notation can be misleading: all these airports belong
to the asian part of Russian Federation, which itself is attributed to East Europe according to
WAN. Hence geographically listed airports are in close proximity to China. While being the
airport with the highest average scope, PEK never acquires scope higher than 20%, except for
an outbreak in Pyongyang. In fact, the decline in scope over all 3865 locations, when sorted,
is slower when compared to other airports with high average scope like LHR or LAX. Hence
we can say that PEK most often acts as a gate into Asian region, by that gaining high average
scope. A similar picture arises when scope is evaluated country-wise: North Korea ranks
first with a big margin to the rest of the ranking. The rest of the countries in the ranking are
from different geographical regions including Africa, America, Europe and Asia. Russia is
not present in the country-wide ranking, even though airports from Russia dominated the
airport-wide ranking. The reason are the biggest Russian airports, which lie in the West of
the country. They show weak association with China but influence the average heavily as
they hold a big share of the overall population. Region-wise, East Europe appears as the
region granting PEK a high scope. Eastern Asia does not appear in the ranking, but this
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Figure 4.9: Relevant outbreak locations from the perspective of a hub airport. On the x
axis are the top outbreak locations which lead to high scope values of the airport of interest
(top label). Bars are coloured according to the geographical region of the outbreak location.
Locations lying in the same country as the airport of interest were excluded from the ranking
as we assume that close range disease import is more likely to happen via other routes. The
top row shows the top locations in case of an outbreak confined to a catchment area of a
single airport. The middle row shows the scenario in which entire countries are affected.
The bottom row shows the region-wide outbreak and is identical to the profiles, previously
described in fig. 4.6. Most of the important outbreak locations in the top row are small
airports which route most flights via one bigger local airport. It is noteworthy that many
outbreak locations lie in a different region than the airport of interest. Similar behaviour
can be seen in case of a countrywide outbreak. Countries with low passenger fluxes route
a high fraction of flights through a bigger hub, which becomes a gate to a considerable
fraction of the network. This is illustrated by an outbreak in Gibraltar, in which case London
Heathrow becomes a gate to 80% of the network. This change of perspective can help airport
administration to better judge the threat posed by an outbreak in a specific region.
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might be attributed to the filtering applied. For the plot, all locations from the same country
were excluded as we assume that local transmission will more likely happen via different
routes. In case of a country as big as China this assumption might be invalid. Furthermore,
China is a substantial part of Eastern Asia, thus eliminating Chinese airports diminishes the
overall impact of the region.
A very different picture arises when we consider Dubai Intl. airport (DXB). It is a base
airport of Emirates airline and an international hub. It becomes a global gate with scope
values approaching 100% for multiple outbreak locations in Southern Asia. Just as in case
of PEK, airports granting DXB a high scope are small and isolated, with flights using DXB
as main transit hub. Interestingly, no airport from Western Asia appears in the ranking
with respect to DBX. This can be attributed to high concentration of hubs in Western Asia,
hence the transit flights from inside West Africa are well distributed across multiple hubs.
In a country-wise ranking West Asia is more represented, with Yemen awarding DXB about
50% scope. West Asia is also represented in the region-wide ranking, showing that while not
being the only gate inside this region, DXB is well connected to West Asian airports. Multiple
countries from Melanesia enter the ranking as well. This is also reflected in the region-wide
plot where Melanesia ranks ninth. Compared to PEK or LHR this airport displays a very high
overall scope in all top 10 rankings. All African regions rank high for DXB, especially Eastern
Africa. South Asia is the highest ranking region for DXB, this is well in line with airport-
wise ranking, which consists solely of South Asian sources, and the top ranking country,
Afghanistan.
London-Heathrow shows a more diverse picture over all, displaying airports from multi-
ple continents in the ranking. Freetown Lungi which has already been exemplified in 4.1 and
as part of the Ebola outbreak in 4.8 ranks 6th. Consequently, Sierra Leone ranks second in the
country-wise ranking with sLHR ≈ 60%. Multiple European airports appear in the ranking
granting LHR a scope of up to 80%. Despite of no airports or countries from Southern Africa
being present in the ranking, this region shows a strong association with London-Heathrow
in the ranking. Further regions from all continents are showing in the ranking, highlighting
that LHR is an important international hub.
4.3 Discussion
As outlined above, scope and confluence provide new possibilities for informed decision
making in the course of an outbreak. An airport starring high scope is a valuable target for
passenger screening or comparable interventions. Hence, the resources can be concentrated
on primary gates instead of a high number of nodes with possibly low impact. To ensure
that our methodology can be easily applied by different interested parties the code used in
this thesis will be available on GitHub as a Python / Julia package after the results have been
published.
General classification of airports via profile and the clustering should give a general rule
of thumb for the respective location, but we strongly encourage precise evaluation using the
source in case of an outbreak. We have demonstrated how this method can be applied on a
variety of real and hypothetical scenarios to determine gate airports. To calculate scope only
little outbreak specific information is necessary, namely the outbreak origin. It is one of the
easiest to establish parameters, as the export of cases via air traffic only becomes probable
when the outbreak reaches a detectable size. Hence, we do not need information on case
zero, but rather the location where the disease generates considerable number of secondary
infections. This allows us to implement countermeasures in a timely fashion, minimising the
probability of infected passengers to escape undetected before the screening or the like are
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set in place. If deploying entity is a local administration of an airport, we demonstrated how
the procedure can be adapted to classify possible outbreak origins, countries and regions
important for the airport in question. Hence, a one-time counselling of the administration
with respect to threats and important locations will be sufficient as long as the WAN is not
undergoing major changes.
While global scope average looses some of its predictive power it still differs a lot from
conventional centrality measures. It shows similar trends with established centrality mea-
sures, but for multiple nodes there is a considerable difference. The probabilistic argument
behind the effective distance and thus the scope might explain the difference. By definition,
scope not only considers the number of shortest paths crossing a node but also the size of
the populations which lie downstream of the node. The latter is a more relevant information
for public health, which seeks to protect the highest possible fraction of people. We need
to point out that an assumption regarding the population size in the catchment area was
made. While in generally correct, there might be a systematic difference in proportionality
in developed vs. developing countries. If available, real census data should be preferred to
estimate the population living in a catchment area of an airport. This data is subject to less
systematic bias.
As has been demonstrated on Moscow Domodedovo (DME), Seatle-Takoma Intl. (SEA)
and Istanbul-Atatürk airports, usage of both metrics, scope and confluence, can highlight
topological specifics of the network. Especially DME and SEA host a high number of low
traffic connections to low populated targets. Thus betweenness centrality and unweighted
degree overestimate their roles. In contrary scope is able to differentiate between a global
hub and airports hosting many low traffic connections.
In cases with a single known outbreak origin gradual averaging can be used to project
how scope of nodes will be changing if a disease spreads locally. We need to consider
that as soon as catchment areas of additional airports are affected new gates can arise. This
allows administrations to be notified early and start countermeasure deployment and further
preparations in advance. Nonetheless, we discourage averaging scope or confluence without
a good reason to do so. As has been demonstrated in figure 4.1, both metrics might vary
greatly across outbreak origins, even in close geographical proximity. Hence, averaging can
obscure the real picture and lead to wrong decisions when no caution is applied.
Furthermore we want to emphasise that scope does not give any insight about the prob-
ability of an infected individual entering the node and interacting with the local population.
When traveling by plane, transit connections are often a norm rather than exception. A
passenger traversing a node in this manner will unlikely introduce the disease into the pop-
ulation of this area as the interaction time is low and a high fraction of the visitors of an
airport do not belong to the local population. We are aware that transmission inside airport
building and on a flight are possible and documented, but they are not a subject in this thesis
[61, 74]. If we disregard the latter issue, despite close effective distance gate nodes might
be at lower risk than nodes downstream from the hub, as they are more likely the terminal
nodes of the journey. In the next chapter we will explain how to infer the probability that an
agent will end his journey at a node from the topology of a network and derive a measure
for the risk of disease importation.
Chapter 5
Quantitative assessment of import
risks for pandemic onset situations
Following chapter introduces a methodology to calculate case importation risks in a par-
ticular outbreak scenario. Similar to scope and confluence, import risk relies on effective
distance trees, and can be tailored to a specific outbreak scenario. Mathematical defini-
tion of import risk requires the knowledge of the probability that a traveller terminates his
journey at a specific location, in short the exit probability. This probability often needs to be
implied from the structure of the network. We provide a method for inference of the exit
probability and demonstrate how it can be used to calculate the import risk from a specific
outbreak origin. After describing the basic distribution of exit probability and import risk
in simple, exemplary cases, we proceed by applying the method to hypothetical and real
world outbreak scenarios. Furthermore, we show how import risk can be used from the
perspective of a target location to establish outbreak sites which pose the highest threat.
When arguing about disease spreading, locally or globally, our thinking is often domi-
nated by geographic distances. Remote outbreaks are perceived to pose little threat, regard-
less of the size of outbreak or specifics of outbreak location. Over many years this thinking
was reinforced by observations, with most prominent and well documented example being
Black Death. It swept over Europe in distinct wave-like front, with death toll estimates of
about one third of European population of that time. Multiple other diseases followed a
similar pattern [106, 101]. Following globalisation and advances in transportation wave-like
patterns weakened and disappeared.
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2002 was one of the first global
outbreaks to demonstrate that geographic separation from outbreak source provides little se-
curity against importation of disease in the current age of fast global traffic. While the disease
originated in China, the country with second most cases was Canada. A single infected from
Guangdong province infected 16 local and international guests during his stay in a hotel in
Hong Kong. Within few weeks after this event SARS was infecting people in 26 countries
across 5 continents. Many countries with direct borders to China showed few cases with no
sustained transmission, emphasising that reasoning in geographical means has little predic-
tive power. SARS was a worldwide wake up call, forcing the WHO to issue a global alert
[110]. The message that spreading is no longer confined by geographical borders was soon
reinforced by a flu pandemic in 2009. Two years after SARS outbreak International Health
Regulations (IHR) were signed by all member states of the WHO, granting it a framework
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to access and coordinate international efforts in case of a global pandemic or an event with
potential worldwide implications [109].
It was suggested by multiple sources that changes in global transportation are at the root
of observed changes. Epidemic models, which account for worldwide air traffic, lie well in
line with empirical data supporting this claim [55, 41, 25]. Recently it has been demonstrated
that remapping geographical distance according to their probabilistic counterpart on the
world aviation network (WAN), called effective distance, restores wave-like patterns. This
methodology was successfully applied to several real world and simulated examples [17].
This result challenges conventional argumentation about importation risks: when wave-like
patters arise on airports mapped according to effective distance, effective distance takes the
same role the geographic distance played in past outbreaks. Hence properties of the trans-
portation network determine the global spread and thus need to be considered with greater
emphasis than plain geographic distance.
In this chapter we propose a method to estimate risk posed by an outbreak based solely on
the topological features of the network and source of the outbreak. We will utilise the notion
of effective distance from [17], which was explained in detail in chapter 3. This approach is
tailored for transportation networks, which have several specific properties. First, most of the
time only raw fluxes between two directly connected nodes are known and no information
about the actual starting and end point of a trip is provided. Nonetheless this information is
crucial. As has been demonstrated by SARS outbreak new epidemic hotspots are likely to be
sparked at locations where infected are released in the native population. Knowing only raw
fluxes we need to infer the probability that an agent will end his trip at a particular node. In
this chapter we will describe one way of such inference. Using it we will further show how
given an outbreak location import risk to every other node in the system can be calculated.
Proposed metric shows the probability, that an infected who left the outbreak origin will end
his journey at a specific node. As in the previous chapter we propose a way to account for
limited information, spacial spreading and the severity of the outbreak. Finally we apply
derived methods on the world aviation network (WAN) in real and hypothetical outbreak
scenarios. Just as scope and fertility, import risk benefits from its context sensitive definition.
We show how this metric can be used from a perspective of a non-outbreak node to rank
possible sources according to the threat they pose.
5.1 Mathematical definition of import risk
As described above we require an agent to exit at a node to be able to spark an epidemic.
Hence we are not only interested which link will be taken by the walker next, but whether the
walker will continue at all. We are given a transportation network with N nodes connected
by weighted links Fmn ≥ 0. Usually raw fluxes are the only information available about
passenger movement. Nonetheless we want to know the probability p(nL, n0) that an agent
starting at node n0 travels to node nL and exits there. We call this probability import risk .
There are multiple paths between two nodes, infinite if loops and multiple transitions over
the same node are allowed. In real air traffic networks passengers are unlikely to exhibit
either behaviours, so we require the paths to be self avoiding. Import risk has two parts to it:
the probability that an agent travels along specified links and the probability that he exits at
nL and not before. We call this probability exit probability qnL . For the moment we assume
to know the latter and proceed with the import risk definition.
Now consider a single path ω = {n0, n1...nL} with a walker starting at n0, traversing all
the nodes of ω and exiting in nL. In previous chapter we derived the probability that an
agent at node n0 makes a step to its direct neighbour n1, Pn1n0 3.1. Using it we can calculate
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the probability of a walker to traverse ω and exit thereafter:
p(ω) = (1− qn0)Pn1n0(1− qn1 )Pn2n1 ...(1− qnk)Pnknk−1...(1− qnL−1)PnLnL−1qL
= qnL
L
∏
k=1
Pnknk−1(1− qnk−1)
= qnL
L
∏
k=1
Snknk−1
where Snknk−1 = Pnknk−1(1− qk−1). While we could argue that import risk is dominated by
the probability of importing disease over the most probable path or path with the shortest
effective distance there is a myriad of less probable path which contribute to import risk.
Some of those paths can be only slightly lower in probability than the shortest path and sum
up to very high import probability in addition to shortest path. Hence we should consider
a bigger subset of paths. We can extend the formula to calculate the probability of a walker
starting at node n0 and exiting at nL by means of all paths of length t
p(nL, t|n0) = qnL ∑
ω∈Ωt
L
∏
k=1
Snknk−1
where Ωt = Ω(nL, n0, t) is a set containing all possible paths from n0 to nL within t steps.
Note that we are talking about length in terms of steps, not in terms of probability. Con-
sideration of path length can become relevant if the timescale of disease and temporal scale
of steps are of same magnitude. We will not examine this special case in the work at hand
as for most diseases and the air traffic timescales are orders of magnitude apart. Assum-
ing infected can not recover during the journey irrespective of its length we are interested
in p(nL, n0) = p∞(nL, n0), the probability that an agent leaving node n0 arrives at node nL
regardless the path length.
p∞(nL, n0) =
∞
∑
t=1
p(nL, t|n0)
= qnL
∞
∑
t=1
∑
ω∈Ωt
L
∏
k=1
Snknk−1
= qnL
∞
∑
t=1
(
St
)
nLn0
(5.1)
From above definition follows ∑m p∞(m, n0) = 1. The notion S
t describes the probability
that an agent will travel from its starting node to a target node in means of t steps without
exiting on his way. The derivation of this matrix notation is explained in more detail in
[70]. Calculating import risk in this fashion can become computationally challenging on big
networks. We can devise methods to limit the number of paths to a smaller subset. With
increasing length import probability over a path is strictly declining, hence all longer paths
contribute less to import risk. In fact p(m, t|n0) → 0 when t → ∞ even though the number
of possible path grows as the number of steps increases. We can thus consider paths only
up to a maximal length, which significantly decreases computation time by removing a high
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amount of paths with minor loss of import probability. In mathematical terms
pmax(nL, n0) =
tmax
∑
t=1
(
St
)
nLn0
On some highly heterogeneous networks paths of same length in terms of steps can have
very different probabilities. In this case we can introduce a probability threshold, below
which a path is not considered. Similarly effective distance can be used. This is mathemat-
ically less straight forward and can not be expressed in matrix notation easily, but it can be
implemented in a programming language of choice using modified Dijkstra algorithm. This
approach was used in a later chapter 6. For more details on the implementation see chapter
2.
Until now we assumed to know the exit probability. WAN data does not contain any
information about the probability of an agent to end its journey at a particular node. In
most if not all transportation networks the number of passengers travelling between two
remote, not directly connected nodes, is unknown. Thus we need to estimate exit probability.
The easiest way is to assume equal exit probability q across all nodes. Using the relation
∑m(P
t)mn0 = 1 and the prior assumption about exit probability to calculate the probability
of a walker to have not ended his journey after t steps
p(t|n0) = q(1− q)
t
Using this formula we can determine how fast import probability over all nodes approa-
Figure 5.1: The distribution of exit probability
across a Delaunay network. Red circle marks
the outbreak origin. The colour of the remain-
ing nodes indicates the exit probability at the
respective location with darker shades repre-
senting higher exit probability. Black links are
part of the effective distance tree. Along a
branch of the effective tree the exit probabil-
ity increases as the distance from the origin
increases. Leaf nodes show highest exit prob-
ability, sn = 1.
ches one. Using this as a sanity check we
can calculate ∑∞t p(t|n0) = q ∗ 1/q = 1.
This formula can be used to pick a sensi-
ble threshold to reduce computational time.
Nonetheless, uniform exit probability is a
strong assumption. It is likely that exit prob-
ability at a transit hub is considerably lower
compared to a small remote airport which
is rarely used for transit. Hence, we need
to account for the role a node plays in a
current outbreak. In previous chapter we
outlined that scope sn is a measure of how
much population can be reached through a
node acting as a transit hub. Node n with
sn = cn is a terminal node, hence we expect
everyone who arrives to exit here. Nodes
with sn ≫ cn are used for transit and agents
are less likely to end their journey here. As
previously outlined the role of a node and
thus its scope is highly dependent on the
outbreak origin. And so is the exit probabil-
ity. Aside from node’s scope, node’s popu-
lation also has an impact on exit probability.
We assume that qn ∼ cn, meaning that high
population nodes are attractors with higher
exit probability while transit nodes with low
population are more often solely traversed.
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Figure 5.2: Total import risk over all nodes depending on the maximal path length. Solid line
shows the mean of cumulative import probability, shaded region - one standard deviation.
For synthetic networks number of nodes N = 100, flux over each edge was assumed to be
one. Captured import probability approaches a limit value of 1 for all network types. In
highly inhomogeneous networks cumulative import risk saturates faster, while on regular
networks, e.g. lattice, long paths need to be considered to account for high proportion of
import risk. In the rest of this chapter τ = 14 was used.
This leads to definition of exit probability as
qn(n0) =
cn
sn(Tn0)
=
cn
cn + ∑k∈Θ ck
where Θ = Θ(n, n0) is the set of children, grandchildren etc. of n on the effective distance
tree Tn0 . We can assume same proportionality as in previous chapter cn ∼ fn and hence
qn = fn/sn. In this thesis we will use this scope dependent definition of exit probability. Note
that the estimate of exit probability is the only part of import risk which relies on effective
distance trees. The above definition is one of various possibilities and a heuristic estimate.
Therefore it is meant to approximate exit probabilities when real values are unknown. We
encourage to use real world data on start and destination if available. Regardless of what exit
probability estimate is used import risk depends strongly on the outbreak origin. It follows
the proposed logic of a context sensitive metric and can be applied on early stages of an
epidemic to guide decision making.
While mathematically tractable ∞ is not a feasible value for computations. To decide on
maximal path length to be considered τ we run simulations on multiple network types as
shown in Fig. 5.2. Synthetic networks were generated to have the same flux over every edge,
absolute value was irrelevant as all link probabilities are computed as fractions of fluxes. In
highly inhomogeneous networks cumulative import probability approaches 1 faster. There
are multiple reasons for this. First, in networks with small world features all nodes can be
reached in means of very few steps. Hence all shortest paths are captured even with low τ.
Second, after reaching a hub n with many neighbours the probability to proceed to any spe-
cial neighbour Pkn is low for every k (though still ∑k Pkn = 1). As has been demonstrated that
by picking a random link you are more likely to reach a hub than a small node [70]. Hence
following this logic the path probability decays very fast in an inhomogeneous network. Lat-
tice as the most regular network has cumulative import probability well below 1 even when
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paths of length 20 are considered. In this chapter we fix τ = 14. It gives reasonably good
results while keeping computation time low.
As has been demonstrated with scope import risk can be averaged in the same fashion.
If multiple locations are affected by the disease, constituting a set Υ, a weighted import risk
can be calculated as
p∞(nL,Υ) = ∑
i∈Υ
αip∞(nL, i) (5.2)
where αi = ci/∑k∈Υ ck. For more detailed explanation see page 38. The same method
can be applied on exit probability, but we in general discourage to do so. Exit probability
varies more than any of the proposed metrics, hence there is a considerable risk that the
average value will greatly misrepresent the matter at hand. It can be interesting to calculate
cumulative risk to a wider geographical or political region. Assume Λ is a set of airports
which belong to a single country, thus the import risk into the country is
p∞(Λ, n0) = ∑
k∈Λ
p∞(nk, n0)
This aggregation can be extended to broader geographical regions and continents. Both,
averaging and aggregation, can be combined.
As shown in Fig. 5.3 there are general trends to both, exit probability and import risk
with respect to the distance from outbreak origin. The figure shows an effective distance
tree of a network with nodes coloured according to their exit probability and import risk.
Exit probability grows with increasing distance from outbreak origin, for terminal leaves
qn = 1. Despite the general trend, nodes lying on the same radial distance often have
different exit probability. This behaviour can be attributed to highly different scope when
nodes lie on distinct branches of the effective distance tree. Further exit probability is not
guaranteed to increase or remain equal along one branch, even though scope is monotonically
decreasing. For detailed derivation of special cases see Appendix 8.3. In Fig. 5.3 import
probability shows inverse trend, decreasing with growing distance to outbreak origin. There
are two components contributing to import risk: qn, which generally increases with distance
on the tree, and ∏k Snknk−1 which decreases with growing distance. Just as in case of exit
probability import risk can exhibit more complex behaviours than shown in Fig. 5.3. We will
demonstrate using WAN that risk of import for gate nodes, which are usually close to the
outbreak origin, is often lower as for direct children of the gate.
Import risk and exit probability can be compared to other centrality measures when aver-
aged over all possible outbreak origins in a network. Fig. 5.4 shows how import risk relates to
other centrality measures. As has been outlined above exit probability and import risk show
opposite trends and low conformity despite of p∞(n) ∼ qn. The reason for opposing trend
can be explained by the relationship between import risk and scope. As can be seen in the
figure nodes with high average import risk show high average scope spanning several orders
of magnitude. The reason is that both metrics depend highly on the effective distance from
the origin. Exit probability relates to scope as qn ∼ 1/sn and hence having a trend opposite
to import risk. Betweenness centrality and import risk show little consistency, hinting that
betweenness centrality is a bad predictor for import probability. Within 100 biggest nodes in
terms of flux (highlighted in the figure) little can be said about the dependency between all
metrics. Those nodes show the biggest variance in importance across different trees. Hence
averaged values are little conclusive.
Some more explanation about the exact meaning of import risk p∞ is needed. The proba-
bility p∞(n0, nL) is the probability of an agent exiting n0 to arrive and exit at nL. Note that no
statements are made about the likelihood or the number of agents starting at n0 in the first
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Figure 5.3: Example of the distribution of import risk p∞ (red) and exit probability q (blue)
in a network. Depicted shortest path tree was derived from a random geometric graph, node
enclosed by the red circle is the outbreak origin n0. The distance of a node from the centre
is proportional to the probability of an agent leaving the outbreak origin and arriving at the
node (but not necessarily exiting). The size of the node scales with its population cn. By
definition qn0 = 0. For all other nodes n qn ∼ cn and qn ∼ sn , for terminal nodes nl qnl = 1
. Some dependencies can be seen on nodes e and f: qe > q f while se > s f . The difference in
exit probability can be explained by ce ≫ c f . For import risk p∞(n|n0) ∽ qn and p∞(n|n0) ∽
De f f (n|n0), which makes it non-trivial as qn ∽ 1/De f f . Nodes a, b and c: ca ≈ cb ≈ cc,
qb = qc = 1, De f f (a|n0) = De f f (b|n0), p∞(b|n0) ≫ p∞(c|n0) and p∞(b|n0) ≫ p∞(a|n0).
Having short effective distance and high exit probability b is at highest import risk. While
ais close to the infected its low exit probability reduces the risk posed by the infected.
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Figure 5.4: Relationship between import risk p∞, exit probability q, scope s and betweenness
centrality Cb. Nodes are coloured according to the geographic region they belong to, 100
biggest nodes flux-wise are highlighted. Size of the node is proportional to the passenger
flux through the node. None of displayed metrics is a good predictor for import risk.
place. This is an important distinction to make when real threat of import has to be accessed.
Let us consider a disease which has no latent period and renders the patient immobile or
kills him in short time. The probability of a person infected with such disease to board a
plane will be close to zero, hence the calculated import risk will be overestimating the risk.
A different disease with long latent period, mild symptoms or imposing little restrictions on
the infected will be likely exported from the area more often as the passengers will perceive
to be healthy. In this scenario import risk will likely underestimate the threat.
5.2 Application on world aviation network
As outlined in the introduction global spread of diseases is dominated by the air traffic.
Hence we apply the metric on the world aviation network (WAN) to demonstrate how pro-
posed methodology can be used in a real world pandemic scenario. Most of the times out-
breaks overarch multiple cities and spread locally so that import risk from one airport is not
sufficient to characterise the threat. In this subsection we demonstrate how averaging can be
used in this case and to compensate for lacking information. We will demonstrate the proce-
dure on well documented outbreaks from recent years and on some hypothetical scenarios.
The context dependent feature of import risk has further advantages: a switch in perspective
is possible if the interest lies on import target rather than the outbreak location. This can be
the case for administration of a certain airport who wants to know what outbreak locations
would pose a threat to their area of responsibility.
When no particular outbreak is threatening the network general classification of airports
according to import risk is possible. Average import risk over all possible outbreak and target
locations in the WAN is p¯ = 0.00026. Due to the heterogeneity of the network and the context
sensitivity of import risk, this value is not representative for any particular scenario. Fig. 5.5
A shows top 20 highest ranking airports in terms of average import risk from all other nodes
is calculated. Import risk of the most threatened airport is more than 20 times higher than
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Figure 5.5: Top 20 airports (A) and countries (B) according to global import risk. Global
import risk is the average import risk over all possible outbreak location weighted with the
size of the outbreak location. The airports are labeled according to the IATA 3 letter code,
country labels are ISO two letter codes. Bars are coloured according to the geographical
region of the location. Only 4 out of top 20 airports in import risk ranking are present in top
12 of the scope ranking in Fig. 4.4. Airports in question are London-Heathrow, Frankfurt
Intl., Singapore Changi and Chicago O’Hare. This demonstrates that the two metrics, p∞ and
s, have different meaning: scope indicating important transit nodes and import risk showing
location in danger of disease importation. In country ranking the population of the country
has an impact on the ranking, but it is not a determining factor. Multiple countries with
low population are present in the top 20. Examples are Malaysia (ranked 42 according to
population), South Africa (population rank 25) and Spain (population rank 30) [10]
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average. Nevertheless absolute values of import risk for a single airport are low, all shown
airports have import risk values of a similar scale. Most at risk airports are medium hubs
from North America, Europe or Asia. There is little overlap with top 12 scoring airports
according to scope (4 out of 12; Fig. 4.4) and betweenness centrality (3 out of 15; Fig. 4.2).
Moderate overlap can be observed with flux (7 out of 15; Fig. 4.2) and eigenvalue centrality
(8 out of 15; Fig. 4.2). We propose that primary gates on the effective distance tree are at
lower import risk than their direct children. Primary gates show much higher scope than
their offsprings while population size can remain comparable. As discussed in the previous
chapter they are used as transit location, which leads to lower exit probability and hence
decreased import risk. While primary gates are ideal locations for enter or exit screening, the
secondary neighbours are at higher risk of case importation. Despite high exit probability
small local airports don’t enter top 20 as the probability of an agent travelling to the terminal
leaf without exiting on the way is minor. As has been described above import risk is subject
of two opposing effects: probability of an agent getting to the node, which decreases with
the number of links traversed, and exit probability at the node, which increases the farther
from origin the agent has travelled. Hence maximum import probability lies somewhere in
between primary gates and terminal leafs.
Country-wise import risk is shown in Fig. 5.5 B. Difference in import risk between coun-
tries is more significant compared to the difference between airports, which can be in part
attributed to difference in country sizes and the number of airports contributing to it. Never-
theless the size of a country is not the only factor, as multiple small countries appear within
top 20, e.g. Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Spain. All of the listed countries are well devel-
oped in means of economy and access to air transportation network. All of them host global
and regional hubs hence accumulating disproportional amount of air traffic. Same cases can
conflict with the assumption that traffic flow is proportional to the inhabitants inside the
catchment are. In that case cn < fn, hence the exit probability for this node is being overesti-
mated as is its contribution to scope of its parents. Reverse case can also happen. An example
of it is Africa: while in part densely populated, amount of airports on African continent is
comparably is low. In some regions of Africa population over all is less mobile in terms of air
travel as has been discussed in Section 3.1. We acknowledge this limitation but don’t think
that it renders the overall method invalid. When crucial this problem can be circumvented
by use of real census data.
In countrywide ranking more geographical regions are present. Australia and Russia are
present in top 20 threatened countries on place 11 and 14 respectively. While no single airport
from either shows in the airport ranking both countries extend over a wide geographical
area and accumulate many regional and international airports (153 in Russia and 136 in
Australia). Hence for both countries the risk of an importation from any specific airport might
be negligible, but accumulated over all possible importation targets the threat is substantial.
More refined picture arises when we differentiate the risk posed by different regions
instead of taking a worldwide average. This way we can derive profiles for airports and
countries similar to those used in Chapter 4. Fig. 5.6 shows profiles for the biggest airport
(A) and respective countries (B) for each of 6 continents. None of depicted locations is
dominated by one region in terms of import risk, which is in sharp contrast with scope (
Fig. 4.6). In a sense all airports are generalists when it comes to import probability. Most
countries and airports are threatened significantly by outbreaks on their continent. While
often enough biggest hub in a region acts as a major gate in case of an outbreak it is also
guaranteed to be at close effective distance to all airports in the region. This leads to higher
average import risk across own region. For a country the effect is even more profound as
smaller local airports are very likely to be direct children of a major local hub, hence having
a high import risk.
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Figure 5.6: Import risk profiles of the biggest airports (top row) and respective countries (bot-
tom row) for each continent. Bars represent regions and are coloured accordingly. Location
itself was not included in the region sum. Different profile types can be observed: airports
which have an overall high importation risk (e.g. London-Heathrow) or airports with only
few locations posing high risk (e.g. Atlanta Hartsfield- Jackson). The country profile is heav-
ily influenced by its biggest airport. An exception is South-Africa, where the highest peak,
region of southern Africa, originates from smaller local airports. In the United States highest
import risk can be attributed to its own continent. Airports on the west coast contribute to
the considerable import risk from Oceania, this is reflected in the countrywide risk profile.
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Figure 5.7: Country profiles of China and USA with exemplary airport profiles. Bars are
coloured according to geographical regions, bar height indicates the import risk from respec-
tive region. Airport profiles inside one country display similar risk across multiple regions,
e.g. high threat is posed to all Chinese airports by eastern and south-eastern Asian regions.
This is the case for most of the 188 Chinese airports. Hence most airport profiles inside China
match profile of the biggest airport and result in a similar country profile. In United States
airport profiles overlap for American regions but can differ in import risk from Oceania. This
is reflected in the countrywide profile.
Profiles of most biggest airports align well with profile of the country it belongs to. Promi-
nent example of this is China, where country profile is strongly correlated to profile of Beijing
Capital airport (PEK). It is even more striking as there are total of 188 airports in China. All
Chinese airports are at high import risk from East Asian region, multiple big Chinese air-
ports have a profile highly similar to that of Beijing Capital. These effects combined result
in a country profile highly resemblant of its main airport as can be seen in figure 5.7. For
Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson airport (ATL) highest threat is posed by multiple regions of Amer-
ican continent, there is only minor association with Oceania. While ATL is the largest airport
in WAN and America according to passenger flux there are multiple major hubs inside the
US with a distinct profiles. An example of an alternative hub is San Francisco Intl. airport
(SFO) which is at high risk of import from Micro- and Melanesia. ATL and SFO also repre-
sent typical airport profiles of the east and west coast respectively. It is not surprising that the
country profile of USA is a combination of both, exposed to high risk from both American
continents and Oceania (see figure 5.7). In big countries like the US a dominant airport is
difficukt to determine, especially because of big geographical stretch of the country which is
also reflected in connections of the WAN.
Another interesting relationship can be observed when the profile of Johannesburg O.R.
Tambo (JNB) airport is compared to its scope profile in figure 4.6. The scope profile is dom-
inated by a single region, South Africa, while import risk this region poses is significantly
lower than the threat from other African locations. This underlines the conclusion that pri-
mary gates are not the most endangered locations. When JNB is the sole gate, which is the
case for Southern Africa, probability that a passenger will exit in JNB is minor. In terms of
flux and thus the population JNB ranks 82. When its scope is close to 1 its population is
not sufficient to increase exit probability to high value. For other regions of Africa JNB is an
§5.2 Application on world aviation network 63
Figure 5.8: Application of import risk on real (A) and hypothetical (B) outbreak scenarios.
Red region on the mini map highlights the outbreak region. Airports located inside the
affected region were excluded from the bar chart. The airports are labeled according to
the IATA 3 letter code, country labels are ISO two letter codes. Top row of the bar charts
depicts most endangered locations worldwide, middle row - locations in Europe, bottom
row - locations in United States. Top ten locations in each category are depicted. The bars
are coloured according to the region to which the airport belongs. Some scenarios, e.g. Ebola
outbreak or Yellow Fever, pose much higher threat on the European region than on United
States. Or vice versa in case of Zika. In multiple scenarios it can be seen that the endangered
locations lie in a different geographic region than the outbreak itself. In case of Ebola multiple
European airports are in the worldwide top 10. Top three worldwide locations at risk with
respect to MERS lie in Southern Asia, two of them in India.
airport with many scheduled flight but is transit for only minor airports inside south Africa.
Hence it is a secondary gate with comparably high population, which results in a high exit
probability and due to its position on WAN also short effective distance.
When more information about the outbreak is provided import risk can be calculated
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to reflect the situation at hand. We incorporate the information about geographic spread
through a weighted average over all airports inside the affected area. This approach does not
consider that some regions can be affected more than others, but precise, quantitative infor-
mation about the severity of the outbreak is rarely available and up-to-date. Nonetheless our
metric can be easily adapted to incorporate this information by defining an altered average.
Note that the import risk is not to be seen as an absolute value of importation probability
in case of pandemic. Import risk evaluates the probability of a single agent, which left the
outbreak origin to finish his journey at the respective airport. In a real world outbreak it is
difficult to evaluate how many infected citizens will leave affected region as it depends on
the mobility of the population and the disease itself. In countries where air traffic is underde-
veloped or in cases when disease puts a great strain on infected right after onset probability
of an infected to travel is greatly diminished. Hence we advise to see import risk as a metric
to compare danger posed to different locations not as an absolute probability as long as the
number of infected leaving the outbreak site are not accounted for.
As outlined above broader geographic regions affected by disease can be accounted for
by averaging over single airports with catchment area inside of the affected region. Fig. 5.8
shows real world (A) and hypothetical (B) outbreak scenarios and risk posed to worldwide,
European and US locations. Airports inside affected regions were not included in the ranking
as import risk has no meaning when an outbreak is already ongoing in the area. The figure
confirms observation from profiles: outbreaks pose high threat to airports in their indirect
geographical proximity. For example multiple Indian airpots are at risk in case of MERS
outbreak, South-East Asian airports are endangered when outbreak happens in East Asia.
Two outbreaks pose disproportionally high threat to USA compared to other regions of the
world: ZIKA and a hypothetical outbreak in the Caribbean. In both cases all but one of top
10 worldwide threatened airports are part of the United States. Multiple airports listed in
top 20 worldwide ranking from Fig. 5.5 appear in this two scenarios. Compared to scope
ranking, the subset of airports is strikingly different for all outbreak scenarios. For all cases
top gate airports are distributed over several geographical regions often showing one or few
dominant gates for the outbreak. Best example of this is Ebola outbreak. In case of import
risk there is no single airport which is at disproportionally high risk. Interestingly in case
of Ebola outbreak two biggest gates, London Heathrow and Paris Charles de Gaule, are
neither in top 10 worldwide nor in top 7 Europe wide threatened airports. Once again this
underlines that gate airports starring high scope are at relatively low risk of initial disease
importation. In every case similar set of airports inside Europe is endangered. The picture
is slightly more diverse inside the US, but multiple hubs appear in each bar chart. In cases
of Zika and a Caribbean outbreak the subset of threatened airports is different from other
depicted scenarios.
Figure 5.9 shows a direct comparison between scope and import risk profiles (A) and
rankings (B). As described above, both metrics produce distinct sets of targets. Biggest gate
airports are rarely at high import risk. Highest threat of case imports is most often pre-
sented to the smaller hubs, which have considerable population size, but do not act as transit
nodes. This is an important relationship, which can be easily overlooked, and can lead to
underestimation of risk for second order neighbours of the outbreak location.
We must keep in mind that worldwide spreading is dominated by air traffic, but local
spreading occurs along different routes. In countries with poorly developed infrastructure
local spreading can still resemble wave like pattern as known from historical outbreaks.
When the infrastructure is present and commuting is a common practise the spreading can
happen faster and wave patterns will be obscured. Locations close to outbreak source will be
affected even if import risk calculated based on WAN suggests otherwise. Hence over time
affected region will become bigger as the disease spreads locally. Same logic can be applied to
§5.2 Application on world aviation network 65
Figure 5.9: Comparison between the scope and import risk profiles (A) and rankings (B).In
both cases the regions and airports indicated by the metrics are different. (A) While Johan-
nesburg O.R. Tambo is a major gate in case of an outbreak in Southern Africa, the highest
importation risk to it is posed by a different African region. Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson is not
acting as a gate for any of the regions. Nonetheless it is at high risk of case importation from
all American regions. (B) In the worldwide ranking according to scope multiple European
airports appear. While acting as spreaders they experience a low importation risk. In Europe-
and US-wide rankings according to either metric deviate considerably, with multiple airports
appearing in one ranking exclusively.
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Figure 5.10: Aggregated, averaged import probability in case of a region wide pandemic.
Outbreak region is shown in black, no import risk is calculated for it. A shows an outbreak
in the region of West Asia, B - West Africa, C - South-Eastern Asia. The colour represents
import risk aggregated for an entire region. This view shows that some outbreaks exhibit
local patterns, endangering mostly regions in close proximity (C). Others pose a risk to
remote locations with which they share historical ties (B). In both of this cases big parts of
the world remain unaffected. Western Asia is region hosting base airpots of multiple big
airlines and therefore hubs of considerable size. In case of an outbreak in this region import
risk is distributes more evenly across the world.
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import location. Even if the destination has a weak coupling to WAN and hence low import
risk, disease can be imported into a hub geographically close to the target. From there it
will spread through commuter traffic and affect its geographic proximity. To account for this
effect it is useful to study relations between broader regions. Fig 5.10 shows how an outbreak
in one of the 21 geographical region affects the remaining map. Depicted outbreaks exhibit
different types of patterns. An outbreak in South-East Asia (C) has a high risk of exporting
disease inside own continent, to Asia and Oceania while presenting almost no risk to Europe
or Africa. This local spreading pattern is the one captured most by current political thinking
when it comes to outbreaks, where treat is evaluated in terms of geographical distance. In an
outbreak scenario as depicted in B this reasoning can lead to dangerous false estimations of
risk when geographical distance is considered. While being geographically closest to its own
continent, West Africa poses highest threat to West Europe. Its historical ties with France
and Great Britain are reflected in the structure of air traffic network as increased travel fluxes
between the countries. This outbreak scenario shows that the influence of history runs much
deeper than previously assumed and can shape seemingly unrelated phenomena. In panel
A a region with high amount of big transit hubs with low population is infected. West Asia
harbours multiple base airports of major flight companies connecting Europe and Asia and
other destinations around the world. Thus it poses a more uniform threat to all regions
including North America, North Africa, Europe and Asia. Once again West Europe is at a
highest threat, followed by South Asia. This scenario contradicts to conclusions which would
be drawn using geographic distance. As was emphasised in the introduction thinking in
terms of geographic distance is not applicable in current age of fast global traffic. Fig. 5.10
shows what differences arise between import risk and geographic distance.
Within the context of local political counselling it is more important to know which loca-
tions affects a specific country instead of knowing how risk is distributed worldwide. Fig.
5.11 demonstrates this application for three international airports in different regions of the
world. Bar charts show top 10 airports, countries and regions posing a threat to the airport of
interest. All airports which appear in the bar charts are medium hubs often sharing the same
or neighbouring region with the airport of interest. This is in line with observations made
with prior examples. An exception is Puerto Plata which poses a high import risk to London
Heathrow (LHR). It can be attributed to colonial and political ties of Martinique, which also
appears in top 10 of countries posing highest threat to LHR. Several African countries, which
also share historical relations with Great Britain, appear in top 10 for London Heathrow. At
the same time no single African airport is represented in the ranking. Airport wide ranking
is dominated by european locations, while country ranking is much more diverse in terms
of geographical region. In terms of regions London Heathrow shows a strong association
with entire Africa, Northern Africa above all others. Again no single airport or country from
that region appears in the rankings. This is surprising but possible if medium risk is posed
by all locations inside this region, which leads to high import risk over all. Dubai airport
shows strong association with African region in terms of airports, countries and overall re-
gional import risk. Only two non african airports appear in top 10: London Heathrow and
Sylhet airport. One word of caution is appropriate in case of Dubai Intl.. Assumption that
the flux of the airport is representative of its catchment area might be validated and thus the
probability of a passenger exiting there is likely to be overestimated. While accumulating
high flux Dubai Intl. is mainly a transit airport, but this does not render any of conclusions
invalid. When validated this assumption affects the probability from every outbreak location
to same extent therefore leaving the sequence intact. For Beijing Intl. airport most airports
posing the highest threat are from the same region. The rest of the airports belonging to
top 10 are from Oceania as well as multiple countries from the ranking. Oceania is also the
region posing highest threat to to Beijing airport. Interestingly for all depicted airports high-
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Figure 5.11: Outbreak locations which pose highest threat from the perspective of an airport.
Airports lying in the same country as the airport of interest are excluded. Top row shows
scenarios in which only the location of the airport is affected, the middle row represents an
outbreak in a single country, the bottom row represents an outbreak in a geographic region.
Bars are coloured according to the geographic region. The airports are labeled according to
the IATA 3 letter code, country labels are ISO two letter codes. This perspective can be used
to judge the threat current outbreak is posing to the location of interest. In case of Beijing
airport most dangerous locations lie inside the same geographic region. Interestingly the
highest threat region wise is posed by Micronesia. From the perspective of London Heathrow
airports from different geographical regions pose a threat. The presence of african countries
and regions is especially striking. The outbreaks in multiple north african locations pose a
high threat for Dubai. In none of the cases is the own region the highest threat. One possible
explanation is that the biggest hub of the region acts as a gateway to the rest of the world,
therefore taking a role of a transit airport with low likelihood of passengers exiting there.
Import risk using air transportation network is not a fitting metric to estimate spreading on
the local scale, where air traffic is not the dominating transport.
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est threat region-wise is posed by a different region than their own, though we need to be
cautious with this conclusion in case of China. In this calculation airports belonging to the
same country as the airport of interest were excluded. In case of China this is a substantial
fraction of Eastern Asia. An interesting detail is that there is no overlap between locations
which grant an airport high scope and pose a threat in means of disease import. This holds
when outbreak origins are airports, countries and regions likewise. Once again this obser-
vation supports the claim that major gates are at lower importation risk than their children.
Other centrality measures did not make this difference between the role a node plays and the
threat posed to a it.
5.3 Discussion
The methodology introduced in this chapter provides a scientific way to judge import risk
during and prior to pandemic situations. We have demonstrated the application on past,
ongoing and hypothetical pandemics. We identified locations exposed to highest threat of
case importation, which are not obvious in terms of their geographical location. Though
in some pandemic situations geographical reasoning and predictions made by import risk
coincide, most of the time very different pictures arise. As we have observed in case of
West Africa sometimes history influences seemingly unrelated processes. Hence reliance
on geographical information only ignores multiple important factors. Import risk is not
considering those directly, but it relies on air transportation network on which the spreading
is taking place, thus all influential factors are already contained in the network.
Import risk of a node is highly context sensitive and makes predictions tailored to a spe-
cific outbreak location. It is an advantage of this metric over conventional centrality measures
which assign a node same value regardless of outbreak origin and spacial spread. While
incorporating some specific information about the outbreak import risk does not rely on pa-
rameters that are difficult to estimate or prone to variations, e.g. basic reproduction rate R0.
Our approach can be applied on early stages of the epidemic while complicated ODE models,
which need proper parametrisation, are available only after several weeks of outbreak. This
is especially true for newly emerging or highly adaptable diseases. As described in chapter
3 spreading speed can be estimated using effective trees and can complement import risk.
Presented results support our claim that transit airports even in close proximity of the
outbreak are not the most endangered locations. Exit probability of transit hubs is very low,
hence reducing the import probability. Nonetheless we have to note that the model is based
on an assumption which can be validated by some diseases. In the definition of import risk
we require infected agent to terminate the trip and exit at a node to spark an epidemic.
During the stay in an airport interactions are limited to a small number of people who might
or might not belong to the population of respective node. When released into population
inside the catchment area of an airport infected is in contact with native individuals and is
more likely to generate secondary cases relevant for the location. For some highly contagious,
airborne infections like measles sufficient number of relevant infections can occur inside the
airport. Due to high R0 in a fully susceptible population and airborne transmission route
an epidemic can be sparked this way. Nevertheless we consider described scenario to be an
exception rater that the rule, either due to low R0 of most diseases or sufficient vaccination
coverage in the population.
Realistic outbreaks are rarely confined to a single location, as they spread over time when
containment efforts are delayed or unsuccessful. Hence to account for this scenarios aggre-
gation and averaging procedures are necessary. We have proposed a method of averaging
import risk over multiple outbreak locations and account for population sizes at outbreak
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sites. Note that with growing size and often geographical spread of the outbreak the threat
of it for other locations is increasing. Using our proposed averaging method does not ac-
count for this as has been explained in this chapter. Other methods are needed to estimate
the propensity or the amount of infected released by a region. In case when origin of the
outbreak is uncertain our averaging method is very fit to account for this uncertainty. Apart
from this we have demonstrated that aggregation over multiple target locations is also pos-
sible. With provided tools it is possible to account for most realistic outbreak scenarios and
also make decisions when information is lacking and true outbreak origin is uncertain.
Knowing the import risk still leaves one important question unanswered: what is to be
done about it? In the next chapter we explore this question by devising a game theoretical
model. At the base of it lies a transportation network analogous to the WANwhere nodes are
players able to commit resources for epidemic prevention. In contrary to previous chapters
we use simplified generic networks for the study to understand basic laws and dependencies
which might be heavily influenced by topology. General rules are derived from the model
giving general advise and widening understanding of this complex problem.
Chapter 6
The good, the bad and the optimal:
resource allocation strategies
during emerging pandemics
In this chapter we investigate a model for optimal deployment of mitigation resources in
a network of interacting countries. We implement two versions of the model: selfish, with
nodes minimising own cost, and pro-social, with nodes minimising global cost. In both
cases the node can exercise a limited amount of resources among all nodes of the net-
work to mitigate an outbreak. At each node costs are a combination of invested resources
and effective susceptibility to case importations. The mathematical definition of the model
presented in this chapter employs game theoretical methods and iterative optimisation.
Therefore, after mathematical definition, we explain the specifics of the implementation
of the model. We show, analytically and numerically, that purely selfish and cooperative
actions do not differ considerably in a single outbreak scenario. In both cases the resources
are donated to the outbreak location. However, in a scenario with multiple outbreak loca-
tions we find that resource allocation can follow more complex patterns and nodes can fall
back on egocentric resource allocations. Furthermore, the amount of resources available
to the system changes the final distribution of resources, with wealthy systems allocating
more resources to the affected nodes. We show that restricting the nodes from specific
strategies gives rise to well known intervention patterns, i.e. ring vaccination, which has
proven effective in the field.
Since the onset of the twenty first century multiple pandemics emerged, went global and
disappeared after making headlines and claiming lives. SARS was the first epidemic of the
century and a wake up call highlighting the speed of spreading and unpredictable jumps a
disease can exhibit in a modern world. While it was by far not the deadliest epidemic claim-
ing 774 lives from total 8096 infected, it forced WHO to issue a global alert and contributed
to implementation of International Health Regulations (IHR) two years later [109]. The latter
agreement, signed by all members of the organisation, was a clear sign that international
oversight and coordination was wished for and needed to handle global issues. One of the
new tools enabled by the agreement is the declaration of Public Health Emergency of Inter-
national Concern (PHEIC) followed up by recommendations of actions to contain the threat.
Until now PHEIC was issued four times, during the flu pandemic in 2009, polio resurgence
in 2014, Ebola outbreak of the same year and most recently in connection with Zika outbreak
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and its proven link with multiple neural disorders. Three out of four pandemics occurred
in developing countries with low gross domestic product and health infrastructure unpre-
pared to handle outbreaks of this scale. One of the most alarming and distressing pictures
arose during the Ebola pandemic which lasted for almost two years with local infrastructure
completely overwhelmed at an early stage. In the course of pandemic 28 616 people were
infected of whom 11 310 died[114]. This number is believed to be highly underreported for
all affected countries as rumours and fear of public stigmatisation prevented many from re-
porting Ebola cases. Even those who did often could not be accommodated in hospitals and
hence were not tested or accounted for in the statistics.
Despite global oversight through WHO international response was heavily criticised by
multiple organisations and assessment boards [35, 78, 68, 76, 56]. It was called inappropriate
on many levels, underfunded, delayed and badly coordinated. Similar, but less harsh evalua-
tions were made after H1N1 pandemic in 2009 [75]. All of the listed assessments emphasised
the role of global engagement and the need of international cooperation in case of large scale
pandemics to achieve timely and adequate response. Achieving the latter is a challenge as
often interests of countries conflict with global interest. Hence an egoistic country can refuse
to comply to WHOs recommendations, free ride by not contributing to the funding or en-
force politics which intervene with the course of global action. During the Ebola epidemic
this behaviour was displayed by about a third of the IHR countries, among others by Aus-
tralia and Canada, who were the only high income countries to impose travel restrictions in
spite of WHO’s recommendation not to do so [82, 90]. IHR lacks any tools of enforcement
or punishment of non compliance hence such behaviour is risk free. This phenomenon is a
well studied topic in game theory and social sciences. It is investigated in form of simplified
scenarios called public good games posing similar dilemma as outlined above. Empirical and
modelling studies show that cooperation can only be sustained when means of punishment
for non-cooperation are given [30]. Without punishment defectors benefit from their cooper-
ative peers by exploiting them, which leads to decline and disappearance of cooperators in
the community. Further it has been shown that if punishment is allowed for all members of
the community anti-social punishment can lead to cooperation decline as well [88]. Hence
when considered as public good game we must conclude that no cooperation will arise with-
out strong enforcement of the recommended strategy and this frail state can be destroyed by
anti-social responses from the participants.
As some countries put emphasis on favouring intrastate matters before interstate relations
we expect it to be challenging to implement policies proposed by agreements like IHR. Given
this situation it is important to study behaviour and decision making of participating coun-
tries when no top-down regulations are imposed or can not be enforced. In context of world-
wide pandemics surprisingly little research is done on this. Many publications concentrate on
the optimal resource distribution between two or multiple connected meta-populations while
assuming that the resources will be distributed by an overarching institution [9, 20, 93, 87, 64].
In reality resources are owned by countries and hence are managed by its government, which
is mainly interested in promoting countries interests. While WHO and IHR have resources
at their expense they heavily rely on donations, either voluntary or issued by agreements.
But again, as no enforcement tools are available contributions can be issued with great delay
or refused altogether. Hence we want to study this system as an optimisation problem on a
network of selfish agents. As outlined above the resources are owned by the agents and are
used to serve self-interest. Nodes are optimising own costs, thus an optimum for one node
can be conflicting with best solutions for others. We assume that pro-social behaviour can
occur in a pandemic situation thus we incorporate it as a second mode of optimisation. In
this case nodes do not optimise costs inflicted to themselves exclusively but minimise net-
work wide costs. We are not interested in emergence of cooperation as our framework is not
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designed for it. We want to observe the final distribution of resources across the network
given all agents are selfish or pro-social. Of particular interest is the difference in allocated
resources between the two optimisation scenarios.
There are multiple challenges connected to this problem which we will not address in this
thesis. While there are multiple ways to evaluate a threat of an ongoing outbreak there is no
unified framework or gold standard. We proposed another, in our view superior method in
previous chapter by defining a probabilistic, network based measure to estimate import risk.
Nevertheless we can not expect all countries to rely on the same metric, hence we expect the
perception of risk to vary across countries. In the work at hand we will use proposed import
risk as a basis for research presented in this chapter and assume that all nodes evaluate the
risk the same way. Another issue which will not be addressed is free-riding. It is a widely
discussed phenomenon in game theory and in context of vaccination of individuals. While
possible in our scenario we will refrain from studying it at this stage. Presented work is aimed
at basic understanding of the system which in itself poses multiple challenges. Further we
disregard that in real world some countries are tied by historical and political relationships
and further interests which alter their cost function and readiness to aid each other. Such
values are hard to estimate and are at risk of overcomplicating and obscuring the picture.
6.1 Model
As outlined in the introduction we want to define a system as a network of players, which
are optimising cost individually and without coordination. The model is comprised of two
main components: backbone based on network theory and the optimisation layer inspired
by game theoretical approaches. In our model nodes represent countries and links are con-
nections between those. Note that a connection must enable transmission of disease across
this link, e.g infected individuals travelling across a link. A natural example of such are
traffic connections, e.g.as described by the world aviation network (WAN). For vector or food
borne diseases trade networks can be used. The strength of the link is determined by its
flux, in the case of WAN the number of plane seats on scheduled commercial flights. Though
we pick the links to be capable of spreading, explicit modelling of the spread is not part of
our model. The outbreak is represented by one or many outbreak sources chosen at system
initiation. Infected nodes harbour certain amount of infected, who inflict costs. Nodes can
assess the probability that an infected will leave the source, travel to and exit at the respective
node. Each arriving undetected infected is connected with cost, e.g. for delayed quarantine,
extended treatment, contact tracing and and treatment of secondary cases. Thus using the lat-
ter and probability of arrival expected cost from an outbreak can be evaluated for each node.
These cost can be modulated through donation of resources for disease containment. All
nodes possess a limited amount of resources ρn ≥ 0, which can be used for disease preven-
tion. These represent the amount of money, personnel or supplies a country n can mobilise
in a case of a pandemic. We do not specify the form in which resources are available to keep
the model as simple as possible. In real world amount of resources will vary across countries
and is likely to be correlated with flux. We want to study general phenomena so we do not
require this proportionality in our model, but we investigate it computationally. A node is
allowed to distribute its resources over a network by splitting them between nodes, donate
all resources to one node or refrain from spending any. All actions can be combined or per-
formed with arbitrary fractions of maximal available resources. To reflect how likely infected
at node n are missed we introduce a property called susceptibility Qn. Susceptibility Qn in-
dicates the probability that an infected will be released from or arrive at node n undetected,
hence 0 ≤ Qn ≤ 1. Susceptibility of a node can be reduced by donations and possibly be
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Figure 6.1: Schematic explanation of resource allocation model. The basis of the model is a
network of players, i.e. countries, where a link fnm, coloured black, represents a traffic con-
nection from node n to node m (e.g. number of passenger in the air transportation network).
Nodes have two model specific properties: their infection state (red pictogram - infected,
blue - healthy), susceptibility Qn and maximal resources ρn. The state of a node indicates
if the node is a source of an outbreak and is hence releasing infected agents. Susceptibility
of a node is a measure of how easily an infected traveller can traverse or enter the node.
When an infected enters a node it causes costs for the node, e.g. to quarantine infected, trace
contacts etc. A node n can donate all or a fraction of its resources to any node in the network,
itself included, to combat disease spreading (investment represented by orange arrows). Sus-
ceptibility of the node, which receives resources for disease prevention is decreased. When
Qi = 0, i no infected agent can traverse of enter the node. Hence if susceptibility of source
is decreased to 0 outbreak is contained. Nodes in the model are players optimising a cost
function. The cost function consists of two parts: 1. resources spent for disease prevention
and 2. cost of importation weighted by the probability of import cases. Depending on the
mode of the model a node is either optimising only own costs (selfish mode) or cost of the
entire network (pro-social mode). No explicit disease spreading or cheating behaviour is im-
plemented in this model. The emphasis lies in the resource distribution across the network
in equilibrium given a certain state of the network. Depicted investment is not an outcome
of a simulation.
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pushed down to 0. In real world reduction of susceptibility can be achieved by exit or enter
screening in airports, where infected can be quarantined fast and efficient without inflicting
high costs. When Qn = 0 is achieved no infected can exit at node n or proceed to travel.
Hence this model allows a complete prevention of the epidemic: if the susceptibility of the
source is reduced to 0 pandemic is successfully brought under control.
We emphasise that proposed system is not equivalent to a public goods game. It re-
sembles public good games formulated to model vaccination behaviour with an important
distinction. While the cost function of each node has a similar form, it is numerically differ-
ent. Network topology determines a unique import probability for each node, thus making
the agents distinct. Accordingly each node can have its own optimal strategy. The latter is in
contrast to the solution of classical public good games. Important implication of the multi-
agent approach, well known in game theory, is that actions of agents change the state of the
system and affect decisions of their peers. Hence action of a player, which was optimal before
action of its peers needs to be revised afterwards. This way optimisation has to be performed
iteratively until the system reaches its final equilibrium. Note that in this model resources
donated to a node can be withdrawn at the next step, hence representing verbal commitment
rather than physical allocation. Iterative nature of this process makes both analytical solution
and computations more challenging.
We further emphasise that, while having similar motivation, our model is distinct from the
model presented in [103]. Wang et. al. restrict the network to two interconnected nodes and
consider the final number of cases for cost estimation. While this allows for elegant analytical
solution, this system is difficult to tract as soon as the number of nodes increases. As our
emphasis lies on exploring the problem in a multi-node system and on varying network
topologies we do not tract the final outbreak size. In the publication by Wang et. al. nodes
are symmetrical in terms of their import probability. We on the other hand pursue a system
which gives rise to different subsets of nodes, close and far from the source of infection.
Further we do not require nodes to spend all available resources, which is the case in [103].
Thus we present a more general system, which is solved with different tools.
In following we will introduce exact mathematical notation for the system and explore it.
Multiple strategic decisions can be solved analytically on general topology, even though final
equilibrium can not be determined regardless of the simplicity of system components. We
explore the equilibrium computationally on different network topologies, outbreak scenarios
and parameter combinations.
6.1.1 Mathematic definition
The base of the model is a network with N nodes and L links between those. Links are
routes with flux F which bear spreading potential . We refrain from a detailed derivation
of the network from data as it has been described in Chapter 3. Each node has a maximal
amount of available resources ρn, which can be distributed across all nodes of the network.
We call this distribution a strategy of the node n, rn, where (rn)k is the amount of resources
n donated to k and 0 ≤ ∑k(rn)k ≤ ρn. Note that the latter implies that not all resources have
to be spent and that the resources are strictly positive. A matrix Rwith Rkn = (rn)kdescribes
investment state of the entire network. Further we rely on the notion of probability that an
agent travels along a link from n to k, Pkn, and import risk p∞(n|i) as defined in equation
5.1. In this model import risk can be modulated by allocation of resources, which changes
susceptibility of a node 0 ≤ Qn ≤ 1. Susceptibility of a node fulfils all requirements to be
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treated as probability and thus can be easily incorporated into import risk
p∞(n|i,Q) = Qnqn
∞
∑
t=1
(S˜t)ni
where
S˜ni = PniQi(1− qi)
Note that if Qn = 1 for all n we return to previous definition of import risk. For a single
path ω = {1, ..., L} new import risk is p(ω) = QLqL ∏
L
k=1 Skk−1. If Qn = 0 for any n ∈ ω no
disease can be transmitted along this path. If the susceptibility of the source of the outbreak
Qi = 0 disease can not be transmitted to any nodes, thus the outbreak is fully prevented.
Note that in the new definition import risk is strictly smaller than defined in Eq. 5.1, hence
∑
m
p∞(m|n,Q) ≤ 1
As shown in previous chapters we can apply the same metric when there are more than one
outbreak origin. Averaging and aggregating can be implemented the same way as described
for initial definition of import risk in equation 5.2.
There are multiple ways how to translate donated resources into susceptibility reduction.
Simplest assumption is to imply linear dependency of a form{
Qn(R) = 1−∑m Rnm f or ∑m Rnm ≤ 1
Qn(R) = 0 else
(6.1)
This definition is in agreement with 0 ≤ Qn ≤ 1. Linear function of Qn has the benefit of
being analytically tractable, further it is a definition with fewest assumptions and is hence
favoured by the law of parsimony. In the work at hand this definition of susceptibility is
used unless stated otherwise. Two further functions are plausible: power law and sigmoidal.
Power law function account for saturation or threshold-like phenomena, depending on the
exponent. It is defined in the same intervals as the linear version with exception of Qn(R) =
1− (∑n Rnm)
ε. Exponents ǫ above 1 reflect that arbitrary small donations are of little use, full
potential can be harnessed only above a certain investment threshold. Exponents lower than
1 reflect that some residual risk remains even if high amounts of resources has been donated.
Both of these effects are simultaneously accounted for when sigmoidal function is used. We
will explore all three possibilities numerically in following sections.
We have defined import risk as a metric to assess the threat posed to a node by a specific
outbreak location. Import risk indicates how likely it is that an infected leaving the outbreak
location will arrive at the node of interest. While irrelevant in prior chapter we need to
define how many infected are exported by the node and how many remain inside. This
can be rarely estimated from data and has to be assumed. We thus define the number of
infected individuals in the source node i, λi. The fraction of infected who leaves node i is
Γi. For simplicity we assume that Γi = Γ for all i. At the target node each individual inflicts
certain cost for its isolation, treatment and contact tracing, C0I . Using the above we can define
expected cost inflicted by the outbreak at node i to node n
CO(n, R) = (Γp∞(n|i) + (1− Γ)Qnδni)CI
where
CI = C
0
I α
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is the global cost of the outbreak in case with no interventions, α reflects severity of the
outbreak. If the outbreak is distributed across multiple origins Υ import risk is calculated
across all of those as described above
CO(n, R) =
(
Γp∞(n|Υ) + ∑
i∈Υ
(1− Γ)Qnδni
)
CI
Cost inflicted by the outbreak can be reduced by investment as outlined above. Investment
is associated with loss of resources, hence it must be incorporated into the full cost function
which is as follows
Cn(R) = ∑
k
Rkn + CO(n)
= ∑
k
Rkn + (Γp∞(n|i) + (1− Γ)Qnδni)CI (6.2)
with δni = 1 if n = i and 0 otherwise.
In selfish mode function 6.2 is minimised by each node disregarding the global cost.
While general form of the function remains the same, import probability varies strongly
depending on position of a node. Calculation of import probability is the reason why exact
analytical solutions for general topologies are not feasible. Optimisation of cost must be
done iteratively, which is the second challenge when it comes to the approach at hand,
computationally and analytically. After one node has decided upon its strategy remaining
nodes of the network decide upon theirs. When every node in the network has updated its
strategy the process is repeated.
In pro-social mode cost inflicted to the entire network is minimised by each node
Cn(R) = ∑
k
Rkn +∑
k
CO(k, R)
Note that investment of other nodes is not entering the equation as it can not be influenced
by the acting node and will only introduce a constant factor to cost of every strategy. To
decide which strategy to adopt cost for all possible strategies need to be calculated. Strategy
with minimal cost is chosen. For this reason we don’t need to be concerned with a constant
factor added to the cost.
To gain some basic understanding of the model we consider some simplified scenarios
analytically. We do not aim to calculate final resource distribution analytically as the prob-
lem at hand is too complex to allow it. We rather seek to understand some aspects of the
decision making and prioritisation of investment recipients. To make our questions ana-
lytically tractable we need to impose some restrictions on the model. Those apply only to
the analytical solutions and will not be posed on computational model. Until the end of
this subsection we consider strategies in which only one entry of the investment vector rn
is changed at a time. Further the change ∆(rn)k is small and ∑m(rn)m + ∆(r)k ≤ ρn, mean-
ing node n owns enough resources to increase investment without affecting the rest of its
strategy. Beyond that we require a linear relation between susceptibility Qn and investment,
Qn = 1−∑m Rnm. While in most general case loops are allowed when paths in a network are
considered it is plausible to assume that agents using air traffic network avoid unnecessary
flights. Thus a path traversing same node multiple node is unlikely. This implies that an
agent leaving the source of infection will not return to it after a mere pleasure flight using a
different node as transit. Hence p∞(i|i) = 0 and the cost function for infection source sim-
plifies to Ci = ∑k Rki + (1− Γ)Qi. Under this circumstances infected only has two strategies:
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invest in self or refrain from using any resources for disease prevention. Thus below we will
not discuss the case of acting node n = i as the solution for the source node is given above.
We consider a scenario in which a selfishly acting node n is comparing two strategies rn
and r∗n associated with cost Cn(R) and C
∗
n(R
∗). We can rewrite Cn(R) as C(rn) as investment
of nodes k 6= n remains unchanged during this calculation. We impose that both strategies
differ in investment in one node (r∗n)k = (rn)k + ∆(rn)k and remain equal for all others
(rn)m = (r∗n)m,m 6= n . Hence C
∗
n(r
∗
n) = Cn(rn + ∆(rn)k). We can use Taylor expansion to
calculate this:
C(r∗n) = C(rn) + ∆(rn)k − CIΓ
∑ω∈Ω p(ω)
Qk
∆(rn)k
with ∑m Rnm ∈ [0, 1] and thus Qn ∈ [0, 1], Ω = Ωk is a subset of paths which lead
from infected to acting node and traverse node k. For detailed derivation see Appendix 8.4.
Change of strategy imposes two sources of cost change: difference in invested resources and
change of import probability. In calculations below we define that ∆Rkn > 0.
Using derived formula we can compare discrete strategic decisions. Assume node n is
comparing two strategies as outlined above. Additionally Cn(r∗n) < Cn(rn), thus r
∗
n is a better
strategy. Using the formula derived by Taylor expansion we can calculate the necessary
conditions. For the sake of clarity only final results will be presented here, for more detailed
derivation see section 8.5. Condition for r∗n to be superior is as follows:
Qk
CIΓ
< ∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)
Multiple insights can be generated from the above formula. Strategy r∗n is more likely to be
beneficial when cost of disease import is high or high fraction of infected is leaving the source.
This lies in line with the expectations that no interventions are needed when disease is mild or
if infectious population is confined at the source. Further if Qk > CIΓ investment in k is never
a beneficial strategy, which means that if Qk is pushed to a low, but non-zero value further
investment is disadvantageous. Hence CIΓ < 1 provides a general threshold below which
no investment will be observed among non-source nodes. Further higher probability of case
importation also makes strategy r∗n more beneficial. Note that susceptibility of recipient of
investment Qk and import probability ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) are not independent and the latter can be
rewritten as QkQnqn ∑ω∈Ω ∏
L
m=1 Smm−1 ∏m∈ω;m 6=kQm and hence Qk can be eliminated from
the equation. Thus exact value of Qk at the moment of decision making does not influence
decision making. Note that above is valid inside the boundaries Qk ∈ [0, 1] and under the
assumption of linear function of Qk.
Another important facet to understand is the prioritisation of nodes when it comes to
investment. Using same tools as described above we can derive condition for node b to be
a better fit for investment than node a. Assume node n has a strategy rn, from which it
considers to deviate. There are two alternative strategies r′n and r
∗
n which differ from the
default by ∆(rn)a. Strategy r′n directs more investment to node a, thus (r
′
n)a = (rn)a + ∆(rn)a
and (r′n)m = (rn)m for m 6= a. In strategy r
∗
n additional investment is donated to node b, thus
(r∗n)b = (rn)b + ∆(rn)b and (r
∗
n)m = (rn)m for m 6= b. Further Cn(r
′
n) > Cn(r
∗
n), meaning that
strategy r∗n is the preferable strategy. For simplicity we assume that ∆(rn)a = ∆(rn)b. Using
Taylor expansion we can derive conditions for above to be true.
∑ω∈Ω(a) p(ω)
Qa
<
∑ω∈Ω(b) p(ω)
Qb
(6.3)
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where Ω(a) and Ω(b) are sets containing all transmission paths from source to acting node
which traverse nodes a and node b respectively. Thus investment decision is based solely
on import probabilities and susceptibilities of the nodes. If the susceptibility of nodes is
equal, best strategy is to invest in the node which set of paths accumulates higher import
probability. There are two nodes which lie in every transmission path, source node i and
acting node n. Hence Ω(i) = Ω(n) = Ω. As ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) ≥ ∑ω∈Ω(k) p(ω) for all k, i and n
are always among the best ones to invest in. If import probabilities via the nodes are equal
node with the lower susceptibility is preferred target. Consequently once a node received
investment it becomes a self-reinforcing process. Taken together these observations suggest
that infected node is the best candidate for investment. Source node is present in every
transmission path of every node, hence it is viable candidate for every player in the network.
Acting node itself is likely to be among investment candidates for himself only. Thus source
of infection has the capability to accumulate more donations than any other node and hence
cause its peers to follow the same strategy. While we can not prove this case on a general
topology we can show how probability for this to happen unfolds in the simple cases.
It is important to point out that it is possible for another node to be as good as source or
acting node, but assuming that all susceptibilities are equal no node can be a better candidate.
If the source is connected to the network via one link, its sole neighbour k is participating in
every path, thus Ω(k) = Ω. In this scenario this node is as likely to receive investment as the
source of investment. This outcome was observed in our simulations.
To study how probability of receiving investment changes with the position of the node
we consider first two steps of optimisation. At each time step a node on the network is chosen
with uniform probability. This node evaluates the situation and chooses the optimal strategy
to adopt. Constrains imposed above remain, meaning that only one entry of the strategy
vector can be changed at a time, susceptibility function is linear according to definition 6.1.
We further assume that at initiation of the model all nodes have the same susceptibility.
For further calculation we combine this assumption with the insights from above paragraph:
only nodes which are present in all transmission relevant paths are considered. For exact
derivation of formulas used in figure 6.2 see Appendix 8.6
First we look at investment on a chain of length L where source is placed at index 0. Chain
topology means that there is only one path, |Ω| = 1 and a node nk is present in transmission
path for all nodes with index larger than k. We can calculate the probability of each node
on the chain to receive investment in step t = 0 and t = 1. As can be seen in figure 6.2
A probability declines with the index of the node. Hence first node on the chain has the
highest probability to receive investment. First node is a viable option for all nodes on the
chain, while a node which lies further down the chain will not receive any investment from
nodes with smaller index. Once a node with low index k ≪ L has received investment at
t = 0, all nodes with index m > k will invest in this node at t = 1. If k = 0 any next chosen
node will dedicate its investment to source node. In this case equilibrium state is determined
at the first step of the simulation. Nonetheless there is non negligible probability that nodes
with higher index will receive investment and the network will settle in a different state.
A more general example is presented in fig. 6.2 B. We consider a network which consists
of two components N1 andN2. Node i is the source of disease and thus present in each trans-
mission relevant path. Node j connects components N1 and N2 and is present in each trans-
mission relevant path for nodes in componentN2. Thus i has a higher probability of receiving
investment as there are more nodes for which it is a viable choice. We can compare probabil-
ities of i and j receiving investment at t = 0 and t = 1 depending on the size of components.
When N1 is big compared to N2, i has considerable advantage over j. As N2 increases this
advantage is shrinking, but i retains considerably higher probability of receiving investment
even when N2 is ten times bigger than the first component. If at t = 0 i received investment
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Figure 6.2: Probability to receive investment with regard to position of receiving node on a
chain (A) and a more general topology (B). Lighter shade represents probability at t = 0,
darker shade at t = 1. In all cases we assume that susceptibilities of nodes are equal at t = 0.
Plot A shows probability distribution on chain with length L = 100. Probability steeply
declines with index of the node, being close to 0 for terminal nodes. Probability to receive
investment is highest for node with index 0. Decline is steeper for t = 1, which is a carry
over from t = 0: in case if node at index 0 received investment at t = 0 it is guaranteed
to receive investment in all subsequent steps. B shows the probability distribution for two
exemplary nodes on a general topology. Depicted network consists of two components N1
and N2, x-axis shows the quotient between sizes of those. Node i is the source of infection
and is present in every transmission relevant path to nodes in both network components.
Node j lies in all transmission paths from source to nodes in N2, but is not a valuable target
for investment of nodes in N1. If the second compartment of the network is negligibly small
compared to the first probability of i receiving investment heavily outweighs probability of
investment in j. Even if N2 is ten times of N1there is still a considerable gap between nodes
j and i. This becomes even more profound for t = 1.
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each subsequently chosen node will invest in i. Hence, similar to the chain, final equilibrium
is decided at first step. This is reflected by higher probability of i to receive investment at t =
1.
Figure 6.3: Schematic representation of
model’s implementation. After initial net-
work set up strategies of nodes are optimised
iteratively until system wide equilibrium is
reached. Latter is the case when no node has
changed its strategy over certain number of it-
erations. We ensure that in course of one itera-
tion strategies of all nodes have been updated.
Both cases presented in figure 6.2 show
that source node is expected to receive con-
siderable amount of donations. This fortifies
previous analytical results that source of in-
fection is an attractive target for resource al-
location. It also shows that early investment
in the source can determine the final state
of the model. While presented analytical re-
sults covered special cases we were able to
gain important insights in the behaviour of
the model. We have clear indications that
source of infection is a good candidate for
investment and is likely to be the node to
receive all investment. Note that we have
only considered outbreaks with one source
of infection. In the implementation of the
model we can restrict this assumptions and
study more complicated scenarios.
6.1.2 Implementation
To observe final strategies of nodes a numer-
ical solution of the model is necessary. Thus
a model as described in the previous section
was implemented. We run simulations on
different network topologies: square lattice,
Erdo˝s–Rényi and networks based on Delau-
nay triangulation. In the latter case nodes
were positioned at random in 2d-space and
links were introduced according to Delau-
nay triangulation rules. In all cases fluxes
over each link were set to be equal, i.e.
fij = 1 if there is a link connecting i and j
and 0 otherwise. Thus Pmn = 1/kn with kn
being degree of node n. Further all nodes
were initiated with Qn = 1 and available re-
sources according to ρn.
After initial network setup outbreak
node was chosen and its state was set to
’infected’. For each node a set of paths for
possible infection import was calculated. To
make it computationally feasible some re-
strictions had to be imposed on import risk
calculation. In the most general case amount
of paths connecting two nodes in a network
is infinite, new path can be created by introducing loops. It is plausible to assume that agents
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travelling via air transport will avoid unnecessary flights and never traverse a node more than
once. Thus we consider only paths without loops. Still remaining number of paths is very
high causing long computations times. Therefore all paths with probability p(ω) < 4 ∗ 10−4
were not considered during the calculation. For details on the implementation of the filtering
algorithm and choice of the threshold see 8.8.
After network setup is finished, strategies of nodes are updated in multiple iterative
rounds. In each round strategies of all nodes on the network are updated. Possible up-
date orders are random, where sequence of nodes is generated randomly, and hazard-based,
where sequence is determined by import probability allowing highly threatened nodes to
update the strategy first. To update own strategy acting node evaluates the cost of 100 strate-
gies generated according to a modified evolutionary strategy algorithm. Strategy bearing
minimal cost is adopted. For more details on the procedure see Appendix 8.8.1. Next node
according to the order rule is chosen to update its strategy. Note that after one round ev-
ery node has updated its strategy once, ensuring that all strategies are updated frequently.
Rounds are repeated until system reaches its final equilibrium. System was considered as
equilibrated when no change happened for sufficient amount of rounds.
It must be pointed out that in this implementation strategy of infected is trivial. By
disallowing paths with loops no importation back into the source was possible, hence for
outbreak origin only valuable strategy is to invest in self. We consider this behaviour natural
as an affected country will likely dedicate available resources to combat emergency which is
already happening inside of it.
In contrary to analytical solution multiple functions for susceptibility were tested com-
putationally. Implemented functions are shown in figure 6.4. Different functions represent
different challenges that can be faced when deploying countermeasures. Linear function
represents the simplest case where donation in directly translated into susceptibility decline.
While it is the simplest case it assumes no limitations on the receiving end. Power law func-
tion of a form Qn = 1− xεwith x = ∑k Rnk accounts for threshold and saturation phenomena.
If exponent ε is greater than one initial investment leads to slow susceptibility decline. Only
after certain amount of resources is accumulated susceptibility drops substantially. This sce-
nario reflects that arbitrary small amount of resources can not be used effectively. If the
exponent of the function is below one, susceptibility decreases very fast initially. At low
susceptibility disproportional amount of resources must be invested to push it further below.
This reflects that residual risk is difficult to eliminate, e.g. preventing asymptomatic cases
from travelling can be connected with unreasonable amount of resources. Sigmoidal function
reflects both limitations and can be thus considered as most realistic case. All functions can
be tuned by choice of parameters. Parameter estimation in this context is close to impossible,
hence we use power law and sigmoidal function to investigate general change introduced by
these functions. In all other cases we use the simplest function. Consequently linear function
is used if not stated otherwise.
Our model was implemented in Python and Julia. It is based on multiple third party
packages available through public repositories. Julia code used for the work at hand will be
made available on git repository. We established default values for all parameters and used
those if not stated otherwise. For full list see Appendix 8.9.3. All simulations were performed
on networks with 100 nodes and average degree of 4 when possible. The model was tested
using different network topologies, with very similar results. Networks were initiated wth
Qn = 1 and ρn = ρ for all n. If not stated otherwise full system has sufficient resources to
fully prevent the spreading by reducing susceptibility of the source to Qi = 0. The latter is not
guaranteed as resources suffice only if a significant fraction of nodes decides to participate in
investment. Further we allow some excess of resources to verify that donations were stopped
when Qi = 0.
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Figure 6.4: Implemented susceptibility functions: linear, power law and sigmoidal. In the
graph x = ∑n Rmn. Different functions account for different phenomena. Linear function
represents the simplest case where any amount of resources is directly translated into benefit.
Power law function accounts for two effects depending on the exponent a. If a > 1 arbitrary
small amount of investment will have no benefit, meaning that an initial threshold has to
be overcome before decline in susceptibility becomes steep. If a < 1 susceptibility drops
very fast but large amount of resources has to be used to conquer residual risk. Sigmoidal
function accounts for both, initial lag and slow decline at low susceptibility values.
6.2 Simulated results
In sections above we defined the model in mathematical terms and gained insights about
several special cases. Due to the complexity of the formulated model numerical simulations
are needed to investigate the final equilibrium. Using implementation described above we
conduct extensive simulations to scan parameter space and study how imposed restrictions
and different network topologies affect the final state. Both modes of the model were eval-
uated: pro-social and selfish. While the outcome of the model differs across the range of
some parameters it is not sensitive to the choice of network topology. Main determinant of
strategy of a node is the import probability from each source present in the network. Import
probability distribution depends on network under investigation, but network topology in
itself did not add any additional value to the analysis. Networks with profound small world
properties more often result in similar distances to multiple infected. This bears specific
implications which will be discussed below.
As has been suggested by analytical solution, when outbreak is seeded by one source it is
likely that source of infection will receive all donated resources. This was confirmed by nu-
merous simulations across a wide range of parameters in both modes, selfish and pro-social.
All nodes, which contributed resources for disease prevention, donated their resources to the
source node regardless of the optimisation mode as can be seen in figure 6.5 A. Two main
differences arose depending on whether agents were selfish or not. First, in pro-social case
infected i was fully immunised, meaning Qi ≅ 0. In a system of selfish agents susceptibility
of the infected node was pushed to a low value, but it never reached zero. This is consis-
tent with analytic findings, suggesting that there is a susceptibility threshold below which
investment is not beneficial for a selfish agent. Furthermore it indicates similar behaviour as
[103], where optimal allocation in selfish case is conflicting with globally optimal solution. Is
in the cited paper, agent interested in global good will invest more resources in the affected
region compared to a selfish player. Note that this finding is consistent across very distinct
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Figure 6.5: Example of resource allocation in a network with one infected. (A) Highlighted
node is the infected node i, colour intensity indicates the fraction of available resources ρn
donated by the node to the infected i. Black coloured links are part of the shortest path
tree, which is the collection of fastest routes from the infected to all other nodes. Upper row
shows optimisation results in selfish , lower row in pro-social mode. Same Delaunay-based
graph was used in both scenarios. There is enough resources in the system to fully suppress
disease spreading by reducing susceptibility of the infected Qi = 0. In selfish optimisation
case nodes invest all available resources if they invest any. In selfish equilibrium Qi > 0 in
all conducted simulations. In pro-social optimisation scenario more nodes participate in the
investment, but only view invest all available resources. In pro-social equilibrium Qi = 0. (B)
Same network as shown in A, nodes are arranged clockwise with decreasing import risk, red
highlighted node is the infected. Node size scales with individual cost at initiation. Blue lines
indicate links, red lines indicate investment with the arrow pointing towards the recipient. In
selfish scenario there is an import risk based cut off below which investment of resources is
not a valuable strategy. In pro-social scenario all nodes participate in investment regardless
of import risk.
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methodologies used to study the problem.
Second, in selfish case import probability to a node determines the strategy of the re-
spective node. Hence nodes in close proximity of the infected invest close to all available
resources. As can be seen in figure 6.5 B in pro-social case distance does not play a role.
As the cost of the entire network is optimised, it is not dependent on node’s position on the
network. Also on average each node donates less resources which is compensated by higher
participation of nodes in the investment. Note that this is a consequence of optimisation
algorithm, where nodes are likely to find suboptimal strategies with lower overall donation
amount in the first round, hence donating less than all available resources. Thus other nodes
fill the investment gap until full immunisation of the source. Note that this finding is in
stark contrast to perceived optimal and implemented reactions to pandemics by single coun-
tries. While countries often operate and think in egocentric means our model suggests that
this solution is far from optimal even in selfish scenario. Our results go in line with argu-
ments about how the interconnected nature of modern world has changed the patterns and
mechanisms of disease spreading and hence requires a different response.
Different susceptibility functions didn’t change this general behaviour. When using Power
law function with exponent ε > 1 system can settle in no-investment state if initial plateau of
the function is too broad. When resources of a single node are less than necessary to breach
the plateau no node will commit any resources. Implementing communication or adoption
of disadvantageous strategies with low probability can solve this issue. When ε < 1 pro-
social systems behaviour remains unchanged, in selfish system final state settles at higher
values of Qi as the payoff of investment decreases with decreasing susceptibility. Sigmoidal
susceptibility function combines both of the effects described above.
A more interesting picture arises when number of sources in the network increases. In
pro-social case general behaviour is not changed: resources are donated to infected until
those are fully immunised. Position of the donor does not influence the choice of the recipi-
ent. On contrary strategy of selfish nodes is determined by the import probability. Hence in-
troduction of new competing sources has a big impact on the final state of the system. Figure
6.6 A shows how increased number of outbreak sources changes the strategy distribution in
final state on a small square lattice. A lattice serves as a good visualisation since importation
probability corresponds strongly to the distance from infected in the visualisation. Number
of outbreak sources is increased from left to right, infected is marked by a star. Single source
realisation underlines what was stated in the previous paragraph. All allocated resources are
directed to the infected node. Remote nodes refrain from investment. When more than one
infected is present in the network self-investment arises as a dominant strategy for nodes,
which are equidistant to the sources and hence have similar import probability from both.
We can explain this strategic choice following the argument posed by equation 6.3. In case
of two remote outbreak sources node n itself is the only node which is present in all trans-
mission relevant paths. Hence it is likely that ∑ω∈Ω(n) p(ω) > ∑ω∈Ω(i) p(ω); i ∈ I where I
is the set containing all infected. Hence even if Qn > Qi; i ∈ I this does not outweigh the
difference in probability. With increasing number of infected number of nodes equidistant
to at least two is increasing and so does the fraction of self-investers in the network. This
visualisation enables us to observe regions of dominant strategies arising in the network.
In close proximity to the infected dominant strategy is to invest in it, in the middle of the
network self-investment is the strategy of choice. This demonstrates that egocentric strategy
can be the optimal choice, but certain requirements need to be fulfilled. Hence adopting
self-investment strategy without proper consideration is likely to be disadvantageous. When
observed on networks with less regular structure regions are less obvious in network repre-
sentation. Main finding remains the same on all types of networks: nodes whose threat is
dominated by one source are advised to invest in the respective source, nodes with similar
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Figure 6.6: Change in strategies with increasing number of infected in selfish mode. (A)
Change in resource distribution when additional infected are introduced into the network.
Infected are marked by stars, colour of the nodes shows investment in infected of the same
colour. Grey nodes are self-investers, white nodes do not contribute any resources. Darker
grey nodes on the right are following a strategy different from all previously mentioned.
Presented strategy distribution presented here is a result of simulation. Nodes in proximity
of an infected donate their resources to closest infected while nodes further away either
don’t invest or invest in self in case of more than one infected. The amount of self-investers
is increasing with increasing number of infected. Self-investment is the dominant strategy
for nodes which are at same risk from multiple infected. (B) Fraction of infected in the
network versus the investment strategies. I is the set containing all infected in the network,
N is the number of nodes in the network. Red line shows the fraction of nodes investing
in self, red shaded area is one standard deviation from the mean. Green line and shading
correspond to nodes investing in infected. Only a small fraction of infected is needed to
eliminate investment in the infected completely. Note that front region is subject to high
variability which will be discussed on page 90.
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import probabilities from multiple infected should self-investment.
Figure 6.6 B shows the change in strategy distribution of a selfish system when fraction of
infected is increased. Simulations were run on Erdo˝s–Rényi networks with 100 nodes, hence
|I|/N = 1 means one infected is in the network. Three percent are already sufficient to dra-
matically reduce amount of donations to the sources and five percent eliminate investment
in the infected fully. This observation has implications for pandemic disease prevention. It
highlights that once disease has spread or sufficient crises have accumulated across the net-
work self-investment might remain as the only viable strategy. Hence early alert and timely
negotiations about containment efforts can boost the amount of resources infected nodes will
receive.
Some parameters which are predetermined in a real world scenario can be manipulated
in our model. By varying maximal available resources we can change the wealth of the sys-
tem. The latter has big influence on the final state of the system in both, pro-social and selfish
modes. Figure 6.7 shows aggregated results from simulations on Erdo˝s–Rényi networks in
case of two outbreak sources. As outlined above import probability is the determining factor
when it comes to strategy of a node, hence in the plot nodes are positioned according to
initial import probabilities from infected i and k (x- and y-axis respectively). In each network
labels i and k were assigned so that in final state Qi < Qk. Colour reflects the strategy of
a node in final state: green and blue indicate investment in infected i and k respectively
and red shows self-investment. Mixed strategies are represented by RGB mixed colours, i.e.
strategy of investment in self and infected i corresponds to colour yellow and investment in
self and infected k corresponds to violet, with exact hue determined by fractions donated
to either node. Nonetheless these strategies are rarely observed, mostly in highly regular
networks like lattices. Rows show scenarios with different amount of system wide resources,
columns represent different optimisation modes. This plot reiterates the observation that
distance to infected does not determine the strategy in pro-social optimisation case. When
plenty resources are present in the network, meaning ∑n ρn ≫ 2 and hence are more than
sufficient to immunise both infected, susceptibility of both sources is pushed to zero in pro-
social optimisation. No segregation in zones of dominant strategies can be observed. When
amount of resources is reduced entire investment is directed to a single infected. It is con-
sistent with equation 6.3. Note that equation 6.3 was subject to multiple assumptions which
does not apply to simulations, but findings of the equation remain valid. In case of two com-
peting candidates for investment, the one with lower susceptibility is preferred. It is likely
that infected i, which receives the first donation, is the only node with Qi < 1 at t = 1. As
∑n p∞(n|i) = ∑n p∞(n|k) node i will be preferred for further investment until its susceptibil-
ity is pushed to zero. This finding is particularly interesting in the pro-social context: one
infected is being abandoned and all resources are concentrated on one source. From ethical
point of view this is a questionable decision, but our model suggest that it is optimal from
pure cost perspective. This is consistent with finding reported in [93] and [64], where the
question is addressed with a different methodology using two node system and evaluating
the cost as final number of infected. Nonetheless the conclusion drawn is that equilibrating
the infection load, analogous to immunising both nodes in parallel in our model, is the worst
strategy. Rowthorn et.al. find that the best strategy is to invest in the node with lesser in-
fection load and concentrate the resources on this node only. This is well in line with our
finding.
In selfish mode division into regions with different dominant strategies is very distinct.
Diagonal line shows region of equal import probability from both infected. As stated previ-
ously node i receives more investment than node k. It is evident that there is a high fraction
of nodes, which are at high threat from i and simultaneously low risk from k. Hence when
randomly picking first node to update the strategy it is more likely to choose a node with
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strong preference to invest in i. As explained above this reduction in susceptibility increases
the likelihood that i will receive further investment. Even when i will not receive investment
in the first step it is likely that subsequently chosen nodes still have stronger preference to
invest in i as k has only small basin of investment. When resources are scarce nodes in close
proximity of k possess too few resources to reduce susceptibility of this source enough to
facilitate investment from more remote nodes. Thus for nodes in the middle ground best
strategy lies in self-investment. Note that the region of self-investment is shifted towards
source k. This implies that certain sources will be at disadvantage due to their position on
the network. This can happen when one node is a hub and the second is peripheral. In
this case nodes close to peripheral infected are likely to be close to the hub, while there is
a substantial fraction of hub’s neighbours which is remote from the peripheral source. In
real world networks peripheral nodes often indicate developing countries, which suffer from
conflicts and have poor economies. Thus they are more reliant on external aid in case of
extraordinary events like big pandemics. Our results emphasise that in a selfish environ-
ment vulnerable countries are likely to be left behind. Hence an overarching organisation
with own resources like WHO, which is acting for a global good, is necessary to balance the
difference in donations.
When amount of available resources is increased self-investment is eliminated and in-
vestment in the infected becomes only dominant donation strategy. Note that the strategy
of nodes in proximity to i remains unchanged as they were already investing in the source.
Nodes which were self-investing in the low resources scenario, on the other hand, allocate
their resources to k when resource availability is increased. This effect can be attributed to
a stronger susceptibility reduction of k through wealthy neighbouring nodes. Its suscep-
tibility is decreased sufficiently to outweigh the difference in import probabilities of path
sets and make investment in k dominant strategy. Importantly this behavioural change does
not depend on the exact distribution of resources. We tested uniform and random distribu-
tion of maximal available resources as well as assignment of maximal resources proportional
to node’s degree. The outcome is not sensitive to this change and depends solely on the
amount of resources present in the entire system as shown in figure 6.8 B. Considering this
behaviour global non-profit organisations like WHO can facilitate the same effect. Donations
into outbreak sources which are not well connected to the rest of the network can prompt
self-investing nodes to reconsider their strategy, even when they act selfish. For this strategy
to be exploited good knowledge of network structure and import probabilities is needed.
In both selfish scenarios we also observe a distinct region of nodes refraining from any
kind of investment. For nodes in this region import probability from either source lies below
a certain threshold. Note that there is a linear threshold with respect to each infected, applied
independently and a less linear threshold applied to nodes which self-invest. We see this as
an indicator that investment in one source does not influence the import probability from the
other substantially, hence both processes can be viewed as two separate decisions. Using first
derivative of the cost function we can calculate exact threshold for investment in any node m
Qm
CIΓ
= ∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)
where Ω is the set of transmission paths in which m is participating. Assuming that source k
participates in negligible fraction of relevant transmission paths from source i and vice versa
we can analytically recover the threshold value seen in the plot. Further we can conclude that
the threshold for investment in self will be a diagonal in the visualisation we have chosen
as target node is present in transmission paths from both infected. For full derivation see
Appendix Section 8.7.
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Figure 6.7: Pro-social and selfish optimisation with varying amount of resources. Each dot
in the plot is a node from an Erdo˝s–Rényi network (100 networks, 2 infected per network).
Infected nodes are not included in the plot. The colour of dots shows the strategy: self-
investment (red), investment in infected i (green) or investment in infected k (blue). Mixed
strategies are represented by RGB mixed colours. Dashed line shows region of equal import
probability from both infected, pi = pk. The axis show import probability from i an k.
Infected are labeled so that Qi < Qk in final state. Plenty resources setup:∑n ρn ≫ 2, disease
can be fully prevented. In this regime all invested resources are distributed between infected
in both optimisation modes. In pro-social scenario import risk posed to a node does not play
any role for its strategy decision. In selfish optimisation it is the major determining factor.
Scarce resources setup:∑n ρn < 2, disease can not be fully prevented. In case of pro-social
optimisation all resources are donated to one infected until he is fully immunised (Qi = 0).
The residue, if any, is donated to the second infected. When the agents are selfish self-
investment arises. In selfish scenario i receives considerably more investment than k. This
behaviour is discussed in Fig. 6.9. The linear threshold separating non-investors from nodes
investing in the infected is discussed on page 88.
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Cost of infection is another parameter, which can influence the amount of donations
directed to source of infection. Costly disease leads to increase in donations directed to the
source as can be seen in 6.8A. Subplot shows the shift in node fraction investing either in self
(red) or in one of the sources (green). Results are drawn from simulations on Erdo˝s–Rényi
networks in selfish optimisation mode and two outbreak sources. Other network topologies
lead to similar results. Not surprisingly at very low cost of importation any kind of donation
is disadvantageous. As import cost increase self-investment is the first strategy to arise. At
higher importation cost this strategy is displaced by investment in the source of infection.
Costly disease can reduce self-investment in the network, but it is not capable of eliminating
it.
Similar picture arises when system-wide resources are varied. While we do not define
explicitly what causes cost of importation to increase there are multiple possibilities for this.
A disease with high R0 can be more costly to bring under control after initial importation.
Severe progression of disease which requires intense treatment and special quarantine can
increase expected cost. Public panic connected with news about import cases can require
additional efforts to manage as has been observed in case of Ebola. These findings indicate
that increase in perceived severity of the disease should prompt countries to donate more
resources to source nodes. We would argue that it is not the observed behaviour and bigger
threat leads to higher isolation and self-centred countermeasure deployment. This is an im-
portant misconception which has to be cleared to enable efficient pandemic response. Further
our model shows that in a poor system self-investment is more prevalent, thus poor world-
wide economy will have negative impact on pandemic response regardless of the wealth
distribution. It is an important message which our model strongly supports.
Figure 6.8 C shows scatter plots explained above for three different system states. In
this plots labels k and i were assigned according to node index, hence without regard of
investment received. C1 depicts self-investment dominated regime, which can be observed
in system with low amount of resources. Note that this state can not be induced by low
importation cost alone. We can further observe that the linear threshold is softened in the
area of self investment as is predicted by the analytical result. Self-investment region reaches
outwards from the region of equal import probabilities spanning a broad region. When
system-wide resources are increased high fraction of self-investment is replaced by invest-
ment in one of the infected. In the range of equal import probability from either sources
self-investment remains dominant (C2). Nonetheless it can be eliminated almost completely
by high system-wide availability of resources or by a very costly disease as can be observed
in C3.
While averaged pictures are conclusive and bear important information we observe high
variability among different realisations of networks and source placement while keeping the
rest of the parameters constant. In few realisations infected nodes receive close to no invest-
ment. In several simulations only one of the two infected receives investment. In majority
of cases both infected receive high amount of donations. Figure 6.9 shows final amount of
donations granted to both sources across realisations with varying system-wide resources.
Each dot represents a single network realisation. Amount of investment needed to decrease
the susceptibility of a node to 0is 1. Therefore if ∑n;i∈I Rin = 2 both infected are unsus-
ceptible and disease can not spread. As expected from figure 6.8 at low resources infected
nodes receive no or very little resources. With increasing resource availability donations into
infected increase, with final states stretched out over a wide range. At superfluous resources
three distinct final states arise: ∑n;i∈I Rin = 0 , ∑n;i∈I Rin = 1 and ∑n;i∈I Rin = 2. When
systems are filtered according to their final state as indicated by black boxes in figure 6.9 and
plotted we can see a difference in import probability distribution. Scatter plot in figure 6.9
3 shows probability distribution in networks where both source nodes receive considerable
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Figure 6.8: Influence of cost of infection (A) and system-wide resources (B) on strategy
distribution within the network. Simulations were conducted on 100 Erdo˝s–Rényi networks
with 〈k〉 = 4, N = 100 and two infected (i, k) per parameter combination. Red line shows
the fraction of nodes investing in self, red shaded area is one standard deviation from the
mean. Green line and shading correspond to investment in infected. The reason for high
standard deviation is discussed on page 90. C shows a scatter plot of 100 realisations of
networks using same parameters as indicated by the number in B and A. Infected nodes are
not included in the scatter plot. The colour of \ dot shows the strategy: self-investment (red),
investment in infected i (green) or investment in infected k (blue). On the x- and y-axis is
the import risk from i and k respectively. Optimisation is selfish in all cases. Increasing cost
of disease or amount of resources available to the network promotes investment in infected.
The distribution of resources across nodes does not play a role. When the parameters are
set as in B1 or B2 they are not sufficient to completely eradicate the disease. In scenario B3
the eradication is possible. Self-investment in all cases arises in the region where import risk
from both infected is approximately equal. With growing amount of available resources self-
invester region shrinks, leaving nodes exactly at the diagonal last to change their strategy to
investment into infected.
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amount of investment. It can be seen that there are plenty nodes at high threat from source k
but not i and vice versa. We will call this set of nodes investment basin of i and k respectively.
As has been discussed previously presence of such nodes with strong incentive to invest into
one infected facilitates global investment into source by reducing its susceptibility. Similar
effect can be observed in figure 6.9 2 for source i but not for k. As indicated by blue triangle,
nodes in close proximity of k exclusively are missing.
Hence, there is a region of self-investors in broader region around source k. Source i in
contrary receives full investment from its neighbours and nodes at higher threat from i than
from k. In networks where infected receive no investment as shown in 6.9 1 all nodes are
concentrated around the middle ground with only few nodes in proximity of exclusively
one source. Hence we can conclude that source needs an investment basin to initiate
investment. If such is lacking region in proximity of such source is likely to self-invest. This
implies that two very central nodes as sources can promote self-investment in the entire
network. Note that proximity to infected alone is not sufficient to promote investment into a
source, it has to be coupled with low import probability from the second infected. There is
an exception to this rule which is discussed on page 94. Results discussed until now
indicate that there are three viable strategies: invest in self if node is at approximately same
risk from multiple infected, invest into infected if node is located in its investment basin or
do not invest if import risk is too low. For several reasons there can occur a situation, in
which one or multiple of those strategies are unavailable. For example if an outbreak is
happening in a country inaccessible for aid for political reasons or deployment of
countermeasures is impossible due to a conflict.
To study this we have simulated our model with several strategic restrictions. Bar charts in
figure 6.10 A represent the fraction of total system-wide resources donated to nodes in
different groups: green represents investment in infection sources, blue - direct neighbours
of sources (first shell), purple - second order neighbours (second shell), red - self-investers
and light grey shows investment different from listed possibilities. Dark grey bar indicates
the total amount of donated resources. Note that the height of the total investment bar can
be lower than the sum of all remaining bars from the chart. Nodes can belong to multiple
categories at the same time hence contributing to multiple bars simultaneously. These
simulations were performed on Erdo˝s–Rényi networks. Simulations on a square lattice with
otherwise equal parameters are shown in 6.10 B. Colour intensity indicates the amount of
resources on a logarithmic scale received by the node. Figure 6.10 1 shows default model
regime with no restrictions. In both selfish and pro-social optimisation modes main fraction
of investment is directed to infection sources. It is considerably higher in pro-social
optimisation mode. In selfish mode minor fraction of self-investment is present with total
investment amount lower than in pro-social optimisation. This behaviour can be observed
on lattice as well, where both optimisation methods result in same distribution.
In figure 6.10 2 investment in infected is unavailable as a strategy. Selfish system imme-
diately evades to self-investment, with minor fraction of donations to direct neighbours of
the source. When optimised pro-socially investment is shifted to the first shell neighbours
and total amount of investment is increased to 100% of available resources. Higher amount
of investment is necessary since first shell of the source is comprised of multiple nodes, thus
many nodes have to be immunised to achieve full disease containment. When simulated on
lattice selfish and pro social outcomes are similar: in both cases high amount of resources is
directed to first shell neighbours. This can be caused by low number of direct neighbours
in this particular setup. In selfish case some nodes in middle ground of the network receive
resources, presumably through self-investment. Note that during selfish optimisation both
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Figure 6.9: Amount of investment into infected in final state of different realisation of
Erdo˝s–Rényi networks (left) and strategy distribution with respect to node position (right).
Left: Each dot represents one network realisation, ρk are resources available to a single node,
Rin is the investment of node n in node i ∈ I , I is a set containing both infected of the
network. Amount of investment needed to decrease the susceptibility of a single node to 0is
1. Therefore if ∑n;i∈I Rin = 2 both infected are fully immunised. At higher values of system-
wide resources there are three most abundant equilibria: ∑n;i∈I Rin = 0 , ∑n;i∈I Rin = 1 and
∑n;i∈I Rin = 2. Scatterplots on the right are derived from networks in a respective equi-
librium (marked by black numbered boxes). 1, 2, 3: Each dot in the scatter plot is a node
from a network. Infected nodes are not included in the plot. Colour of the dot shows the
strategy: self-investment (red), investment in infected i (green) or investment in infected k
(blue). Dashed line shows pi = pk. On x- and y-axis are import risk from i and k respectively.
Networks in 1 lack nodes that are threatened by infected i, but not k (marked by green tri-
angle) and vice versa (blue triangle), all nodes refrain to self-investment. Networks in 2 lack
nodes threatened by k and not i(marked by blue triangle). Nodes for which reverse is true
are present, they invest in i. In equilibrium 3 nodes from both sides of the spectrum are in
the network, self-investment is adopted by minority. This leads to conclusion that an initial
reduction of susceptibility of the infected is needed to make investment in it a beneficial
strategy for nodes closer to the diagonal. If this initial seed of a group with strong incentive
to invest in infected is lacking nodes prefer to invest in self.
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neighbours of source are immunised equally. In pro-social mode one neighbour’s susceptibil-
ity is pushed to zero while the second receives considerably less resources. This observation
is well in line with results shown in figure 6.7, where higher benefit is gained by investing in
node with low susceptibility. Note that the concept analogous to ring vaccination arises nat-
urally in our model when investment into infected is not possible, whether due to political,
geographical reasons. Our model confirms that ring vaccination is a valid option with low
costs. Further our simulation show that this behaviour is beneficial not only in pro-social case
but also in selfish scenario. If number of first shell neighbours is low selfish agents utilise
immunisation of first shell neighbours, but change the strategy to self-investment if first shell
consists of high number of nodes.
Restricting self-investment has no impact on simulations with pro-social optimisation. In
selfish mode amount of donations to sources and total amount of investment are increased
when self-investment is unavailable. In this case selfish and pro-social investment equilibria
show little difference on all topologies. Thus self-investment and investment in the infected
are the two best strategies in selfish optimisation case which can substitute each other if
one of respective strategies is unavailable. Note that results from pro-social optimisation
underlie overall less fluctuation than results in selfish mode. It is not surprising as position of
infected nodes play no role for pro-social optimisation and in general cost functions of nodes
underlie less variability as they account for entire network. When both, self-investment and
investment in infected is restricted in pro-social system nodes of first shell receive all available
investment. In Erdo˝s–Rényi networks the outcome is equivalent to scenario with restricted
investment in infected only. On lattice a slightly different picture arises. Instead of first shell
neighbours a single second shell neighbour is immunised. One possible reason for this is
comparatively small size of the lattice used for visualisation purpose, N = 36. Both second
shell neighbours can not invest their resources in themselves, hence two nodes would have
to direct their resources to a different node, which is the second shell neighbour. This node
participates in a high fraction of paths and is hence a good target, especially because its
susceptibility can be further reduced by first shell neighbours of source.
A different distribution of resources is observed during selfish optimisation: entire in-
vestment is directed to first shell neighbours. We attribute this to high incentive of second
shell neighbours and nodes on the edge to invest in the first shell. This is also represented
in the bar plot derived from Erdo˝s–Rényi networks. Here investment in the second shell is
more prevalent, but there is a possibility that nodes which belong to first shell of one source
comprise second shell of the other. Overall investment is lower compared to case 2, when
only investment into source is restricted. It is probable, that for some nodes taking the risk
of importation of infected is less costly that a suboptimal investment into shells.
In previous simulations we have chosen positions for infection sources randomly. As has
been outlined above positioning of nodes with regard to each other can be relevant for the
outcome. Further we have made multiple analytical calculations assuming that source k does
not contribute considerably to transmission paths from source i and vice versa. In figure 6.11
we purposefully position nodes to violate this assumption. Figure 6.11 A shows scenario in
which infection sources are not connected by a link. In B we ensured that k and i are neigh-
bours, this is also reflected by the tighter cloud in the plot. Two interesting observations arise
from these simulations. First, linear border between non-investors and nodes contributing
resources to the infected remains unaffected in both scenarios. Calculation of the threshold
for i was based on assumption that reduction in susceptibility of k, Qk, does not change
p∞(n|i) for acting node n. This assumption is clearly violated when k and i are neighbours,
nonetheless the type and value of the threshold remain unchanged. Second, self investment
is not observed in simulations where nodes are direct neighbours, even though there is no
distinct basin of investment for either infected. It is likely that considerable fraction of paths
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Figure 6.10: Strategy distribution when strategic restrictions are imposed. 1 shows a regular
scenario. In 2 investment in the infected is prohibited, in 3 - self-investment, in 4 - investment
in self and infected. A shows strategy distribution from 100 realisations of Erdo˝s–Rényi
networks with size N = 100 and two sources. Green bars show investment in source, blue
bars - investment in direct neighbours of the infected (“1st shell”), purple bars - second
order neighbours (“2nd shell”), red bar - self-investers, light grey - other strategies, dark
grey - total investment. B shows a simulation on a 6 x 6 lattice using same parameters
as respective scenario on the left. Infected nodes are marked by stars. When restricted
from investment in source (2) selfish system react by increasing fraction of self-investers,
investment in 1st shell is minor. In pro-social scenario 1st shell is immunised (analogous
to ring vaccination). Due to low number of neighbours of sources lattice results deviate.
On lattice 1st shell is immunised in both optimisation modes. In selfish mode some self-
investment can be observed, investment granted to 1st shell neighbours is lower than in
pro-social mode. Restraining self-investment (3) has only minor impact on the final state
in both optimisation modes using given parameters. When both strategies are restricted (4)
selfish system donates considerable amount of resources to 1st shell. Investment in 2nd shell
can also be observed, presumably when receiving node is present in a high fraction of paths
from both infected. On lattice result differs from outcome in Erdo˝s–Rényi networks. When
optimised pro-socially second order neighbour of each infected lying on a diagonal between
infected is immunised. This node lies in highest fraction of paths from infected to remaining
nodes. Decreasing its susceptibility results in biggest decrease in global risk. As global risk
is not important in selfish optimisation this node receives no investment in selfish case.
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form i traverses k and vice versa, hence there is additional benefit of investment into each
source through import probability reduction from the other. Further overall investment in
the network where sources are neighbours is smaller due to interdependency of paths from
both sources. Thus to reduce overall import probability less investment into individual nodes
is necessary. The results were observerd with two or more neighbouring nodes as sources.
These observations have multiple implications with respect to real world scenario. On the
one hand when infection spreads from source to its neighbours on the network no sudden
jump in self investment will arise. Hence both sources can continue to rely on external aid.
On the other hand less resources overall will be contributed to combat the disease. Note that
many external factors are not accounted for by the model, e.g. increase in perceived risk
through spreading of the disease, which can in turn compensate for observed effect.
Simulation results enable a variety of observations and conclusions about our model.
They confirm analytical results suggesting that donation to infection sources and self invest-
ment in multi source case are most beneficial strategies if any investment is done. Further
they emphasis how model parameters and positioning of infection sources can change the
equilibrium state of the model. Simulations also enabled us to show that network topology
does not play a dominate role in defining the final distribution of strategies. The latter is
mainly determined by values and ratios of import probabilities from all infection sources in
the network.
6.3 Discussion
In this chapter we presented a model to study resource allocation problem in context of a
pandemic scenario. While remaining very general and simple this model includes a minimal
set of features needed to describe the problem and the challenges of decision making. It
is grounded in network theory, which proved to be a valuable tool to explore spreading
phenomena in general and disease spreading in particular [79, 80, 63, 69]. Second component,
based on game theory and optimisation, is ideal to describe decision making processes. Using
the model we described a system of interconnected selfish and pro-social agents optimising
their strategy in context of a pandemic outbreak.
While analytical findings were only possible by imposing constraints on the model they
provided important insight. Complemented by numerical simulations they provided a clear
picture about model’s behaviour and general governing principles. According to our model
main determinant of strategy of a node is the import probability and in case of multiple
sources the ratio of import probabilities. There are three dominant strategies: not to invest,
invest in one of the sources or in oneself. Latter is only present in multi-source outbreaks
and selfish optimisation mode. Which strategy is followed by a node is determined by its
position and position of the sources. Considerable differences between selfish and pro-social
optimisation are only observed in case of multiple infected. In outbreak scenario with one
source equilibrium states of optimisation modes only differ in the amount of donated re-
sources, but not in its recipient. In both cases all donations are directed to the source of
infection. This is in sharp contrast to the perceived optimal solution as it was observed dur-
ing recent outbreaks, where countries chose isolation and ramping up preparedness in their
own locale. We argue that our model provides evidence that this reaction is ineffective, even
from a selfish perspective. On contrary our model indicates that combined global aid is the
most effective strategy to minimise cost connected to imported cases. When multiple infec-
tion sources are introduced self-investment emerges as viable strategy for nodes in certain
regions of the network. Nevertheless, donation of resources to aid infected remains dominant
among nodes in its direct vicinity. During pro-social optimisation source of infection remains
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Figure 6.11: Influence of sources’ position on equilibrium state in selfish optimisation case.
Nodes i and k are infected. In A sources are not neighbours, in B sources are connected by
a link. All parameters are equal. Each dot in the scatter plot is a node from a network, each
plot contains results from simulations on 100 realisations of Erdo˝s–Rényi networks (N = 100).
Infected nodes are not included in the plot. Colour of dots shows strategy: self-investment
(red), investment in source i (green) or investment in source k (blue). Dashed line shows
pi = pk. On x- and y-axis are import risk from i and k respectively. When infected are direct
neighbours all nodes in the scatterplot are located close to the diagonal pi = pj, while the
nodes in A have a higher spread. In contrary to results showed in Fig. 6.9 no self-investment
can be observed in scenario B even if the nodes are distributed as close to diagonal. In case of
neighbouring infected investment into i reduces probability of disease importation from k as
it is present in a high fraction of transmission paths from k. Same is true for investment in k.
This increases the payoff of investment into either infected. By contrast to A self-investment
is not beneficial in scenario B.
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the only viable target for investment.
Further susceptibility of a node is playing an important role in determining how likely
a node is to receive investment. Nodes with low susceptibility are favoured for investment,
which means that receiving investment further increases the probability to receive additional
aid. This process hence exhibits self-reinforcing behaviour. In real world this can be exploited
by overarching organisations like WHO to promote desirable outcomes and increase dona-
tions in a specific country. By early commitment of resources an organisation can reduce
susceptibility of a node prior to decision making of its peers, hence making investment in
source an overall attractive strategy.
Apart from these node specific properties some global parameters can also promote cer-
tain strategies. Overall resources of the system change the final state of the model, where a
wealthy system shows a higher tendency to invest in the infected. This implies that raising
global wealth will result in more commitment to global disease control. At the same time
this indicates that financial crises and failing economies can start a spiral, where lack of aid
in case of severe outbreaks will leads to more failing economies. Note that throughout our
simulations distribution of resources played no role. This means that any failing economy
will result in decrease of overall commitment and increase the likelihood of self-investment
dominated final state. A counteracting effect is that diseases bearing high cost of import
cases promote investment in infection sources. Hence our model suggests that severe out-
breaks should generate more donations than mild diseases. Regrettably this behaviour is
rarely observed in case of real outbreaks. Outbreaks, that are perceived more dangerous
lead to isolation politics and egocentric thinking. We hope that our model can be used to
challenge this reactions. Intuitively, reduction in export rate Γ leads to lower risk and decline
in investment participation. This change can be driven externally by air traffic disruption
and reduction of flights or by disease itself. A fast onset and severe symptoms can prevent
infected individuals from travelling, thus changing the export rate.
We also demonstrated that position of nodes relative to each other and on the network
plays an important role. Network topology influences the distribution of import risk across
nodes, e.g. networks with pronounced small world properties contribute to shorter distances,
hubs can route infected to high number of nodes but they also introduce considerable drop in
import probability for each neighbour individually. Chain-like structures and bottlenecks can
divert investment from infected and lead to alternative final resource distributions. When dis-
ease sources are introduced independently certain combinations can promote self-investment
among subgroup of nodes. Sources lacking neighbours with high import probability from
source and low threat from other infected, lack persistent donors. Hence they rarely get
high amount of donations and nodes in their vicinity fall back to self-investment. A network
where both sources lack a donor core is dominated by self-investers. In real world scenar-
ios this can occur when one node is a major hub and the other is located on the periphery.
According to our results node on periphery will receive minimal amount of aid. Peripheral
location of a node often indicates developing economy, which is sensitive to disturbances
like large scale epidemics and hence is reliant on external help. As outlined above global
organisation like WHO can take on the role of donor core by contributing initial donations.
One exception from this general rule are neighbouring sources. In this set up each source
participates in a high fraction of transmission paths from the second infected, thus invest-
ment in it diminishes importation risk from both infected. In this setup self-investment is far
less prevalent, which means that disease spreading from source to neighbouring nodes does
not immediately result in increase of self-investment.
When node’s actions are restricted certain recurrent patterns arise. In selfish optimisation
mode when detained from investment in source the system always evades to self-investment.
In pro-social optimisation mode self-investment is not a beneficial strategy, even when invest-
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ment in the source is not an option. Instead neighbours of the source are immunised to act
as a protective barrier against disease export. This is analogous to the concept of ring vac-
cination, which is well known in public health. Nevertheless this strategy requires a much
bigger amount of resources to effectively contain the disease as, depending on the network
topology, degree of source can be high. In cases where sources have a very low degree their
neighbours can receive considerable amount of resources even in a selfish network.
The model at hand is a simplification, which does not include all facets of the real world.
While some of those will be difficult to capture in a model, like political relations, skewed risk
perception and public pressure, others can be implemented in the future, e.g differing import
cost for countries, explicit modelling of the spreading, link cutting, cheating behaviour and
different cost functions of notes in the same network (selfish or pro-social). Nonetheless
caution needs to be applied, as it is easy to overcomplicate a model. We see simplicity
of proposed methodology as a virtue rather than a limitation, as it is reduced to essential
features which are necessary to describe the problem with as little assumptions as possible.
Some general rules of action can be derived from it, like the lack of difference between
pro-social and selfish optimisation under specific circumstances or reduction in utility of
self-investment when importation cost are increasing. This emphasises how current regional,
national and egocentric thinking conflicts with optimal solution and can lead to suboptimal
outcome of pandemic for all participants of the network. We hope that our findings in
context of selfish optimisation can be used to persuade governments to rethink their strategic
assessments and also give overarching organisations hints on how to manipulate a selfish
network to proceed towards a more globally optimal solution.
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Chapter 7
Summary and outlook
Pandemics and worldwide outbreaks present a constant threat to society as a whole and to
countries situated in high risk regions, e.g. the regions which harbour big populations of
mosquitos or where people live in close contact with animals. Thus, it is a heavily researched
topic which experienced a boost in research output in the last decade. Insights in this field
are highly important for public health, economy and crisis response. Hence, we believe
that the results presented in the work at hand are of high relevance for current and future
pandemics and can aid decision making in context of the countermeasure deployment. In
this thesis we have presented a set of methods to study multiple facets of epidemic outbreaks.
We have proposed two context sensitive centrality measures to judge the role of a node in a
pandemic situation. Furthermore, we have introduced a method to estimate the threat posed
to a specific location by an outbreak. Finally, we established a framework to study resource
allocation in the context of pandemic situations and presented multiple general insights in
the process of pure cost based decision making. We have published implementation of these
algorithms in Julia and Python and encourage all interested parties to use proposed methods.
The methods presented in the work at hand are based upon the concept of effective
distance introduced by [17]. Brockmann et. al. propose that the likelihood of an agent to
travel across a link can be calculated using the flux over this link. From this probability
the effective distance between two neighbouring nodes can be calculated. Effective distances
along a path comprise the length of the respective path. Using these, an effective distance
based shortest path tree can be constructed. In subsequent paragraphs when using the terms
’shortest paths’ and ’shortest path trees’ we imply the effective distance as the underlying
metric.
As has been pointed out in the previous chapters, conventional centrality measures do not
take the specifics of the outbreak into account and thus assign a node the same importance
regardless of the outbreak situation. We present two context sensitive metrics, which report
the importance of a node, given a specific outbreak location or region. As we have demon-
strated in chapter 4, some nodes have a highly variable role in different outbreak scenarios.
First metric, scope, accounts for the number and size of the nodes located downstream from
the node on the effective distance tree. It characterises what fraction of the population of the
network is reached by passing through a particular node. Thus, an entry or exit screening of
passengers at this node will have protective effect for this fraction of global population. We
call nodes which have a very high scope value and thus are present in the most shortest paths,
gates. Second proposed metric, confluence, indicates the branching of the shortest path tree
downstream of the node in question. Hence if a node n has low confluence, the shortest path
tree remains a single branch after it passes through the node in question. For countermea-
sure deployment a subsequent node m can be considered, as by shifting the countermeasure
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downstream only the population of n is exposed to higher risk. This might be an unavoidable
loss when certain factors prevent factual or efficient deployment of countermeasures in node
n.
Both metrics can be used to coordinate containment efforts in an informed manner, with
the information tailored to the specific outbreak. A further benefit of these metrics is their
independence from any disease parameters. Hence, at early stages where these parameters
are not yet estimated or subject to strong variations our metrics can be readily used. As it is
important to react timely when a pandemic emerges, we see this as one of the key benefits of
the proposed metrics. At later stages of the pandemic or in the case of a pathogen surfacing
at multiple locations simultaneously, the proposed metrics can be averaged over all affected
locations, thus be adjusted to the situation at hand. We have demonstrated that the hubs can
be characterised according to their scope profile. Certain airports show high scope and thus
play an important role in case of outbreaks in narrow regions, while playing close to no role
during outbreaks in the majority of the world. We call these nodes specialists. Using scope
or confluence averaged over all possible outbreak locations is especially misleading for these
nodes, as the mean value misrepresents the importance in every scenario. A second type of
nodes are the generalists, which play a considerable role in outbreaks in most regions of the
world, but a rarely the dominant gate. Here an averaged value is of less risk. Nonetheless,
we strongly encourage to use all available information if possible. Hub nodes can be clus-
tered according to regions, which promote them to gates. This procedure creates well defined
groups of nodes which are relevant in case of an outbreak in a broad geographic region. It
also highlights relationships between the nodes. Some nodes fall in the cluster of their own
geographic region (e.g. Johannesburg O.R. Tambo is associated with the African cluster), oth-
ers display a strong connection to a different continent (e.g. Madrid Barajas airport, which
is assigned to the South-American cluster). Furthermore some historical ties between coun-
tries become apparent through effective distance trees and scope values. When considering
effective distance tree rooted at Freetown, Sierra Leone, London Heathrow airport gains a
very high scope. If the tree is rooted at Conakry, Guinea, Paris Charles de Gaulle takes on
a similar role. While geographically close, these countries have a different history. Sierra
Leone was tied to Great Britain, while Guinea was colonised by the French. This is reflected
in the scope value assigned to the respective airport.
We have demonstrated that our metric can be used for a specific outbreak situation by
applying it to theoretical and real-world scenarios. Using the scope, a ranking of nodes can
be created, which indicates important targets for countermeasure deployment. These targets
vary across presented scenarios, emphasising that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for
different pandemics. The ranking can be limited to the target airports from a certain region
to inform the officials of the respective region or any other entity with limited range of actions
or bound by other limitations. The simplicity and low computational cost of these metrics
make them easy to use as has been demonstrated on the world aviation network. Scope and
confluence can be applied to other transportation networks or networks accumulating fluxes
in the same fashion.
As became apparent in the Ebola crisis in 2014 there is still no consensus about how
import risk should be estimated. Elaborate mathematical models present a reliable approach
when parametrised successfully. The latter is a challenge as disease parameters, like R0, are
difficult to estimate in field conditions and tend to vary depending on the season, hygiene
and other conditions. Even when reliable estimates are available, extensive simulations need
knowledge to be implemented and require time and computational resources to complete.
We have proposed a metric based on effective distance trees, which allows to calculate the
distribution of risk across the network given a specific outbreak origin. Our approach exploits
the idea, that the probability of a traveller to traverse a link is proportional to the flux over
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the link. Additionally, we expect a traveller to end its journey at a node with the probability
proportional to the size and inversely proportional to the scope of the respective node. These
processes have an opposing trend. While the probability to travel to a proximate hub is high,
exit probability at a hub is very low. Opposite is true for leaf nodes of the effective distance
tree: agents rarely travel this far, but if they do they are guaranteed to exit there. Thus,
import risk is distributed across the network in a non trivial manner, so that neighbouring
hubs are often at lower risk than the second degree neighbours.
Just as the previous metrics, import risk is independent from disease parameters and can
be computed as soon as the outbreak origin is known. The local fluctuations of parameters
inside a country play no role at the scale at which import risk is estimated. Import risk is not
correlated to any conventional centrality measure as has been described in chapter 5. This
emphasises that no centrality measure is a good estimate for the threat posed to a node. As
described previously, centrality measures do not consider outbreak specific information, that
leads to under- or overestimation of risk in particular outbreak scenarios. We emphasise, that
import risk is highly sensitive to the outbreak origin, showing that a threat posed to a node
varies strongly and no universal statement can be made about the risk without knowing the
outbreak situation.
When outbreak location is not bound to a catchment area of the airport, but is distributed
across a wide region, the average import risk can be calculated to account for this. Further-
more import risk into a country, as opposed to an airport, can be calculated. While we advice
to use all available information if possible, averaged risk can highlight association of certain
airports to specific regions. We have introduced risk profiles for airports and countries com-
posed of averaged import risk from each of 22 regions as listed in [58]. Some countries are
associated with regions different than their own, e.g. USA is strongly associated with mul-
tiple regions in Oceania. Other countries have no clear association with any specific region,
e.g. Great Britain, or are threatened exclusively by their own region, e.g. South Africa. The
risk profiles show that airports inside one country can display distinct association patterns,
especially if the country has a wide geographical stretch.
To demonstrate how import risk can be utilised in an outbreak scenario we have calcu-
lated import risk distributions for multiple hypothetical and real-world outbreak scenarios.
When considering the worldwide ranking of endangered locations in a specific outbreak sce-
nario an interesting pattern arises. It becomes apparent that most endangered airports lie in
regions close to the outbreak, but not necessarily in the same region. It shows that the closest
neighbours are not always at highest risk. But we have to point out that the air transport
is not the most common type of travel to reach a close location. Thus, when judging risk
to geographically proximate locations additional transport networks or approximation mod-
els should be considered. Inside each region there exists a set of hubs, which always rank
highest. In Europe those are Frankfurt International (FRA), Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG),
London Heathrow (LHR) and Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS). Depending on the outbreak lo-
cation only a subset of these is observed in the worldwide top ten ranking, but over multiple
evaluated scenarios we confirmed that certain regional hubs are consistently at higher threat
than their peers. Interestingly, historical ties are also reflected in the distribution of import
risk. The import risk ranking for Ebola outbreak shows three European airports among the
top ten worldwide. Among them are CDG and Brussels-Zaventem. Both countries, France
and Belgium, have historical connection to Guinea, which was one of most severely affected
countries.
We must emphasise, that the import risk reflects the probability of a single infected,
who has left the country, to end its journey at the respective airport. It does not reflect
the absolute risk of the epidemic. If epidemic is not contained and continues for sufficient
amount of time eventually each country in the network is expected to have imported cases.
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Severity of the outbreak and the disease are likely to influence the number of infected exiting
the country. Furthermore, the number of asymptomatic cases can increase the amount of
infected travellers. Therefore import risk must be viewed as the distribution of risk across
the network rather than the final, absolute probability of case importation.
When the risks are established, actors on the network need to decide how to respond
to the epidemic at hand. We propose a simple model to study this question, which reveals
general laws observed over a broad spectrum of parameters, susceptibility gain functions
and network topologies. We have implemented two modes of optimisation: selfish and pro-
social, which reflect the attitude of the agents in the system. Pro-social optimisation can
be compared to the resource allocation of a global benevolent entity which aims to reduce
the cost inflicted to all nodes on the network. Results discussed below apply to the selfish
system if not explicitly stated otherwise. Players in selfish mode minimise only their own
cost, thus each node has a different cost function due to a different position on the network.
The determining factor for strategic decisions of selfish nodes is the import risk from the
outbreak sources. Consequently, depending on the parametrisation, for some nodes it is
optimal not to contribute any resources for the disease prevention. In pro-social case all nodes
optimise an identical cost function, therefore the conflict inherent to selfish optimisation is
not present here. If the outbreak is seeded by a single source, the latter is the only viable
target for resource allocation, regardless whether the optimisation is selfish or pro-social.
This is confirmed by computational and analytical results alike. The difference between
optimisation modes lies in the amount of the resources allocated to the infected. While
the susceptibility of the source is reduced to zero in pro-social optimisation, residual risk is
tolerated in a selfish system. The precise amount of tolerated residual risk depends on the
parameters of the system.
According to presented analytical results, the nodes which present viable targets for in-
vestment have two crucial properties. First, they contribute to a considerable subset of paths
which account for a high import probability. Second, they have a low susceptibility, thus
already exhibit a low probability of disease transmission across the node. Since investment
reduces the susceptibility, the process is self-reinforcing. It is evident that a node, which
already received any investment, will be favoured for further investment. Consequently, an
initial commitment of resources can influence the final equilibrium of the system. The lat-
ter is true for linear topologies, like chains and rings, but is not observed on graphs with
multiple possible transmission paths. The final equilibrium of such graphs is independent
from the initial conditions. On any topology there are at least two nodes which are present
in all possible transmission paths: the source of infection and the target node itself. While
all nodes share the infected as a viable investment target, it is unlikely that other nodes are
a good target for any node but itself. Following from the above, after multiple iterations the
source node is likely to have lower susceptibility than any other node in the network, making
it the most viable investment target in subsequent steps. When multiple sources are present
in the network the situation becomes more complex. Each source is a part of a subset of
paths, while the target node itself is present in all possible transmission routes. Neverthe-
less, source nodes are relevant to other nodes beside the target node, thus likely to receive
investment from a higher number of nodes.
While a multi-source system is not analytically solvable with reasonable effort, we can
observe its equilibrium in computational results. Multiple strategic regions in the network
emerge in this case, with most distinct changes in the selfish optimisation scenario. Similar to
[103], we observe a conflict of interest between selfish and pro-social optimum. As outlined
above, in pro-social case the position of the nodes plays no role in their investment decision.
The conclusion, that the source with lowest susceptibility presents a most favourable target,
is confirmed by the final equilibrium. Outbreak sources are immunised in a following order:
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first the susceptibility of a source presenting a higher threat to a higher number of nodes
is reduced to zero, only thereafter does the second source receive any resources. This is
consistent from observations made in different resource allocation models [64, 93].
In the selfish optimisation mode a more complicated picture arises. Nodes in close prox-
imity of an outbreak source and thus at high probability of case importation prefer to invest
in the respective source. Nodes which have approximately equal probabilities of case im-
portation from multiple sources prefer to invest in themselves. This is accordant with the
analytical insights derived for the general case. For a node which is equidistant to two
sources each source contributes to approximately 50% of the import probability. For nodes
in close proximity of a source the latter contributes to a higher fraction of import probability,
thus making investment in this source a favourable decision. In pro-social optimisation mode
the self-investment is never a preferable strategy for non-infected nodes. Our results indicate
that in most generic networks with random outbreak source selection the transmission paths
from one source rarely traverse any other infected node, thus the investment in any infected
has no significant influence on the import probability from other sources. A linear threshold,
separating the region of investment into a particular source and the region of non-investment,
can be observed in selfish mode simulations. This threshold is dependent only on the import
probability form that particular source and not any other infected. Using this as assumption
we have calculated the threshold value analytically. The exact value depends on multiple
model parameters: the cost of case importation and the probability of an infected to leave the
source.
Concluding from our model, some outbreak sources are likely to receive less investment
due to their position on the network. Usually a source has a basin of attraction for invest-
ment. In this region the import probability from the respective closest source is considerably
higher than from any other infected. Thus, it it favourable for nodes in this region to invest
in the closest source. In some networks one source lacks the core of this basin, e.g. if the
second source is well connected with the rest of the network while the first isn’t. In this case
nodes in proximity of the first infected turn to self-investment as the preferable strategy. This
considerably increases the fraction of self-investment in the network. Under specific circum-
stances nodes from both core basins can be lacking, in this case the entire network adopts
self-investment as its strategy. Nonetheless, when infection sources are direct neighbours, as
in case of a disease present in the catchment area of multiple airports of the same country,
self-investment is not the dominant strategy in the network. On the contrary, self-investment
is highly diminished. We attribute this effect to partial protection from case importation from
source i1 gained by investing in source i2 and vice versa.
Remaining parameters of the model also have a big influence on the distribution of strate-
gies in the final equilibrium. A disease which is associated with high importation cost leads
to a higher fraction of resources being allocated to the infection sources. Similar effect is
achieved by an increase in system-wide resources. The latter can be attributed to a higher
drop in susceptibility of the source achieved by the nodes inside of its investment basin.
While increasing disease cost can only reduce self-investment, increasing system-wide wealth
fully eradicates self-investment as a strategy.
When the nodes are restricted from following their preferred strategy multiple alterna-
tives arise. In general, when restricted from investment into the infected the pro-social play-
ers are more likely to employ a strategy resembling the ring vaccination. In this case the
resources are allocated to the neighbours of the outbreak sources, thus encapsulating the
infection inside the source. Selfish players, on the other hand, fall back to self-investment in
this case. When both, self-investment and investment into infected, are unavailable, strategies
in selfish and pro-social optimisation modes are similar, differing mainly in the amount of
allocated resources. Hence, our model shows that the difference between selfish and globally
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optimal solution has a considerable overlap in many scenarios.
Results presented in this work generate new insights about the risk and possible coun-
termeasures during a disease outbreak, which presents a threat to global community. This
work and proposed metrics contribute to the understanding of different roles the nodes can
play in a pandemic. It emphasises that neither the importance of nodes nor the import risk
in varying outbreak scenarios can be described by a single number. Our methodology is po-
sitioned in the middle ground between the precise, but difficult to parametrise, models and
oversimplified general metrics, which disregard all specifics of a particular scenario. Pro-
posed metrics can be applied at early stages of an outbreak and are computationally feasible,
since they do not require compute clusters or long time periods to be evaluated. Our metrics
help to navigate in a complicated scenario of a pandemic, make more informed decisions
and, ultimately, use available resources more efficiently.
By using the scope, transit nodes can be identified reliably and efforts to contain the
disease made by multiple downstream countries can be combined at the respective node. In
this case, even if the downstream countries do not own considerable amount of resources,
an effective response, e.g. state of the art passenger screening, still can be set in place. The
confluence can be used to identify and exploit the bottlenecks in the effective distance tree
and estimate the loss of protection of the respective population, if the countermeasures are
deployed in a more downstream node for any reason. Such reasons can be unstable situation
in the upstream country, refusal to accept aid or political sanctions. Whatever the reason
and the situation are, these metrics provide a base for more informed and justified decision
making.
We are convinced, that import risk is a reliable metric to use during the onset of a pan-
demic. Import risk accurately identifies the nodes at the highest threat from the outbreak,
setting clear priorities. Combined with methods to estimate the number of infected leaving a
country the import risk will reflect the risk of importation in a specific time period. However,
we emphasise that if an outbreak is not contained and disease ravages for a long time period
the import of cases to any country will be imminent. This is an important matter, which
is often disregarded when arguing about endemic and emerging pandemics in poor coun-
tries, which are unable to cope with the outbreak when left alone. Sophisticated models can
complement insights generated by the import risk at later stages, when disease parameters
are reliably estimated and disease dynamic is not changing. Otherwise, early modelling at-
tempts can lead to high variation in final prediction and be of limited use. Such projections,
when reported prematurely and misrepresented to the public, can undermine public trust
and subsequently divert public attention from an urgent crisis.
The import risk can be extended to account for an uncertain outbreak origin or a broad
spatial distribution of infected cases. Thus it can be used to evaluate threats of endemic dis-
eases or pandemics with an unequal burden of infected across multiple locations. Multiple
examples of such a situation exist, poliomyelitis and Zika outbreaks are the most pressing
ones. Probability distributions acquired through import risk calculations can be comple-
mented by additional information, like the habitat of Aedes mosquitos in case of Zika or
vaccination status of the population and the vaccine used in the case of polio. The prob-
abilistic nature of import risk makes it easy to incorporate this metric into further models.
The most obvious use of the import risk metric lies in informing the governments and global
organisations about import probability into countries, states and districts, as opposed to sin-
gle airports. In this case the import risk can be aggregated to reflect the threat for a broader
region, weighing different parts according to users needs. The weighing can be combined
with previously mentioned specifics of the local population or the environment. The coarse-
grained perspective can also disclose relationships between the geographical regions. We
have demonstrated, that certain regions export cases in their direct proximity, while others
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pose a threat almost uniformly distributed across the world. Thus, knowledge about the type
of export behaviour of the region can help to design a fitting response, well in advance or
timely after the outbreak.
Our results concerning the resource allocation demonstrate that the currently dominating
perception about resource hoarding and self investment as the safest way through a pan-
demic, are often false. We have shown that investment into infected is the best strategy in
many cases, selfish and pro-social. Thus, investment in the affected region is not an altruis-
tic act, but an efficient strategy of disease containment from a selfish perspective. As most
pandemics strike subsequently, the likelihood of a disease emerging in two locations simul-
taneously is low. Consequently, decision making mostly takes place in the context of a single
source outbreak. In such cases investment in the outbreak source is the optimal strategy for
any investing country. The importation of disease and an outbreak in the adjacent nodes
does not justify self-investment, it in fact makes it less beneficial. However, we have to point
out that contrary to the assumption in the model the decision process about catastrophic and
humanitarian aid can stretch over long time periods. Thus during the negotiations a new
catastrophe can arise and change the situation.
Our work confirms that the ring vaccination is a valid strategy, though it is not the opti-
mal one. Multiple circumstances can make investment in certain countries impossible as has
been demonstrated by Nigeria, Afghanistan and Pakistan [2, 44]. Our model indicates that
applying the ring vaccination is the second best strategy in this scenario when resources are
allocated pro-socially. Selfish optimum deviates from this, which is not relevant for diseases
like poliomyelitis, where the response and the resources are managed by the World Health
Organisation (WHO), with little participation of non-affected member states. While a high
scope of a node makes it a better target than a node with low scope, we do not observe any
investment in the high scope targets except for the infected himself. Our analytics suggest,
that to make investment in a node beneficial, its scope has to be close to one in its magnitude
or the susceptibility of the node must be low prior to the decision making. While investment
in high scope nodes can reduce import probability, it can never prevent the importation of
the disease if it is not contained, due to less probable existing paths. Consequently, invest-
ment in high scope can buy time rather than resolve the problem entirely. Nonetheless, in
circumstances that strongly violate the assumptions of our model the investment in high
scope nodes can be considered, e.g. the disease is expected to be contained in a fast manner,
so that probability reduction is a sufficient protection.
While in the work at hand the resource allocation was studied in context of a disease
outbreak, the methodology is sufficiently general to be applied to any spreading phenomena
which follows the rules of a contagion process. Many of such phenomena originate from
social field, e.g. popularity of brands, spreading of ideas, rumours and social uproar. Thus,
the study can be extended to any of these fields and our results apply if the spreading of
the process can be contained by means of resource commitment. For example, rumours
can be combated by the education and clarifications of facts. When we consider all these
phenomena as contagious processes in the model, simultaneous emergence of two outbreaks
becomes more likely.
As has been emphasised, the model at hand is not a classical public good game, but it
shows features of a public good dilemma. We can observe a disparity between the globally
optimal solution and the selfish optimum, where in the latter nodes contribute less to the
’public good’ than is required to achieve the global optimum. If multiple outbreaks arise
simultaneously, the optima diverge stronger. Emergence of self-investment is the feature of
a selfish system, this strategy is never optimal in pro-social context. Furthermore, certain
outbreak sources can be at disadvantage compared to other outbreak sources through their
position on the network. In these cases they will receive no investment, which is the worst
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possible scenario for pro-social optimisation. To counterbalance this, global benevolent actors
can contribute resources to the disadvantaged source to reduce its susceptibility. Our model
suggests that it will encourage additional investment into the respective outbreak origin. To
determine whether a node is at disadvantage the distribution of import probabilities need
to be calculated. As demonstrated in our work, the absence of core basin of investment is a
clear indicator for investment deficit in the final state.
Our model demonstrates that pure cost based approaches can pose ethical issues even
if optimised pro-socially. In case of two outbreak sources and low system-wide resources
the model identifies resource commitment to a single source as the optimal strategy, con-
sequently leaving the second outbreak source without aid. This poses an ethical dilemma
and the questions whether such a strategy should be implemented, even if it is optimal in
terms of cost. This strategy can can provoke opposition not just from the abandoned coun-
try alone, but from its neighbours, who are left with higher probability of case importation.
Furthermore, our model shows that the distribution of the resources, available for disease
containment, among the nodes of the network plays no role for the final amount of recourses
received by an outbreak source. The amount of resources in the system as a whole, on the
other hand, has a great influence on the outcome. A selfish system with low resources has
a strong tendency to self-investment. Such behaviour can drive the system into a weaker
economic state, since the economy of a country left without aid during a pandemic will take
severe damage. This is a spiralling process, leading to overall decrease in systems wealth and
stability.
In summary, we have presented tools to study epidemic outbreaks and prepare coun-
termeasures, prior or at early stage of a pandemic. While we have provided tools to plan
outbreak response, we also contributed to a more basic understanding of efficient resource
allocation. We encourage all parties to use presented insights to plan and coordinate deploy-
ment of pandemic countermeasures. We earnestly hope that this work will help to rebut the
local thinking when it comes to global pandemics, eliminate cost inefficient practices and
convince global players that aiding infected is a valid option, even from a selfish perspective.
There are multiple possibilities to expand and broaden the research based on the work
in this thesis. While we have proposed the metrics, they need to be evaluated on different
network topologies and disease models and be compared to existing intervention models.
Similar evaluations can be done with the resource allocation patterns reported by our model.
In this work, the resource allocation model was kept very simple, reduced to the features
indispensable to describe the studied phenomenon. After we have extensively studied the
simple model, additional features can be included. Our work was limited to the investigation
of the behaviour of network nodes who can act either selfishly or pro-social. To account for
the complex interplay between countries, NGOs and other donors, multiple non-connected,
altruistic agents can be added to the network. Also, a mixed network of agents with differ-
ent attitudes can to be investigated to quantify the effect of free-riding by the selfish agents.
As has been shown in multiple game theoretic studies, cooperation can arise in repeated
games with a punishment system in place. In context of resource allocation the possible
punishment includes loss of status, monetary penalties or exclusion from beneficial treaties.
It is an important question whether cooperation can be enforced by punishment in context
of resource allocation and pandemic countermeasures. Further elements of classical game
theory can be included in the model, e.g. cheating behaviour or coordination of players.
Players can also exhibit preferences in their willingness to donate resources to a certain af-
fected node, e.g. influenced by political relationships, controversies in cultural and political
systems. As resource allocation is rarely detached from other political matters, multi-game
view on the question of disease containment can facilitate valuable insights about the inter-
actions of many political and social processes at the same time scale. A big challenge which
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should be approached is the implementation of resource allocation and disease spreading on
similar time scales. Not only to account for extensive negotiations, but also to consider the
delays and logistical challenges connected with physical resource allocation.
Pandemic spreading and prevention remains an active and highly researched topic. Mul-
tiple approaches and methodologies coexist and, as has been demonstrated in this thesis,
often lead to very similar results. The benefit of new, groundbreaking insights in pandemic
research is high, with potential to save millions of lives. We hope that research presented in
this thesis will help achieving this ultimate goal.
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Chapter 8
Appendix
8.1 Relation between scope and betweenness centrality
From the basic logic, scope and betweenness centrality are very similar. We want to demon-
strate that under certain conditions they are equivalent up to a proportionality factor. Note
that shortest paths for both metrics need to be calculated based on effective distance. We
need to rewrite betweenness centrality in notation used for scope. Classic notation is
Cb(n) = ∑
st
χits
where χits = 1 if shortest path from s to t traverses i and 0 otherwise. In notation used for
scope betweenness centrality reads
Cb(n) =
N
∑
s=1
∑
k∈Θ
1
where Θ is the subset of nodes which is accessible on shortest path tree via node n. Scope is
defined as
sn(Υ) = ∑
i∈Υ
fi ∑
k∈Θ
ηk
First assumption is that cumulative flux over each node is equal, ∑k Fnk = F
∗ for all n. We
can further rewrite scope as
sn(Υ) =
F∗
Φ
∑
i∈Υ
∑
k∈Θ
1
Hence for the case of equal fluxes over all nodes and Υ = {0, 1, ...,N} we obtain following
proportionality
Cb(n) = sn(Υ)
Φ
F∗
8.2 Scope based clusters
Following list contains full description of region-based clusters presented in figure 4.7
1. Middle Africa, Western Africa, Eastern Africa
2. Southern Asia
3. Western Asia, Southern Asia
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4. Southern Africa
5. Central Asia
6. Northern Europe
7. Melanesia, Australia, New Zealand
8. South-Eastern Asia
9. Northern America
10. Central America
11. Western Europe
12. Northern America, Caribbean
13. Eastern Asia
14. Southern Europe
15. Eastern Europe
16. South America
8.3 Circumstances under which exit probability will not in-
crease along one branch
Exit probability is defined as qn(i) = ηn/sn(Ti). We consider a case qn−1(i) > qn(i) which leads
to a final formula
η − 1
ηn
>
sn−1
sn
As per definition sn−1 > sn, hence the right side is larger than one. Thus minimal condition
for exit probability to increase along a branch is that population of n − 1 is larger than
population of n.
8.4 Taylor expansion of the cost function
As defined in 6 the full cost function is
Cn(rn) = ∑
k
Rkn + (Γp∞(n|i) + (1− Γ)Qnδni)CI
We are interested in Cn(r∗n) where (r
∗
n)k = (rn)k + ∆(rn)k and (rn)m = (r
∗
n)m for all m 6= k.
Thus we use Taylor expansion to approximate it. Note that ∑m(rn)m < ρn, this way we
ensure that (rn)k is independent from (rn)m,m 6= k. Further we assume linear function of Q
of a form Qn = 1− ∑m Rnm and ∆(rn)k = ∆Rkn. First derivative of the cost function has a
form
∂Cn
∂(rn)k
= 1+ CI
(
Γ
∂p∞(n|i)
∂(rn)k
+ (1− Γ)δni
∂Qn
∂(rn)k
)
§8.5 Comparison of strategic decisions 113
Partial derivative of the import risk differs depending on what node is k. If k 6= n
∂p∞(n|i)
∂(rn)k
= Qnqn ∑
ω∈Ωk
(
L
∏
m=1
Smm−1
L
∏
m=1,m 6=k
Qm
)
∗ −1
= −
Qnqi
Qk
∑
ω∈Ωk
(
L
∏
m=1
Smm−1
L
∏
m=1
Qm
)
where Ωk is a set of paths containing traversing node k and ω = {n0, n1, ...nL} is a path of
length L from infected node i = n0 to the acting node n = nL and Smm−1 = Pmm−1(1− qm−1).
Second part of the equation differs depending on whether k = n or not. If n 6= k, ∂Qn/∂(rn)i =
0, otherwise it is 1. Further if k = n 6= i, δni = 0. In this case solution is equivalent to k 6= n.
All higher derivatives are equal to 0. As discussed in the main manuscript strategic solution
for the source node is trivial, hence we will not consider this case using Taylor expansion.
Solution of the Taylor expansion for k 6= i is as follows:
C(r∗n) = ∑
m
Rmn + ∆(rn)k +
[
Γ
(
p∞(n|i)−
Qnqn
Qk
∑
ω∈Ωk
L
∏
n=1
Sˆnn−1
)
+ (1− Γ)Qnδni
]
CI∆(rn)k
= C(rn) + ∆(rn)k − CIΓ
∑ω∈Ω p(ω)
Qk
∆(rn)k
where Sˆnm = (1− qm)PnmQm. Note that Qn(R) is discontinuous for ∑m Rnm > 1. Further
Rnm ≥ 0 for all m, n so that above formulas are defined in range ∑m Rnm ∈ [0, 1].
8.5 Comparison of strategic decisions
8.5.1 Invest in n
Assume node n has two possible strategies rn and r∗n with (r
∗
n)k = (rn)k + ∆(rn)k and
(r∗n)m = (rn)m for m 6= k. This means that strategy r
∗
n allocates more resources to node k
than strategy rn. Further Cn(r∗n) < Cn(rn), meaning that strategy r
∗
n is preferable one. Using
Taylor expansion above we can derive conditions for the above to be true.
C(rn) > C(rn) + ∆(rn)k − CIΓ
∑ω∈Ω p(ω)
Qk
∆(rn)k
1 < CIΓ
∑ω∈Ω p(ω)
Qk
Qk
CIΓ
< ∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)
Constrains imposed by Taylor expansion and model definition remain.
8.5.2 Invest in a or invest in b
Assume node n has a strategy rn, from which it considers to deviate. There are two alternative
strategies r′n and r
∗
n which differ from the default by ∆(rn)a. In strategy r
′
n more investment
is directed to node a, thus (r′n)a = (rn)a + ∆(rn)a and (r
′
n)m = (rn)m for m 6= a. In strategy r
∗
n
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additional investment is donated to node b, thus (r∗n)b = (rn)b + ∆(rn)b and (r
∗
n)m = (rn)m
for m 6= b. Further Cn(r′n) > Cn(r
∗
n), meaning that strategy r
∗
n is the preferable strategy. Using
Taylor expansion above we can derive conditions for the above to be true.
C(r′n) > C(r
∗
n)
C(rn) + ∆(rn)a − CIΓ
∑ω∈Ω(a) p(ω)
Qa
∆(rn)a > C(rn) + ∆(rn)a − CIΓ
∑ω∈Ω(b) p(ω)
Qb
∆(rn)a
∑ω∈Ω(a) p(ω)
Qa
<
∑ω∈Ω(b) p(ω)
Qb
Constrains imposed by Taylor expansion and model definition remain.
8.6 Probability to receive investment
8.6.1 Probabilities on a chain
Assume we have a chain of length L with infected node at index 0. At time step t = 0 all
nodes have equal susceptibilities. In case of a chain there is only one path on which disease
can spread, hence for every node na at index a all nodes nk with k ≤ a are valid targets
for investment. Note that we have proven using restriction that a node can only change its
investment in one node at a time. Nonetheless on a chain same is likely to be true if this
restriction is lifted. At each time step a node, which is given the opportunity to update its
strategy, is chosen with uniform probability over all nodes on the chain. Probability of an
acting node na to invest in any node nm with m ≤ a is 1/a and 0 for all nodes m > a. Hence
probability for each node nk to receive investment at time step t = 0 is
π(k, t = 0) =
1
L
(
1
k
+
1
k+ 1
+
1
k+ 2
+ ...+
1
L
)
=
1
L
(HL − Hk−1)
where HL and Hk−1 are harmonic series. To calculate probability that nk receives investment
at t = 1 two additional scenarios must be considered.
• At t = 0 node nm with m > n receives investment
1
L
L
∑
m=k+1
(HL − Hm−1)
• At t = 0 node nm with m < n receives investment
1
L
k−1
∑
m=1
(HL − Hk−1)
Note that due to posed restriction investment can be granted to only one node per step.
Depending on which scenario occurred at t = 0 subsequent actions will differ.
• If node nk received investment at t = 0 it is guaranteed to receive investment at t = 1
if a node na with a ≥ k is chosen as acting node. If a < k no investment in k will be
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performed
L− k+ 1
L
• If at t = 0 node nm with m > k received investment node nk has the probability to
receive resources from node na with k ≤ a < m if one of those is chosen to be the acting
node
m− k+ 1
L
(Hm−1 − Hk−1)
• If at time t = 0 a node nm with m < k was granted resources k will not receive any
investment in subsequent rounds
We can combine all of the above to calculate probability of nk receiving investment at t = 1
π(k, t = 1) =
1
L
(HL − Hk−1)
L− k+ 1
L
+
1
L
L
∑
m=k+1
(
(HL − Hm−1)
m− k+ 1
L
(Hm−1 − Hk−1)
)
=
L− n+ 1
L2
(HL − Hk−1) +
1
L2
L−1
∑
m=k
((m− k+ 2)(HL− Hm)(Hm− Hk−1))
8.6.2 Probabilities on a more general topology
Assume a general network consisting of outbreak source i, two components N1 and N2 and
a node j which connects components N1 and N2 as depicted in fig. 8.1. Hence node i is part
of all transmission relevant paths, while j is part of all transmission paths leading to nodes in
compartment N2. As in previous considerations when investment game is initiated all nodes
share the same susceptibility. At time step t = 0 one node na is chosen to update its strategy.
Following cases can arise when a node na is chosen to be acting node
• if node na ∈ N1 it is a viable strategy to invest in node i and himself with equal
probability
• if node na ∈ N2 it is a viable strategy to invest in node i, node j and himself with equal
probability
• if na = i only viable option is to invest in self
• if na = j viable options are node i and node j with equal probability
Following the cases above we can calculate the probability of nodes i and j to receive
investment
π(i, t = 0) =
1
N
(0.5|N1|+ 0.3|N2|+ 1+ 0.5)
π(j, t = 0) =
1
N
(0.3|N2|+ 0.5)
For subsequent step it matters whether i or j received investment at t = 0.
• If at t = 0 i received investment it will be always granted resources in subsequent steps
until its susceptibility drops low enough
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Figure 8.1: General network topology used to calculate probability to receive investment for
nodes i and j. N1 and N2 are network components containing an arbitrary number of nodes.
Node i is outbreak source, node j connects network components N1 andN2. Being the source
node i is present in all relevant transmission paths. Node j is present in all transmission paths
for nodes in component N2.
• If at t = 0 j received investment every acting node na ∈ N2 chosen at t = 1 will donate
its resources to j
• If any other nodes received investment and is drawn as acting node at t = 1 it will
donate further resources, if any, to itself
Following from the above we can derive probability of i and j to receive investment at time
step t = 1
π(i, t = 1) =π(i, t = 0) + (1− π(i, t = 0))
1
N
[π(j, t = 0) (0.5|N1|+ 1) +
0.5
|N1|
N
(0.5(|N1| − 1) + 1.5+ 0.3|N2|) +
0.3
|N2|
N
(0.5|N1|+ 1.5+ 0.3(|N2| − 1))
]
π(j, t = 1) =π(j, t = 1)
1
N
(|N2|+ 1) +
(1− π(j, t = 0)− π(i, t = 0))
1
N
[0.3(|N2| − 1) + 0.5]
8.7 Observed investment threshold
Using first derivative of the cost function we can calculate the extreme points of the function
with respect to one parameter. We are particularly interested in minima with respect to
investment into a specific node. These are the points where investment turns from beneficial
into disadvantageous.
∂C(rn)
∂(rn)k
= ∆(rn)k −
CIΓ
Qk
∑
ω∈Ω(k)
p(ω)
1
CIΓ
=
∑ω∈Ω(k) p(ω)
Qk
As already stated above following assumptions were made:
• linear susceptibility function of a form Qk = 1 − ∑n Qkn which is defined between
inside the interval [0, 1]
• investment into single nodes are independent, thus ∑k(rn)k ≪ ρn
• k ∈ I ∨ k 6= n where I is the set of infected nodes
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Figure 8.2: Screening of path probability threshold. A shows overall number of paths in-
cluded (blue) and the overall import probability accounted for by the paths included in the
calculation (green). Shaded area represents one standard deviation. Each threshold value
was evaluated on 100 randomly generated Erdo˝s–Rényi networks, source of the outbreak
was chosen at random, each network contained 100 nodes.Care was taken to ensure that no
nodes were disconnected from the network. As has been shown in 5.2 in Erdo˝s–Rényi long
paths have to be considered to account for high fraction of import risk.While number of paths
increases steadily accounted probability saturates at approximately 0.6. B shows the increase
in computational time and memory allocation. Both is increasing nearly exponentially.
8.8 Choice of path threshold and filtering algorithm
For computational purposes we have to limit the number of paths considered during the
calculation of import probability from source to the acting node. First we disregard all paths
containing loops. Second we introduce a threshold below which a path is not entering the
calculation. To incorporate both restrictions we use a modified version of Yen algorithm. Yen
algorithm relies on Dijkstra algorithm, which was develop to handle networks in which link
weights are additive. In our model path lengths are judged according to the probability of
an agent traversing those. Further exit probability is entering the calculation. Hence link
weights are multiplicative rather than additive. Our modified algorithm uses the probability
to proceed along a link Sij and translates it to a link weight wij = −log(Pij). It then follows a
classical Yen algorithm as described in [?]. Instead of finding k shortest paths, our modified
algorithm proceeds until first path below a threshold is reached. Threshold is defined as
T = −log(pt) where pt is a threshold in terms of probability. As soon as such a path is found
it is discarded, all paths above the threshold for current node are found. Hence algorithm
proceeds to the calculation of paths for the next node.
To decide on appropriate threshold we scanned the threshold monitoring the quality of
the approximation and its computational costs. Note that analytically ∑m(P
t)nm = 1 regard-
less of t. Hence if all paths are regarded we expect the probability to reach 1. As can be seen
in fig. 8.2 when paths are thresholded cumulative probability saturates at about 0.6, meaning
that the residual is constituted from a high number of paths with low probability. Com-
putational time increases nearly exponentially, hence small increase in probability coverage
comes at a high prise. To reduce computational time but harness highest possible probability
coverage we set the threshold pt = 4 ∗ 10−4.
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8.8.1 Modified evolutionary strategy algorithm
With increasing network size the strategy space for nodes grows, making it unfeasible to cal-
culate the exact optimal solution. Therefore a heuristical approach was used to optimise the
cost function. We used a modified version of an evolutionary strategy algorithm [16]. Base
algorithm generates strategy vectors randomly, evaluates costs and chooses the one with the
lowest. In a modified version a certain fraction of best scoring strategies is kept until the next
round. In subsequent round fraction of new strategies is produced by shuffling multiple best
performing strategies from previous round. Additionally some strategies are generated ran-
domly the same way as in original algorithm. Cost are evaluated for all generated strategies
and strategy with lowest cost is adopted.
Modified version of the algorithm operates with three sets of strategies: Θ, which contains
randomly generated strategies, Φ, which contains best performing strategies from previous
round, and Ψ, which is a set filled with strategies based on strategies from Φ. Assume a
node is reconsidering its strategy. To do this a number of strategies N is generated. In the
first round (t = 0) a set of strategies Θ is generated randomly where |Θ| = N. Cost for each
strategy are evaluated and the strategies are ranked accordingly. Best strategy is adopted
by the node. A number of top performing strategies are kept as set Φ with |Φ| = M. At
the second round t = 1 set Ψ is filled with strategies generated using strategies from Φ.
To do multiple strategies are chosen from set Φ as template strategies, e.g. r,r∗ and r′. A
new strategy r# is produced by drawing vector value at each index n from values with same
index in one of the template strategies, i.e. (r#)n ∼ U({rn, r∗n, r
′
n}) for all n. This procedure
is repeated to fill a set Ψ so that |Ψ| = L. Additional strategies are generated by random
to fill the set Θ so that Θ = N − M− L. Finally cost for all N strategies are evaluated, best
performing strategy is adopted by the node and all sets are cleared. Set Φ is filled with M
best performing strategies from the current round. The algorithm proceeds to the next node.
To ensure that a newly generated strategy complies to the requirement ∑k(rn)k = ρn
following procedure is employed. Strategy vector rn is initiated as a zero vector and filled
sequentially in random order. For each index i in the strategy vector a number is drawn from
uniform distribution so that x ∼ U([0, ρn]). If ∑k(rn)k + x ≤ ρn x is added to the vector at
index i, otherwise (rn)i = 0. Vector is filled in random order to avoid disproportionally low
values at high indices. This procedure is repeated until the vector is filled.
8.9 Tables
8.9.1 IATA code of 100 biggest airports
IATA
code
airport name IATA
code
airport name
AMS Amsterdam Airport Schiphol ARN Stockholm Arlanda Apt.
ATL Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson Intl.
Apt.
AUH Abu Dhabi International Apt.
BCN Barcelona–El Prat Apt. BKK Bangkok Suvarnabhumi Inter-
national Apt.
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IATA
code
airport name IATA
code
airport name
BNE Brisbane International Apt. BOG Bogotá El Dorado International
Apt.
BOM Mumbai Chhatrapati Shivaji
Maharaj Intl. Apt.
BOS Boston Logan International
Apt.
BRU Brussels International Apt. BSB Brasília International Apt.
BWI Baltimore–Washington Interna-
tional Apt.
CAN Guangzhou Baiyun Interna-
tional Apt.
CDG Paris Charles de Gaulle Apt. CGH Sao Paulo–Congonhas Apt.
CGK Jakarta Soekarno–Hatta Inter-
national Airport
CKG Chongqing Jiangbei Interna-
tional Apt.
CLT Charlotte Douglas Interna-
tional Apt.
CPH Copenhagen Kastrup Apt.
CTS Sapporo New Chitose Apt. CTU Chengdu Shuangliu Interna-
tional Apt.
DCA Washington Ronald Reagan
National Apt.
DEL Delhi Indira Gandhi Interna-
tional Apt.
DEN Denver International Apt. DFW Dallas/Fort Worth Interna-
tional Apt.
DME Moscow Domodedovo Apt. DOH Doha Hamad International
Apt.
DTW Detroit Wayne County Apt. DUB Dublin International Apt.
DUS Düsseldorf International Apt. DXB Dubai International Apt.
EWR Newark Liberty International
Apt.
FCO Rome Fiumicino Apt.
FLL Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood
Intl Apt
FRA Frankfurt International Apt.
FUK Fukuoka International Apt. GIG Rio de Janeiro–Antonio Carlos
Jobim Intl. Apt.
GMP Seoul Incheon International
Apt.
GRU Sao Paulo–Guarulhos Interna-
tional Apt.
HGH Hangzhou Xiaoshan Interna-
tional Apt.
HKG Hong Kong International Apt.
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IATA
code
airport name IATA
code
airport name
HND Tokyo Haneda International
Apt.
HNL Honolulu Daniel K. Inouye In-
ternational Apt.
IAD Washington Dulles Interna-
tional Apt.
IAH Houston George Bush Intercon-
tinental Apt.
ICN Seoul Incheon International
Apt.
IST Istanbul Atatürk Apt.
JED Jeddah King Abdulaziz Inter-
national Apt.
JFK New York J. F. Kennedy Inter-
national Apt.
JNB Johannesburg O.R. Tambo In-
ternational Apt.
KIX Osaka Kansai International
Apt.
KMG Kunming Wujiaba Interna-
tional Apt.
KUL Kuala Lumpur International
Apt.
LAS Las Vegas McCarran Interna-
tional Apt.
LAX Los Angeles International Apt.
LGA New York LaGuardia Apt. LGW London Gatwick Apt.
LHR London Heathrow Apt. MAD Madrid Adolfo Suarez–Barajas
Apt.
MAN Manchester International Apt. MCO Orlando International Apt.
MDW Chicago Midway International
Apt.
MEL Melbourne International Apt.
MEX Mexico City International Apt. MIA Miami International Apt.
MNL Manila Ninoy Aquino Interna-
tional Apt.
MSP Minneapolis International Apt.
MUC Munich International Apt. MXP Milan–Malpensa Apt.
NRT Tokyo Narita International Apt. ORD Chicago O’Hare International
Apt.
ORY Paris Orly Apt. OSL Oslo Gardermoen Apt.
PEK Beijing Capital International
Apt.
PHL Philadelphia International Apt.
PHX Phoenix Sky Harbor Interna-
tional Apt.
PMI Palma De Mallorca Apt.
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IATA
code
airport name IATA
code
airport name
PVG Shanghai Pudong International
Apt.
RUH Riyadh King Khalid Interna-
tional Apt.
SAN San Diego International Apt. SAW Istanbul Sabiha Gökçen Inter-
national Apt.
SEA Seattle–Tacoma International
Apt
SFO San Francisco International
Apt.
SGN Ho Chi Minh City Tan Son
Nhat Intl. Apt.
SHA Shanghai Hongqiao Interna-
tional Apt.
SIN Singapore Changi Apt. SLC Salt Lake City International
Apt.
SUB Surabaya Juanda International
Apt.
SVO Moscow Sheremetyevo Interna-
tional Apt.
SYD Sydney Kingsford Smith Apt. SZX Shenzhen Bao’an International
Apt.
TPE Taipei Taiwan Taoyuan Interna-
tional Apt.
TXL Berlin Tegel Apt.
VIE Vienna International Apt. XIY Xi’an Xianyang International
Apt.
XMN Xiamen Gaoqi International
Apt.
YVR Vancouver International Apt.
YYZ Toronto Pearson International
Apt.
ZRH Zurich Airport
Table 8.1: 100 biggest airports according to flux
8.9.2 List of generalist and specialist airports among 100 biggest on the
WAN
Generalists Specialists
Abu Dhabi International Apt. Baltimore–Washington International Apt.
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol Beijing Capital International Apt.
Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson International Apt. Bogotá El Dorado International Apt.
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Generalists Specialists
Bangkok Suvarnabhumi International Apt. Brasília International Apt.
Barcelona–El Prat Apt. Brisbane International Apt.
Berlin Tegel Apt. Chongqing Jiangbei International Apt.
Boston Logan International Apt. Copenhagen Kastrup Apt.
Brussels International Apt. Delhi Indira Gandhi International Apt.
Charlotte Douglas International Apt. Denver International Apt.
Chengdu Shuangliu International Apt. Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood Intl Apt
Chicago Midway International Apt. Hangzhou Xiaoshan International Apt.
Chicago O’Hare International Apt. Ho Chi Minh City Tan Son Nhat Intl. Apt.
Dallas/Fort Worth International Apt. Jakarta Soekarno–Hatta International Airport
Detroit Wayne County Apt. Johannesburg O.R. Tambo International Apt.
Doha Hamad International Apt. Kuala Lumpur International Apt.
Dubai International Apt. Toronto Pearson International Apt.
Dublin International Apt. Melbourne International Apt.
Düsseldorf International Apt. Mexico City International Apt.
Frankfurt International Apt. Moscow Sheremetyevo International Apt.
Fukuoka International Apt. Mumbai Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Intl.
Apt.
Guangzhou Baiyun International Apt. New York J. F. Kennedy International Apt.
Hong Kong International Apt. New York LaGuardia Apt.
Honolulu Daniel K. Inouye International Apt. Oslo Gardermoen Apt.
Houston George Bush Intercontinental Apt. Rio de Janeiro–Antonio Carlos Jobim Intl. Apt.
Istanbul Atatürk Apt. Riyadh King Khalid International Apt.
Istanbul Sabiha Gökçen International Apt. Rome Fiumicino Apt.
Jeddah King Abdulaziz International Apt. San Diego International Apt.
Kunming Wujiaba International Apt. Sao Paulo–Congonhas Apt.
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Generalists Specialists
Las Vegas McCarran International Apt. Sao Paulo–Guarulhos International Apt.
London Gatwick Apt. Seoul Gimpo International Apt.
London Heathrow Apt. Shanghai Hongqiao International Apt.
Los Angeles International Apt. Shenzhen Bao’an International Apt.
Madrid Adolfo Suarez–Barajas Apt. Stockholm Arlanda Apt.
Manchester International Apt. Surabaya Juanda International Apt.
Manila Ninoy Aquino International Apt. Tokyo Haneda International Apt.
Miami International Apt. Tokyo Narita International Apt.
Milan–Malpensa Apt. Washington Ronald Reagan National Apt.
Minneapolis–Saint Paul International Apt. Xi’an Xianyang International Apt.
Moscow Domodedovo Apt.
Munich International Apt.
Newark Liberty International Apt.
Orlando International Apt.
Osaka Kansai International Apt.
Palma De Mallorca Apt.
Paris Charles de Gaulle Apt.
Paris Orly Apt.
Philadelphia International Apt.
Phoenix Sky Harbor International Apt.
Salt Lake City International Apt.
San Francisco International Apt.
Sapporo New Chitose Apt.
Seattle–Tacoma International Apt
Seoul Incheon International Apt.
Shanghai Pudong International Apt.
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Generalists Specialists
Singapore Changi Apt.
Sydney Kingsford Smith Apt.
Taipei Taiwan Taoyuan International Apt.
Vancouver International Apt.
Vienna International Apt.
Washington Dulles International Apt.
Xiamen Gaoqi International Apt.
Zurich Airport
Table 8.2: Clusters according to airports profiles
8.9.3 Default parameter set
Table below describes parameters used in the model. Listed value is the default used when
nothing further is specified. Name used in Julia implementation is included in the last row.
Parameter default
value
description
Network size 100 Number of nodes in the network
Average degree 4 Average number of neighbors in the network
Susceptibility
function
linear function which converts donated resources into
susceptibility reduction
Update order random order in which nodes are chosen to update their
strategy at each step
Duration of strat-
egy deployment
10 to prevent oscillations and allow system to change
steadily strategy changes were adopted stepwise;
during the adaptation strategies were evaluated
and reconsidered as described above
Gamma 0.5 fraction of infected leaving the node
Path threshold 0.0004 Threshold below which paths were disregarded
Maximal rounds 200 Maximal number of rounds performed during the
simulation
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Parameter default
value
description
Number of gener-
ated strategies
100 Number of strategies N generated by the evolution-
ary strategy algorithm for each node
Number of best
strategies kept
30 Number of strategies M kept to be used in subse-
quent step
Number of shuf-
fled strategies
15 Number of strategies L which are generated by
shuffling best strategies of previous round
Number of tem-
plate strategies
3 Number of strategies to be used as template for
creation of shuffled strategies
Susceptibility
function exponent
1 Exponent of the susceptibility function; only con-
sidered when exponential susceptibility function is
used
Cost of infection
import
50 Cost connected to one imported case
Outbreak severity 20 Scaling factor to represent the severity of the out-
break
Single
source:
1.4/N
Amount of re-
sources
Double
source:
2.4/N
Amount of resources available to the system, N is
the number of nodes in the network; in default
state all nodes had equal amount of resources
Tripple
source:
3.4/N
Number of rounds
without change
before termination
20 Required number of rounds without strategy
changes before system is considered to have
reached it final steady state
Table 8.3: Default parameters used in the resource allocation model
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